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ABSTRACT
This study will provide an analytical account of the changing
practices and strategies for manpower utilisation in a single
shipyard (Govan) from the 1950/60's to the beginning of the 
1990's. This will reveal, at different phases, four distinct 
approaches to manpower utilisation strategies and their associate 
industrial relations process. These could be summarised as:-
Model One - the classical approach where
manpower utilisation strategy was based on the 
principle of dividing labour and characterised 
by the concept of job specialisation and 
manpower agreements that were concluded on the 
basis of national agreements.
Model Two - the scientific management approach 
where the strategy was to conclude local
agreements between management and the 
workforce that were characterised by the 
introduction of limited forms of functional 
flexibility and industrial engineering 
techniques.
Model Three - the flexibile work approach 
where the strategy was based on the concept of 
the 'Flexible Firm' and characterised by the 
move to conclude national agreements to enable 
the introduction of functional and numerical 
forms of flexible working.
Model Four - /.
xiv
Model Four - the new realism approach where 
the strategy was to recognise that manhours 
were the principal component of shipyard 
competitiveness and where local agreements 
were concluded between management and the 
shipyard workers that increased manpower 
effectiveness.
The account of models One to Three provides us with an 
understanding and detailed analysis of the systems of manpower 
utilisation and associated industrial relations practices adopted 
by management as the shipyard progressed through different 
economic, technological and organisational phases prior to 
Kvaerner's acquisition of the yard in 1988.
Model Four is the approach to manpower utilisation developed and 
implemented as part of this work, and this account details the 
ways in which the manpower and industrial relations problems were 
identified and resolved.
The differences between the approaches as depicted in the four 
models will be interpreted on the basis of a 'conceptual 
framework' developed for this purpose, and this 'toolbox' will 
enable us to present conclusions on the successive phases of 
change.
XV
INTRODUCTION
1. THE AIM
The Govan Shipyard was acquired by the Kvaerner Group, 
Norway's largest privately-owned commercial enterprise, from 
the state owned British Shipbuilding Corporation in August
1988. At the time of the acquisition the shipyard was
highly unprofitable and taking two to three times more 
manhours to build its ships than its international 
competitors. A contributory factor of these additional 
manhours was the way in which manpower was being utilised in 
the yard. As such, the shipyard's approach to manpower 
utilisation was an influential determinant of Govan's 
uncompetitiveness.
Developing and implementing an effective manpower 
utilisation policy aimed at making the best use of the 
shipyard's manpower resources and thereby reducing the 
manhours taken to build ships was, therefore, a major 
priority for the new management at the yard. However, the 
process of bringing viability to Govan required more than 
this. The internal manpower constraints associated with 
demarcation, restrictive working practices and overmanning, 
an inherent part of the shipyard's traditional approach to 
manpower utilisation, had to be changed. A prerequisite of 
this was altering the prevailing industrial relations system 
and the attitudes and values within it.
The simple fact was that the shipyard had been uncompetitive
for at least three decades and during that period massive 
numbers of shipyard workers in the U.K. and on Clydeside had 
lost their jobs. Those still in employment preserved their 
restrictive working practices as a means of protecting their 
j obs.
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The prevailing industrial relations system was the means by 
which this was achieved. The shipyard also suffered through 
a lack of strategic direction and an inconsistency in 
implementing corrective actions, particularly actions 
associated with manpower and industrial relations issues.
The manpower utilisation policy to be developed for Kvaerner 
Govan had, therefore, to be an integral part of an overall 
strategy aimed at achieving shipyard competitiveness and
thereby providing job security for the shipyard workers. 
Within that strategy the approach to manpower utilisation 
had to be aimed at changing the work ethic, shipyard 
culture, workforce attitudes and industrial relationships.
It also had to be aimed at increasing the competence and
effectiveness of the shipyard workers and management and 
thereby provide a base on which competitiveness will be 
achieved.
2. THE PLAN AND STRUCTURE
The aim of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the 
systems of manpower utilisation which preceded the Kvaerner 
acquisition of the Govan yard, providing an explanation of 
the deep seated nature of the Kvaerner inheritance; and to 
provide a detailed account of the ways in which Kvaerner 
identified the problems and set about resolving them. To 
achieve its aim, the thesis will be structured in four 
parts:-
Part One - will provide a brief historical
review of the Upper Clyde shipbuilding 
industry. The aim will be to provide an 
understanding of the industry, its shipyards 
and the economic influence these shipyards 
had on the Clydeside urban communities and 
the reason for the industry's decline. 
Chapter one will be devoted to this review.
xvii
Part Two - will be devoted to a set of
theoretical ideas underlying manpower 
utilisation and, in particular, the concepts 
of job specialisation and flexible working. 
The aim is to develop from theory a
'conceptual framework' to enable Govan's 
manpower utilisation developments from the 
1950's/60's onwards to be looked at with a 
set of analytical tools. This is designed to 
assist in explaining what management were 
trying to do when they changed their approach 
to manpower utilisation. Chapters two and 
three will be devoted to this.
Part Three - will provide an account of three 
approaches to manpower utilisation adopted 
and practiced at the Govan shipyard as it 
progressed through different economic, 
managerial and organisational considerations. 
The account will be framed in terms of three 
models of manpower utilisation broadly 
identified as the Classical Approach, the 
Scientific Management Approach and the 
Flexible Working Approach. Chapters four to 
nine will be devoted to this analysis.
Part Four - will provide an account of the
'New Realism' Approach to manpower 
utilisation developed and implemented at 
Kvaerner Govan. In particular the account 
will demonstrate where the manpower 
utilisation policy fits into the overall 
business strategy. The restrictive nature of 
working practices and manpower inhibitions 
will be described and quantified.
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The uniqueness of the prevailing industrial 
relations system will be outlined and the 
merits of the alternative industrial 
relations framework explained. Finally, the 
account will provide supporting data to 
confirm that the manpower utilisation policy 
and the associated 'action programmes' have 
improved manpower utilisation, manpower 
effectiveness and shipyard competitiveness, 
in the period down to the end of 1992.
The thesis will conclude by addressing a number of 
fundamental questions related to the four manpower 
utilisation models. They will be set within the context of 
recent contributions to the literature relating to manpower 
utilisation. The 'conceptual framework', developed earlier, 
will be used to draw conclusions on and to explain, on a 
model by model basis, the developments associated with the 
individual approaches.
PART
A Historial Review of The Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilding Industry
1.
PREFACE
Part one of the work is devoted to a historical review of the 
Upper Clyde shipbuilding industry. It will be concerned with:-
Firstly - The establishment of the Upper Clyde based 
industry and the reasons associated with the move by 
shipbuilders from their existing locations to the 
Upper Clyde.
Secondly - The shipyards who operated in the 1940's at 
a time when the industry was at its peak, and the 
economic importance of these shipyards to the 
Clydeside urban communities.
Thirdly - The shipyard closures of the 1950's and 
1960 's and the consequences of these on the community, 
in the terms of jobs and economical losses.
Fourthly - The reasons put forward for shipyard 
closures and the decline of shipbuilding on the Upper 
Reaches of the River Clyde.
Chapter one will be devoted to this review which is aimed at 
providing a basic understanding of the Upper Clyde shipbuilding 
industry, its shipyards, the economic influence these shipyards 
had on the Clydeside urban community and the reasons put forward 
for the industry's decline.
2.
CHAPTER 1; A HISTORICAL REVIEW
1. THE ESTABLISHMENT
Upper Clyde shipbuilding, an industry that, since its 
inception in the nineteen century to the late 1940's, 
expanded to such an extent that it provided the main 
employment for, and was the economic lifeline to, the urban 
communities of Clydeside. Indeed, the expansion was such 
that during this period, shipbuilding emerged as the leading 
industrial sector in the economy of the West of Scotland.
The Clyde based industry built up a tremendous reputation in 
the international shipbuilding market field and became 
renowned throughout the world for the quality of its 
products and the skill of its workforce. 'Clyde Built' 
became synonymous with high quality ships that were 
respected throughout the world for their reliability and 
performance.
The important question, therefore, is why of all the rivers 
in the United Kingdom did the River Clyde become a principal 
shipbuilding centre of excellence? There have been various 
explanations put forward to explain the reasons why 
shipbuilding was initially attracted to, and thereafter 
established, on the upper reaches of the Clyde and, indeed, 
to explain the emergence of shipbuilding as a leading sector 
in the economy of the West of Scotland.
According to Campbell (1971) the initial main determinants 
were twofold:-
Firstly, the changes associated with the 
construction of ships of iron and steel instead of 
wood.
Secondly, the changes associated with methods of 
propulsion, and in particular, the move away from 
sail to steam and diesel.
Campbell (1971) wrote:-
"Frequently these determinants in the first group 
are regarded as being more important to the growth 
of shipbuilding and following this reasoning it 
becomes possible to suggest that the rise of the 
iron and steel industries in the West of Scotland 
adequately explains the rise of shipbuilding on 
the Clyde." (Campbell 1971 Page Ref.5).
However, he suggested that there was a further determinate. 
He argues that the meteoric rise of the Scots industry was 
mainly dependent on its ability to keep wage costs lower 
than those in England. In effect, the shipbuilders moved to 
the Clyde to be nearer the source of their raw materials and 
to take advantage of the cost benefits of the lower wage 
rates which prevailed in the locality.
Pollard (1951), putting forward his explanation, identified 
three major factors which he suggested were associated with 
the establishment of shipbuilding on the Clyde's upper
reaches All were interlinked with the transformation from
wood to iron technology. These factors were:-
Firstly, raw materials, and in particular the
transport costs for iron, coal and steel.
Secondly, proximity to the shipping markets and in 
this context the sea-route linking Glasgow to the 
open sea was particularly important.
Thirdly, labour.
Like Campbell, he suggested that one of the principal 
determinates was the location of the shipyard raw materials 
and the advantages of locating the shipyard in close 
proximity to these materials. Pollard, however, adds a new 
determinate. He suggests that the deepening of the River 
Clyde and its transformation into a navigable sea route 
linking Glasgow to the open sea, meant that a shipyard 
located on the Clyde was in close proximity to the shipping 
market.
He further suggested that, in terms of labour, the key 
factor was not so much the actual wages levels, which he 
recognised as comprising only a third of total shipbuilding 
costs, but more the question of the malleability of labour. 
His key labour factor was the degree to which more extensive 
malleability could be introduced. In this context, factors 
such as, a lack of strong craft tradition and the lack of 
resistance to the introduction of new methods of production 
and organisation were of great importance.
"It is certain that the marked tendency for the 
industry to leave the large cities for the open 
banks of their rivers was, to some extent, at 
least due to a hope for a more intensive 
exploitation (malleability) of labour." (Pollard 
1951 Page Ref.6).
He, therefore, added a new dimension with regard to the 
"malleability" of labour as a factor in the siting of the 
shipbuilding industry on the upper reaches of the Clyde. 
He suggested that, in order to create the conditions for a 
greater malleability of labour, the general trend in the mid 
19th century was to move away from the large industrial 
towns. The areas where working practices had become 
restrictive and strong trade union influences were 
prevalent.
The East end of London was only one of the areas which fell 
victim of this general trend and this move had devastating 
effects on the shipbuilding community of that area.
"The removal of the iron shipbuilding trade from 
the River Thames was enough to reduce the whole 
East End of London to chronic pauperism." (Engles 
1949 Page Ref.6).
Glasgow and its district communities were major benefactors 
as industries, such as shipbuilding, moved away from the 
large industrial towns. The process of relocation took 
place in the 1850's and shipbuilding, in particular, was 
attracted to the now developed River Clyde with its open 
river banks and its navigable waterway linking Glasgow to 
the open sea.
The Upper Clyde shipbuilding industry expanded spectacularly 
in terms of competed tonnage from a level of 100,000 gross 
registered tonnes in 1864 to 500,000 gross registered tonnes 
in 1900. The expansion was also reflected in the growth of 
population in the districts around the shipyards.
Perhaps the growth of the district of Govan is as eloquent 
as any testimony to the expansion of the industry, and even 
its. emergence as a leading sector in the economy of the 
community. In the late 1850's, Fairfield was a farm on the 
south bank of the Clyde, immediately west of the village of 
Govan and within three miles of the City of Glasgow. Govan 
had a population of 9058 before the creation of the 
Fairfield Shipyard. Fifty years after its establishment in 
1907 the number of inhabitants was 93,093 as illustrated in 
figure 1.1.
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SOURCE: Campbell (1988)
Figure 1.1
This fast pattern of growth reflected the significant part 
that shipbuilding was playing in the provision of employment 
and business opportunities with more and more immigrant 
workers flocking to the Clydeside shipyards in the search 
for work. A major shipbuilding industry, with considerable 
international recognition was, therefore, established on the 
River Clyde. In the world shipbuilding market place, the 
colloquial term "Clyde Built" was generally understood to 
mean a high class product from a Clyde shipyard.
Accordingly, the main determinants for the establishment of 
this internationally recognised industry, based on the upper 
reaches of the River Clyde were:-
7.
a) The changes associated with methods of
construction and propulsion.
b) The lower wage rates prevailing on the Clyde 
as compared to the industrialised rivers of 
the 1850's .
c) The proximity of the River Clyde to the
shipping market of Glasgow.
d) The close proximity of the River to the
source of raw materials for wood and steel 
ships.
e) The malleability of labour.
The final determinant is particularly important in terms of 
the work of this project, as it was concerned with the
shipbuilders ability to introduce new methods of production, 
manpower utilisation and organisation.
2. THE SHIPYARDS
By the late 1940's, shipbuilding on the Upper Reaches of the 
River Clyde was thriving. Most of the districts of 
Glasgow, from the Broomielaw to Old Kilpatrick, had their 
own individual shipyard. Each shipyard had its own unique 
history and the local communities looked to the shipyard for 
employment and an economic lifeline.
In the Burgh of Partick and bordering on the Anderston 
district of Glasgow, were sited two fine shipbuilding and 
engineering companies, these being, A. & J. Inglis and D.W. 
Henderson. Their premises were located on the north bank 
of the River Clyde, just west of Yorkhill Quay, as 
illustrated in figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2
The district of Govan had within its boundaries two thriving 
shipbuilding and engineering companies. On the south bank 
of the River Clyde, immediately opposite A. & J. Inglis, was 
the site of Harland Wolff, - illustrated above. Harland's 
acquired the shipyard on 4th April 1912, from the London and 
Glasgow Shipbuilding and Engineering Company who had 
operated the site from 1864.
To the west of Harlands, on the south bank of the River 
Clyde, was the Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Company Limited, founded in 1864 by Randolf and Elder. 
Initially Randolf and Elder entered shipbuilding in 1885 by 
purchasing the shipyard known as the "Old Yard". However, 
some 5 years after purchase, with business steadily 
expanding, they moved to the more extensive premises at 
Fairfield. At the new works, John Elder laid out, with 
forethought, a shipyard to meet the requirements of the 
future - a fact which his successors have not failed to 
appreciate.
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The layout of the Fairfield Shipyard which is the sole 
remaining merchant shipyard on the Upper Reaches of the 
Clyde and is illustrated in figure 1.3.
F A I R F I E L D ' S  Y A RD L A Y O U T
SOURCE: Fairfield (1908)
Figure 1. 3
The shipyard was initially established under the management 
of William Pearce. Business at what was then John Elder. & 
Co. , went steadily forward and by 1871 the yard had added 
facilities for the construction of engines and boilerwork. 
In- 1887 the Company changed its name to Fairfield 
Shipbuilding and Engineering Company. Fairfield made 
shipbuilding history and helped establish the reputation of 
Clyde built ships, in the international market place, when 
the sister ships "Camporia" and Lucanic", built in 1893, 
became the fastest vessels of their time on the Atlantic 
Route.
Located on the south bank of the River Clyde, to the west of 
the Fairfield shipyard, in the Linthouse district of 
Glasgow, stood the shipyard known as Alexander Stephen and 
Son.
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This shipyard was set up in 1869 after Alexander Stephen 
purchased the Linthouse Estate. Stephen was no stranger to 
shipbuilding, or indeed the River Clyde, when he set up 
business at Linthouse. He had previously leased and traded 
for a shipyard at Kelvinhaugh. The layout of the Stephen 
shipyard is illustrated in figure 1.4.
L I N T H O U S E  Y A RD L A Y O U T
SOURCE: Carvel (1951)
Figure 1.4
In the Whiteinch district of Glasgow was, without doubt, one 
of the oldest shipbuilding companies on the Clyde. Located 
on the north bank of the river and occupying one of the most 
historical shipbuilding sites on the river. The location of 
Barclay Curie and Alexander Stephen is illustrated in figure 
1.5.
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Figure 1.5
To the west of the Barclay & Curie shipyard at Whiteinch, 
was a very extensive engineering works known as the North 
British Engine Works, where marine engines were built for 
ships constructed by a number of shipbuilders on the Clyde. 
The engine works had a wharf where the installation of 
propelling machinery could be carried out.
The Scotstoun district of Glasgow was well served by the 
shipbuilding industry in the late 1940's. No fewer than 
four of the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders were resident within 
its boundaries. To the west of the North British Engine 
Works, stood the Charles Connell and Coy. shipbuilders. 
The Scotstoun yard was founded in 1861 when Charles Connell 
left the Kelvinhaugh Shipyard of Alexander Stephen and Son 
to set up his own shipbuilding complex.
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The second of the Scotstoun's shipbuilders was the Scotstoun 
Iron Works which was better known as Meechan's Limited and 
was located to the west of the Charles Connell Shipyard. 
Meechan's were specialists in the building of ships 
lifeboats, a function, which, before the arrival of the 
larger sized passenger ships, was, for many years, carried 
out by a department of the larger shipbuilders All types 
of lifeboats were built at the yard, some with motor power 
and others without. Further down river was the ordnance 
works of Harland and Wolff and to the west of that stood the 
Blythswood shipyard. Though well known in the 1940's, 
Blythswood was a comparatively young shipyard. Founded on 
16th October 1919.
Next door to Blythswood, as illustrated in figure 1.5, stood 
Scotstoun's fourth and largest shipyard, the Yarrow 
Shipbuilding and Engineering Company. The sole surviving 
naval yard on the Upper Clyde and, who with the Kvaerner 
yard, are the only shipbuilding operation on the upper 
reaches of the Clyde in the 1990's. Founded at Poplar on 
the River Thames by Alfred Yarrow, the shipbuilders became 
famous for their admiralty work and moved to the River Clyde 
in 1907. To the west of Yarrows was the largest ship repair 
facility in Scotland and possibly the largest in Britian. 
Known as the Elderslie Dry Dock, the site was initially
opened in 1904 by Messrs. Shearer and Coy. and purchased by
Barclay Curie and Coy. in 1911.
In the Town of Renfrew, on the south bank of the River
Clyde, and 5 miles to the west of Glasgow, stood two of the
Clyde's specialist shipbuilders. The site of the first of
these shipyards, Lobnitz and Coy., was initially developed 
in 1847 by James Henderson and Son.
Next door to Lobnitz was the second of Renfrew's shipyards,
Messrs. William Simons who moved to the site in 1860.
Simons had previously established themselves as shipbuilders 
in 1812 on the lower reaches of the River Clyde at Greenock. 
From Greenock, Simons moved to Canada before finally 
settling at Renfrew.
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Across the river, on its north bank, in the town of 
Clydebank, stood the John Brown's Shipbuilders, illustrated 
in figure 1.6 below.
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Figure 1.6
This shipyard was originally developed in 1870 by brothers 
James and George Thomson. Two important dates in the 
history of Clydebank were associated with the launching of 
the Queen Mary in September 1934 and the Queen Elizabeth in 
September 1937. The fitting out of one of the ships is 
illustrated in figure 1.7.
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"Q UE EN E L I Z A B E T H "
SO UR CE: Shields (1949)
Figure 1. 7
The Upper Clyde shipbuilding industry, and its thirteen 
shipyards, were thriving towards the end of the 1940's. 
They provided around 45,000 employment opportunities direct, 
and almost three times that number of jobs indirectly, in 
industries associated with shipbuilding. Moreover,
nationally, the shipbuilding industry was providing 290,000 
direct jobs and three times that number in industries 
associated with building ships.
It can be concluded, therefore, that:-
a) The shipbuilding industry on the Upper Clyde 
consisted of 13 shipyards. These shipyards 
were located in the eight District 
communities between the Broomielaw to Old 
Kilpatrick.
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b) The shipyards provided 45,000 direct jobs and 
a substantial number of indirect jobs. 
Consequently, shipbuilding became a leading 
sector in the economy of the communities.
The shipbuilding industry, therefore, became a leading 
sector in the economy of the shipbuilding communities by 
providing the main source of employment.
3. SHIPYARD CLOSURES
The Upper Clyde shibpuilding industry was, as indicated 
previously, at its peak in the late 1940's. The thirteen 
shipyards were working 'flat out' to refurbish the shipping 
fleet lost during the second world war. This Clydeside 
shipbuilding 'boom', however, was not to last, and within a 
decade the industry was in decline.
Ironically, the Clydeside decline took place at a time when 
the international shipbuilding market, in terms of world 
output, was on the increase - illustrated in figure 1.8.
The decline of the shipbuilding industry was not confined to 
the Clyde based shipyards. There had been no expansion 
generally in the United Kingdom shipbuilding capacity to 
meet the increased world demand and the industry steadily 
lost its share of the market to the rest of the world. 
While the output of the United Kingdom shipbuilders, in ship 
tonnage, had remained fairly constant at around 1,300,000 
registered tonnes, the world output increased from 4,700,000 
tonnes in 1954 to around 40,000,000 tonnes by 1974. The 
United Kingdom's share of the market fell, therefore, from 
42.79% in 1954 to 3.49% in 1975.
A consequence of this loss of market share was, in some 
cases, shipyard closures and in others amalgamations, as an 
alternative to closure. The effects of the closures, on the 
Upper Clyde shipbuilding industry, were devastating, both to 
the industry, and to the communities they served.
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Figure 1.8
By 1966, only 5 of the 13 shipyards who operated in the late 
1940's continued to trade and the once thriving industry 
entered a serious stage of decline, as illustrated in figure 
1.9.
Decline of Upper Clyde 
Shipyards
Year
SOURCE: Shields (1948)
Figure 1. 9
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This decline started in 1957 when the two Renfrew yards, 
famous for building dredgers, amalgamated to become Simon & 
Lobnitz. Five years later, in 1962, the close of D. & W. 
Henderson, A. & J. Inglis, and Harland & Wolff were major 
blows to the communities of Partick and Govan, but worse was 
to follow. Renfrew lost its amalgamated shipyard of Simon 
& Lobnitz in 1963 and the Scotstoun district suffered the 
loss of two of its shipyards when firstly, Blythswood and 
then Meechans closed their doors in 1964. A further blow 
to the industry came when the giant Barclay Curie 
shipbuilding complex in Whiteinch closed in 1966.
Concern about the serious decline in the shipbuilding 
industry, on the upper reaches of the Clyde and throughout 
the United Kingdom, prompted the Government to set up the 
Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. 
A.R.M. Geddes. Its terms of reference were:-
"To examine the shipbuilding and marine engine 
industries and to establish what changes were 
necessary in organisation, in the methods of 
production and any other factors affecting the 
costs, to make them competitive in the world 
markets.M
The committee made recommendations on actions to be taken by 
the shipbuilding employers, trade unions, and Government, to 
bring about changes. Their findings were published in 1966 
under the title of the "Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee 
1965-66 Report", popularly known as the Geddes Report.
The main recommendation was the rationalisation of U.K. 
shipbuilding into four big and compact groups. One group 
was set up on the Upper Clyde, and brought about the 
amalgamation of shipyards, John Brown, Yarrow, Charles 
Connell, Alexander Stephen and Fairfield, to form Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders Limited. By this time Fairfield was the 
subject of an important industrial experiment, known as the 
'Fairfield Experiment', the details of which will be 
discussed later in this work.
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The new shipbuilding group was set up in 1968, but, by 1971, 
Yarrow withdrew from the consortium and re-established 
itself as an independent naval yard. One year later the 
consortium collapsed.
Fairfield, which had, by 1971, incorporated Alexander 
Stephen's into its complex, merged with Charles Connell's to 
become a new Company known as Govan Shipbuilders Limited. 
John Brown's the remaining member of the ill-fated U.C.S. 
consortium, was taken over by the oil rig builders Marathon 
(U.K.) Limited.
Accordingly, the consequences of the decline of the once 
thriving Upper Clyde shipbuilding industry were:-
a) A reduction in the number of shipyards from 
thirteen in the later 1940's to two by 1971.
b) Two remaining shipyards - the naval yard of 
Yarrows, and the merchant shipbuilders of 
Govan.
c) A new Govan Shipbuilders Limited which had, 
within its complex, the shipyards of 
Fairfield, Connell's and Stephen's.
The decline also had catastrophic consequences for the Upper 
Clyde shipbuilding communities, with the number of direct 
employment opportunities reduced from 45,000 in the late 
1940's to around 9,000 in 1971, while jobs in industry, 
associated with building ships, declined from 135,000 to 
27,000.
4. REASONS FOR DECLINE
There have been various reasons put forward to explain the 
decline of the shipbuilding industry. Some of the reasons 
have been put forward by individuals concerned about the 
future competitiveness of the industry.
One such individual who anticipated the industry's decline 
when he expressed his concern about the shipbuilding 
industry's ability to compete in the international market 
place. He was quoted as having said:-
"The peculiarly restrictive nature of British as 
opposed to foreign shipyard labour conditions has, 
in some instances, nullified serious attempts to 
raise the standards of shipbuilding costs and 
efficiency. As a consequence, the ability of 
British shipbuilders to compete successfully in 
foreign markets has been jeopardised." (Ayre 
1939 Page Ref.113).
Ayres, therefore, had the view that the industry's 
restrictive approach to manpower utilisation and flexibility 
adversly affected its ability to compete in the 
international market place. Ayres was, therefore, 
indicating that British shipbuilding industry's attempts to 
reduce the costs of its ships were being hampered by the age 
old problems of restrictive working practices, demarcation 
and over manning. In effect, the mechanisms which the 
shipyard workers were using to protect their jobs were 
placing the industry in an uncompetitive situation and thus 
placing jobs at risk.
A Government inspired report, "The Commission of Industrial 
Relations", chaired by George Woodcock, and set up in 1971, 
was considered highly relevant and instructive, in that, it 
assessed the industry's progress in productive bargaining 
and consultation. It also looked at developments in 
personnel functions and union organisation. Moreover, it 
examined the industry's record of disputes and assessed the 
contributions made nationally by procedural and demarcation 
agreements.
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"We are struck by the comparative narrowness of 
the area subject to joint determination by 
negotiation and consultation and to the wide area 
of common concern that are the subject to 
independent control by one side or another." 
(Woodcock 1971 Page Ref.140).
He expands on these comments by indicating that his 
committee considered this approach to industrial relations 
was a major factor of the industry's decline. He pointed out 
that both sides could improve industrial relations and 
achieve more of what they wanted by extending negotiations 
and consultations into the areas which were controlled 
independently.
Interwoven with the prevalence of this independent or 
individual action was what Woodcock termed as 
'sectionalisation'. This was simply the extent by which 
action was confined to an individual union or work group. 
This sectionalisation had its roots in a variety of factors, 
including job specialisation, union organisation and 
economic pressures. The report, therefore, identified 
shipbuilding's poor approach to industrial relations as .a 
major obstacle to the industry's performance. This poor 
approach manifesting itself in the areas of business 
associated with the effective use of manpower and 
demarcation issues.
A further significant report, commissioned by the Department 
of Trade and Industry, and produced by the consultancy firm 
of Booz, Allan and Hamilton International B.V, also put 
forward reasons for the industry's decline. The report 
'British Shipbuilders 1972', published in 1973, recognised 
that the performance of the United Kingdom's shipbuilding 
industry had not been impressive and the future outlook 
appeared bleak. It also recognised, that following Geddes 
(1966), funds had been provided for the restructuring of 
shipbuilding, but these funds were short term measures and 
that for the longer term, a more positive strategy was 
required.
The report highlighted a number of major problems facing 
shipbuilding, and indeed contributed to the industry's 
decline. These included a shortage of management ability, 
particularly in support functions, such as, personnel and 
labour relations. The industry's failure to plan adequately 
at both strategic and detail level. It also highlighted 
management's lack of close control over Company activities.
The Booz Allan Report added to the views already put forward 
from the decline and, perhaps, help explain the industrys 
poor approach to industrial relations. It highlighted a 
shortage of managerial competence, particularly in labour 
relations, as a principal reason for the industrys decline.
Castle (1988) views on the decline of the shipbuilding 
industry were restricted to the Clyde based shipyards. He 
suggested that the main reasons for the decline were:-
a) A reluctance to invest in new plant and
equipment.
b) Competitors adopting new mass production 
techniques.
c) Misjudgement of market needs.
d) Fixed price contracts.
He supported his view by suggesting that the Clyde shipyards 
failed to cash in on the post 1945 shipbuilding boom.
He pointed out that there was a marked reluctance by the 
shipbuilders, of Clydeside, to invest in new plant and 
equipment during their boom periods. In contrast to this,
competitors in Japan, West Germany and Scandinavia, did
invest and, as a result, adopted new mass production
techniques to ensure that they gained a market share of what 
had been hitherto a British dominated market.
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He also suggested the misjudgement of the market needs, as a 
critical factor of the industrys decline. On this Castle, 
was particularly critical. He stressed that even when the 
Clyde based shipyards realised that the shipbuilding boom in 
the tanker market was to be sustained, they continued to:-
a) Build liners when it became apparent that the 
future of long distance travel lay with air 
transport.
b) Built dredgers when up-river terminals were 
closing in favour of deep water ports.
c) Built ferries when roads, bridges and 
tunnels, were reducing the dependence on 
these.
Castle (1988) final view was that the Clyde shipyards were 
making hugh losses as a result of fixed priced contracts, 
poor labour relations, rising material costs, and in some 
cases, a reluctance to accept new technology.
Accordingly, can be concluded that amongst the factors 
associated with the decline of the Upper Clyde shipbuilding 
industry were:-
a) Poor approach to industrial relations, 
typified by the narrowness of joint 
consultation and negotiations on manpower 
issues.
b) Sectionalisation, which had its roots in 
union organisation and craft specialisation, 
and which restricted the effective use of 
manpower.
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c) Low productivity and high cost due to 
restrictive working practices and the 
ineffective use of shipyard resources.
d) Shortage of management ability, particularly 
in support functions such as personnel and 
industrial relations.
e) Lack of management control of Company 
activities and a failure to adequately plan 
at both strategic and detail level.
^  Reluctance to invest in new plant and
equipment at a time when competitors were 
adopting new mass production techniques.
g) Misjudgment of the market needs, insofar as 
the various shipyards continued to build 
specialist ships, when the tanker market was 
buoyant.
h) Fixed prices and unreliability of delivery 
dates.
Perhaps, however, the most significant factors were the
industrys poor approach to industrial relations which 
restricted the shipyard ability to utilise its manpower
effectively and, as such, was a major factor of the
industrys low productivity and uncompetitiveness.
PART TWO
The Theories Related to Manpower Utilisation
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PREFACE
Part two provides a 'conceptual framework' and is devoted to the 
theories related to manpower utilisation. In particular, part 
two is concerned with the theories associated with job
specialisation, the associated problems of co-ordination, 
flexible working and the concept of the flexible firm, all of 
which have a direct bearing on manpower utilisation and
management in the Govan Shipyard during its long and
distinguished history.
The aim is, therefore, to put into a meaningful format
Firstly - The theories associated with the division of 
labour and job specialisation and, in particular, the 
doctrines of Adam Smith. This part of the work, 
detailed in Chapter 2, also examines the negative side . 
of Adam Smith's doctrines and the challenges put 
forward to this concept of manpower utilisation.
Secondly - The alternatives to job specialisation and, 
in particular, the theories associated to flexible 
working and the concept of the flexible firm. This 
part of the work is illustrated in Chapter 3.
In a shipbuilding context the concept of job specialisation was 
synonymous with the craft and trade structures operated as the 
principal means of manpower utilisation for over 100 years, while 
the flexible working and the concept of the flexible firm had 
relevance to the manpower utilisation approaches adopted during 
the 'Fairfield Experiment' and British Shipbuilders.
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CHAPTER 2: JOB SPECIALISATION
1. INTRODUCTION
We are, during the course of this work, going to be looking 
at changing practices and strategies for manpower 
utilisation in a single shipyard from the 1950/60's to the 
beginning of the 1990's. This investigation will reveal, at 
different phases, four distinct approaches to manpower 
utilisation strategies and their associated industrial 
relations processes. These could be summarised as:-
Model One - the classical approach where manpower 
utilisation strategy was based on the principle of 
dividing labour and characterised by the concept 
of job specialisation and manpower agreement that 
were concluded on the basis of a national 
bargaining process.
Model Two - the scientific management approach 
where the strategy was to conclude local 
agreements between management and the workforce 
that were characterised by the introduction of 
limited forms of functional flexibility and 
industrial engineering techniques.
Model Three - the flexible working approach where 
the strategy was based on the concept of the 
'Flexible Firm' and characterised by the move to 
conclude national agreements to enable the 
introduction of function and numerical forms of 
flexible working.
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Model Four - the new realism approach where the 
strategy was to recognise that manhours were the 
principal component of shipyard competitiveness 
and where local agreements were concluded between 
management and the shipyard workers that increased 
manpower effectiveness.
The purpose of the investigation will be to provide an
understanding that will enable us to interpret the
difference between the models and the reasons for the 
change. In order to achieve this there needs to be some 
conceptual framework; some prerhetorical basis, which will 
inform the investigation. This is the task of the following 
two chapters.
A review of literature does not suggest any simple approach 
which will readily be appropriate to the specific case; thus 
what we are attempting here is to develop a selective, 
pragmatic framework focused on the tensions between
specialisation and flexibility which are, we would argue, at 
the heart of the problems of manpower strategy for
shipbuilding.
In the next two chapters, we review some of the relevant 
literature on specialisation and flexibility allied to an 
analysis of organisation or managerial requirements. This 
will provide a conceptual tool box, which we believe will 
permit a better understanding of the successive phases of 
change in the case study shipyard depicted as four separate 
models of manpower utilisation each with its own 
identifiable characteristics.
2. DIVISION OF LABOUR
The shipbuilding industry was an offspring of the Industrial 
Revolution. In general terms, the processes associated 
with the Industrial Revolution had begun spontaneously, not 
in response to any systematic doctrine.
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The doctrine was provided by Adam Smith who, in 1776, at a 
time when the Fairfield shipyard was still a green field, 
published his "Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations".
Essentially, Smith's doctrine had two apparent pillars:-
Firstly, enterprise should be free in that 
individuals and organisations should be left free 
to deal in open markets. This was in the belief 
that the "invisible hand" of the market place 
would ensure that in following their own self 
interest, they would necessarily work to the 
public good.
Secondly, labour or manpower should be divided 
because the process of division makes tasks 
simpler, easier to learn and more speedily carried 
out. Through division, the output of a number of 
people in a given time could be immensely 
multiplied, and this was an important contribution 
to economic growth.
To illustrate this point Smith cited an example from a very 
trifling manufacturer; but one in which the division of 
labour had been taken notice of - the trade of the 
pin-maker.
"A worker not educated to this business (which the 
division of labour has rendered a distinct trade), 
nor acquainted with the use of machinery employed 
in it (to the invention of which the same division 
of labour has probably given occasion), could 
scarce, perhaps, with his utmost industry, make 
one pin in a day and certainly could not make 
twenty. But in the way which this business is 
now carried on, not only the whole work is a 
peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of 
branches, of which the greater part are likewise 
peculiar trades." (Smith 1776 Page Ref.4).
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More precisely, the business of making a pin was divided 
into about eighteen distinct operations. One man draws out 
the wire, another straightens it, a third cuts it and a 
fourth points it, a fifth grinds it and so on. In some 
manufacturers, all eighteen operations were performed by 
different operators while in others the same man performed 
two or three operations.
In the particular example cited by Smith, the manufacturer 
employed ten men. Some performed two or three distinct 
operations, and collectively the ten produced twelve pounds 
or forty eight thousand pins in a day. Had the ten 
employees wrought separately and independently without any 
of them having been educated in this peculiar business, they 
would not have produced twenty pins each in a day. They 
would certainly not have produced the four thousand eight 
hundred pins a day they were capable of as a consequence of 
a proper division and combination of their different 
operations.
With Adam Smith the division of labour principles was 
certainly a key factor in economic progress. He had the 
view that in every art or manufacture, the effects of the 
division of labour was similar, in that its introduction 
gave rise to a proportional increase in labour productivity. 
However, it is important to recognise that Smith accepted 
limitations on the division of labour, stemming from the 
extent of the market. In other words, how far 
specialisation was profitably to be carried would depend on 
the market size. An important implication to this is that 
in a contracting market, previously achieved degrees of 
specialisation may no longer be feasible. That, as we shall 
see later, is important from the recent history of the 
shipbuilding industry.
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The process of trade specialisation was not a phenomenon 
restricted to shipbuilding, nor indeed, to this country. It 
was generally carried furthest in countries which enjoyed 
the highest degree of industrial improvement. In this 
context, Smith's doctrines were accepted in the liberal 
economies of the west - the economies now regarded as 
developed. Assisted by advances in technology, and the 
release of more mechanical energy to support muscle power, 
affluence increased and as a consequence, the doctrines were 
unchallenged. This illustrated in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1
This increased affluence can be demonstrated in two 
industries which applied the principles, both in the United 
Kingdom and the International Market Place. The graph
illustrates the fruits of the Industrial Revolution in terms 
of the purchasing power of the pre-tax basic wage of a 
skilled man in the printing (solid line) and engineering 
(dotted line) industries of the United Kingdom. The graph
was compiled under severe limitations insofar as cost of
living indices only began to be compiled in 1880.
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Before then, calculations of this nature were based on the 
price of bread. Even using this measure, long-term 
comparisons were difficult due to the massive increase in 
consumer choice. However, not withstanding these 
limitations, decade on decade changes are reasonably 
comparable. The graph clearly illustrates that the 
purchasing power of the skilled worker, based on one hour's 
work, had significantly increased between 1801 and 1961.
Smith may have argued that this increase in purchasing power 
was made possible by a range of factors, one of which was 
his doctrines and, in particular, the division of labour. 
Indeed, even although marxists, churchmen and humanists 
spoke out against the unbridled capitalist aspects of 
Smith's doctrines, nobody challenged the belief that the way 
to increase the wealth of the whole community, and increase 
productivity within industry, was through even more detailed 
division of labour. This belief was based on the 
underlying principle that jobs should be segmented as far as 
possible and that the way to increase productivity was to 
make tasks simple and therefore more speedily carried out.
3. JOB SPECIALISATION
The principle of job specialisation gained new life in the 
early years of the twentieth century when methods of 
Industrial Engineering were introduced to Industry. Taylor 
(1911), probably best known as the founder of work study, 
had the view that maximisation of specialisation was the key 
to manpower and organisational efficiency. In fact, he 
regarded work study as scientific management.
His approach, distinguished by the organisational theorists 
as the classical approach, was founded on four basic 
principles:-
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Firstly, that true science of work should be 
developed. Observations and measurement should be 
used to discover what constitutes a fair day's 
work.
Secondly, men should be scientifically selected 
and trained to work for which they are best 
suited.
Thirdly, the science of work and the scientific 
selection and training of men need to be 
integrated, so that the employee has the 
opportunity of earning a high rate of pay, while 
the employer obtains a low cost of production.
Fourthly, there must be constant and willing 
co-operation between employer and employees to 
achieve the benefits of scientific management.
Taylor's scientific observations and measurement of work,
led him to believe that greater efficiency could be achieved 
by dividing work into component parts and training men to 
very high performance levels on individual parts. This type 
of scientific observation was a major feature of the 
manpower utilisation strategy to be examined as model two.
The practitioners of Taylor's time and motion studies the 
Industrial Engineers, were not always regarded as the most 
popular members of the industrial society and were often 
looked upon with suspicion by their colleagues in industry. 
Indeed during the 1940's and 1950's that suspicion turned to 
opposition from the trade union movement. The point at
issue was not that industrial engineering brought about 
improved productivity, after all, the results were there as
to the merits of the techniques involved. The point at
issue was who should benefit from this increase in 
productivity.
In other words, there would be no argument about using the 
techniques to produce the biggest cake; the argument would 
be about how the cake would be shared out afterwards. 
Although, to be fair, some were concerned with how the cake 
was produced in terms of the psychological costs and efforts 
of those subjected to work study. Thus, Industrial 
Engineering became closely bound up with the collective 
bargaining process.
It was within the setting of a local bargaining process that 
scientific management techniques, associated with model two, 
where introduced into the Govan shipyard, ironically some 
two decades after trade union suspicion had turned to 
opposition against such techniques.
Specialisation was, therefore, a key factor in Taylor's 
contribution to manpower effectiveness from an 
organisational point of view and was a major feature of 
model two referred to as the 'Scientific Management 
Approach' but it was not the only one. Others included work 
measurement, selection, training and co-operation. However, 
all of this tends to concentrate the discussion at operator 
level, or in the case of shipbuilding, at craft level, but 
the concept of maximising specialisation is about much more 
than this and at a higher level, co-ordination, decision 
making and supervision, technical support and material 
supplies, figure prominently.
"Specialisation brings both a greater degree of 
efficiency and a greater need for co-ordination. 
Decisions must be centralised in one command, if 
company wide co-ordination is to be maintained.
There must be man-to-man responsibility and no 
supervisor should be asked to control the work of 
more men than he can effectively supervise. The 
strength of the organisation lies in its ability, 
lack of ambiguity and rigidity." (Barnes 1969 
Page Ref.24).
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Specialisation to the organisational theorists, therefore, 
makes full use of standardisation and uniformity of company 
wide practices in areas such as union negotiation, wage 
structures, and outside contracts. Moreover, the idea of 
central direction is embodied in the two classical concepts 
of unity of command and centralisation of decision making. 
Consequently, the organisation's strength lies in its 
clarity, rigidity and lack of ambiguity.
Perhaps Taylor's best known contribution to this 
organisational theory was in the system he called 
'Functional Management'. He realised that while 
specialisation improves efficiency at the operator levels, 
it greatly expanded the duties of first line supervisors. 
As a solution Taylor advocated that the principle of 
specialisation was no less appropriate at higher levels than 
it was at operator level. The result was his Functional 
Management system, under which each supervisor had a 
specialist function. In shipbuilding, as will be 
demonstrated in manpower utilisation, model one 'The 
Classical Approach', this specialisation is inherent in 
production supervisory/management structures which are 
reflective of the specialist craft and trade structure.
4. DEHUMANSING EFFECTS
The Industrial Revolution, the Adam Smith doctrines and 
specialisation might well have increased industrial output 
and efficiency but not everyone appeared to benefit from it, 
or indeed, the Industrial Revolution itself.
"The population is crowded into one dense mass, in 
cottages separated by narrow, unpaved and almost 
pestilential streets, in an atmosphere loaded with 
smoke and exhalations of a large manufacturing 
city.
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The operators are congregated in rooms and 
workshops during twelve hours in a day, in an 
enervating heated atmosphere, which is frequently 
loaded with dust or filaments of cotton, or impure 
from constant respiration, or from other causes.
They are engaged in an employment which absorbs 
their attention, and unremittingly employs their 
physical energies. They are drudges who watch the 
movements and assist the operations of a mighty, 
material force, which toils with an energy ever 
unconscious of fatigue.” (Kay 1830 page ref. 2).
Kay, therefore, perceived that there was a negative side to 
the industrial revolution and to the Smith doctrines; the 
population was concentrated into industrial based areas 
where the quality of life was less favourable and where the 
environment was polluted. They worked long hours in 
unhealthy conditions doing menial tasks.
For example, to service the shipyards, the population of 
Govan, according to Campbell (1988), increased from 9058 to 
93,058 in little more than 50 years. This was as a direct 
result of an influx of what was termed as 'immigrant 
workers'. These workers moved from the rural communities of 
Ireland and the highlands of Scotland into houses crowded 
around the shipyards in a smoke populated atmosphere. The 
immigrants worked long hours and were often engaged in 
unskilled employment which employed their physical energies 
rather than their intellect. In Kay's words they were 
drudges who watch the movements and assisted operations, of 
a mighty, material force, which toils with an energy ever 
unconscious of fatigue.
On the wider front, others, critical of Smith's doctrines, 
bemoaned the division of labour and job specialisation as 
dehumanising industrial society, pointing out when work is 
soulless, life stifles and interest and commitment dies.
Perhaps the most critical views on the negative or 
dehumanising side of Smith's doctrines and, in particular, 
the division of labour, were expressed in a proposition put 
forward by Herzberg (1959).
No matter how theoretically efficient the division of labour 
was, in the end it was self-defeating. Simplification of 
tasks to lessen learning problems; fragmentation of work to 
enable it to be carried out more speedily; close 
specification of methods to ensure that operations were 
carried out in the most efficient way; the end result of all 
of these, according to Herzberg, may not be to segment the 
job, but to fragment it. Consequently, this produces jobs 
that are inherently so meaningless and alienating that they 
destroy any commitment of the worker to effectiveness of his 
work.
5. HUMAN RELATIONS APPROACH
The approach to organisation, distinguished by the theorist 
as the Classical Approach and, in which the division of 
labour and job specialisation was a major feature of 
manpower utilisation, pre-supposes the availability of 
materials and, although people are part of the 
organisational requirements, their individual needs tend to 
have low priority. This approach recognises only financial 
incentives, physical, and occasionally, the security needs 
of individuals and was the typical approach adopted by 
shipbuilders.
It is, however, not the only approach to organisation that 
is recognised as an important influence on manpower 
utilisation. The contrasting Human Relations Approach, 
emphasises the need to take full account of people when 
designing industrial work places. Part of the design 
process recognising the conditions under which people are 
more likely to co-operate in achieving organisational 
objectives.
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The starting point being the realisation that individuals 
bring their own needs and values to the work place. These 
are categorised as physical needs, security, self fulfilment 
and the achievement of potential.
The order of the categories is significant, as the Human 
Relations approach is based on the assumption that people 
try to satisfy their needs in this order of priority. The 
more the needs for physical well-being and security are 
satisfied, the more the need for self-fulfilment and
achievement of potential is frustrated in the Classical 
approach by standards, uniformity, specialisation and
over-definition. The Human Relations approach is,
therefore, an attitude rather than a set of principles of 
organisation, a warning that people are not machines and 
cannot be treated as such. Their needs and values have to 
be taken into account and integrated with the needs and 
values of the organisational objectives.
Support for this approach is found in research into 
motivation and general behaviour of people at the work
place, conducted by American social psychologist Douglas 
McGregor. His work, which he calls theory 'X' and theory 
'Y', distinguishes between two basic theories and human 
behaviour at work.
Theory 'X' which we would argue was the prevailing work 
ethic associated with the shipbuilders manpower utilisation 
model one and reflected by management and reward system 
methods, assumes that the average worker is lazy and 
dislikes work; he is unambitious, awaits responsibility and 
prefers to be led; he is selfish, having no concern for 
organisational objectives. He must, therefore, be
controlled, coerced and directed if the organisational 
objectives are to be achieved. This idea of behaviour had 
gained strength and, according to McGregor explains many of 
the observable features of human behaviour, but there are 
many facts which it did not explain. For example, why was 
it that higher productivity could be found in units where 
control and coercion was minimal?
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McGregor's answer was Theory 'Y', which he claimed, was a 
more realistic explanation of human motivation and 
behaviour. Theory 'Y' concludes that people are not, by 
nature, as Theory 'X' supposes them to be, but they have 
become so as a result of their treatment in the work place. 
Behaviour at work should be no different from that displayed 
in society generally insofar as the average individual can 
seek responsibility.
McGregor's research found that people had a great resource 
for self-direction, commitment to problem solving and 
co-operative potential, most of which is completely untapped 
in the work place. McGregor's idea of an effective 
organisation, therefore, is one which has replaced 
direction and control with integration and co-operation.
In such an organisation, everyone affected by a decision 
contributes to the decision making process and people are 
encouraged to realise their potential. The seperate work 
units of the organisation are interacting and support each 
others functions. The ideal being achieved when everyone 
can identify with the organisational objectives and feel 
that their contribution is worthwhile.
6. ATTITUDES AND REALITY
Having considered the broader implications of the Smith 
doctrines previously, and accepted that they also had a 
negative side, there seems little doubt that generally they 
provided the constituents for advances in all branches of 
economic activity as well as economic success. In this 
way, the doctrines helped create the basis for successive 
improvements in the standard of living and were an important 
instrument in efforts to improve the working environment. 
This was particularly so of the Upper Clyde shipbuilding 
industry which, as discussed previously, prospered and 
developed to such an extent that by the 1950's it became the 
leading Industrial sector in the economy of the West of 
Scotland.
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In shipbuilding, as in other sectors of industry, changes 
took place in the way ships should be built and the way in 
which manpower should be utilised. The detail of the
changes will be discussed later. However, with this change 
came a challenge to the very principles of the division of 
labour by the people engaged in job specialisation and those 
whose concern was with increasing productivity.
"People showed their dissatisfaction in complaints 
and formal grievance; in industrial disputes; in 
absence and in unpunctuality; in a fairly
widespread lack of commitment to work; and, in a
small minority or cases, in calculations that no 
work or intermittent work would be preferable to 
continuous employment of the kind offered." 
(Wilson 1972 page ref.7).
Managers were unhappy about workers who lacked commitment 
but their worries extended beyond this particular issue and 
included concerns about the fact that the single trade 
specialists lacked the skills required by modern industry, 
skills associated with adaptability and versatility; the
type of skills which multi-skilled tradesmen had. There was 
also some apprehension about workers' reliability, work 
discipline and their poor approach to quality and lack of 
economic realism.
It is, of course, difficult to say exactly when the 
particular industrial changes described by Wilson occurred, 
but some of the symptoms of the change are perhaps more 
easier to detect. An extreme example, cited by Wilson, was 
industrial disputes, an activity which became more and more 
commonplace towards the end of the 1960's.
"From the relatively peaceful year of 1966 
onwards, there has been a considerable and fairly 
constant increase in total losses from industrial 
action in shipbuilding, although this is also true 
of industry as a whole." (Woodcock 1971 page 
ref.88) .
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Indeed, Woodcock's point is well founded. From 1965 to 
1970 the shipbuilding industry was losing days through 
strikes; on average, some 5 times the National level, with 
only 3 industries - the docks, motor vehicles and coal 
mining having worse records.
The only significant difference between shipbuilding's 
record and elsewhere, is on issues of demarcation. Over 
the same period disputes on demarcation issues were three 
times more important in shipbuilding as compared to other 
industries. They accounted for roughly double the 
proportion of total days lost in shipbuilding than was the 
case in industry generally.
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Figure 2.2
The pattern and causes of industrial disputes in 
shipbuilding were, according to Woodcock, roughly comparable 
with that experienced by all other industries, although some 
marginal differences can be discerned. Wages, as in 
industry generally, were by far the biggest cause of 
industrial disputes, accounting for almost two-thirds of all 
stoppages from 1965 to 1970 - illustrated in figure 2.2.
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Strike action was used as a weapon by groups of shipyard 
workers who were distinguished only by the work they did, 
and the way in which shipbuilding labour was divided into 
its various trade structures, i.e. Welders, Platers, 
Cranemen etc. This strike weapon was used primarily to 
protect the group's relative position in the pay scale.
A display of industrial strength was regarded as the best 
way of establishing a point of view. Thus a strike by one 
group, to achieve an advantage, would almost certainly 
provoke a counter strike in defence of the wage 
differential. This produced what the Donavan Commission of 
1968 described as "leap frogging" bringing about chaotic 
wage structures and a lack of control of labour costs. 
Using these methods, shipyard workers increased their 
earning powers considerably towards the end of the 1960's, 
as illustrated in figure 2.3.
Average weekly earnings of fall time adalt male manual 
workers and male administrative, technical and clerical 
employees in shipbuilding and all manufacturing industry, UK
Industry group
April 
1964 
£ s.
October 
1965 
£ s.
October 
1968 
£ s.
October 
1969 
£ s.
October 
1970 
£ s.
Shipbuilding and . 
marine engineering:
manual 17 10 19 16 23 19 26 3 29 12
staff n.a. 24 0 28 3 30 18 35 6
All manufacturing industry: 
manual 18 4 20 3 23 12 25 11 28 18
staff n.a. 25 13 30 1 32 8 36 10
Source: Employment and Productivity Gazette, July 1969 and
Department of Employment Gazette, April 1971, tables 122 and 123
Figure 2.3
The table shows that the average weekly earnings of adult 
manual workers in shipbuilding, up until the mid 1960's, was 
rather lower than the average for all manufacturing 
industries. The position changed rapidly from the mid 
1960's and the industry's average weekly wage moved above 
that of manufacturing generally.
Strike action was also used by the various work groups to 
thwart attempts to influence the way in which labour had 
been divided. Demarcation lines had previously been drawn 
around the work associated with the various work groups and 
any attempts to encroach was met with resistance. 
Consequently, the industry suffered from what became known 
as "who does what disputes". Management's attempts to 
introduce more flexible forms of working met with 
opposition.
The other symptoms of change cited by Wilson were the 
reports of increased absence and unpunctuality which were 
perhaps less obvious than those of industrial disputes but 
nonetheless equally damaging to industry generally. 
Figures for April 1970, according to Woodcock, indicated 
that in shipbuilding the percentage of employees being paid 
for less than their normal basic hours, for any reason, was 
42%.
This was far in excess of any other industry and almost 
double the rate for manufacturing generally. Of that 
total, 10.5% was accounted for by voluntary absence and and 
12% for late arrival and early finishes. This was more than 
double the figures for all manufacturing industries as 
illustrated in figure 2.4.
Full-tim  a im l  mca era ploy m s  paid for I«m  thaa their normal basic hoars, by n lccM  
Industry group tad reason la Groat Britain, April 1970
Percentage of total sample losing pay by reason
Industry group All
reasons
Sickness
Voluntary
Absence
Late
arrival 
or early finish
Holidays 
or other 
approved absenceCertified Uncertified
Shipbuilding and shiprepairing 
(National agreement group) 42-3 6-6 0-8 10-3 12-4 49
Mining and quarrying 311 12-3 0-7 12-1 1-9 3-3
Mechanical engineering 20-3 4-5 21 3-8 7-8 1-3
All manufacturing industry 19-6 4-5 16 39 6-2 18
Source: Department of Employment Gazette, February 1971, p. 142, Table 96 and information on the shipbuilding and shiprepairini industry supplied by 
_______the OS_______________________
Figure 2.4
In shipbuilding, therefore, as in other sectors of industry, 
there was sufficient evidence to suggest that things were 
changing. The symptoms described previously by Wilson were 
part of a change process in which those directly concerned 
with increasing productivity were challenging the principles 
of the division of labour and job specialisation.
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CHAPTER:3 FLEXIBLE WORKING
1. INTRODUCTION
The single minded exploitation of the principles associated 
with the division of labour had, as illustrated earlier in 
chapter 2, become unsuitable and, in many circumstances, 
unprofitable. As such, those responsible for increasing 
productivity and industrial efficiency sought different ways 
of improving manpower utilisation. This prompted a move 
away from job specialisation to more flexible patterns of 
working.
•’There is nothing new about the need for change in 
the labour market. Change is, and always has 
been, the norm. More recently however, there has 
been a sharp edge to things. Competition sets 
international standards, and failure to adjust to 
it extracts a severe penalty. Couple that with 
the onward rush of technology and the much 
increased uncertainties of financial markets, and 
there is little surprise that companies are 
constantly seeking to do things in better ways and 
to adjust more readily to the changing demands of 
markets and customers." (Cassells 1986 page 
ref.iv).
The move to more flexible working patterns was, in effect, 
industry's response to uncompetitiveness. In shipbuilding 
terms the British industry had become uncompetitive. 
Shipyards were closing, jobs were being lost and new orders 
were hard to come by. New, better ways had to be introduced 
in order that the remaining yards, including the Govan 
Shipyard, could adjust to the changing market demands. 
Given that manpower was a principal component of 
shipbuilding costs, as will be illustrated in Part Four, 
changes to the way in which manpower was utilised were at 
the forefront of the thoughts of those responsible for the 
industry's survival and profitability.
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It was against this type of backdrop that the National
Economic Development Office commissioned the Institute of 
Manpower Studies to carry out a major study of changing
working patterns and practices in four important sectors of 
the economy; Engineering, Food and Drink Manufacturing, 
Retail Distribution and Financial Services. The aim was to 
assess the nature, extent and underlying rationale of the 
changes in working patterns and practices that had been 
taking place, and to consider their implications for the 
competitiveness of British Industry.
Atkinson (1985), found that widespread changes in working 
practices had been introduced in the past few years to allow
companies to respond more flexibly to the changing market
conditions. The study identified and analysed the 
different forms of flexibility which had been introduced, 
allowing companies to fit more precisely the demand for 
labour to its supply.
The principal forms developed were; functional flexibility, 
numerical flexibility, distancing strategy and pay 
flexibility. We will discuss each of these, with specific 
regard to the shipbuilding industry, in the following 
sections.
2. FUNCTIONAL FLEXIBILITY
The shipbuilding industry's problems of low productivity 
tended to be associated with restrictive working practices, 
related to job specialisation and demarcation. The form of 
flexibility introduced to improve productivity and aimed at 
removing demarcation and encouraging workers to acquire 
further skills was termed as "Functional Flexibility" and is 
defined as:-
44.
"The ability of firms to reorganise the competence
associated with jobs so that the job holder can
deploy such competence across a broader range of 
tasks. This may involve horizontal enlargement 
of competence at roughly the same skill level." 
(Atkinson 1986 page ref.8).
It is important to recognise that, within the context of 
this definition, a job is defined as a collection of tasks
allocated to an individual job holder. There may have been
a variety of historical, organisational or technical reasons 
for associating certain tasks to particular jobs. This was 
certainly true of shipbuilding. It was, after all, the 
introduction of new systems of industrial organisation, 
over one hundred years ago, which prompted a move towards 
dividing the industry's manpower into specialist 
occupations. At that time certain tasks were allocated to 
particular jobs. The trade structures which resulted from 
this move had remained more or less intact since their 
inception.
As indicated previously, the shipbuilding industry's 
performance throughout the second half of the 1960's was 
adversely affected by industrial disputes. It was, 
moreover, acknowledged that the significant difference 
between the industrial relations record of shipbuilding and 
elsewhere was on issues of demarcation. The demarcation 
lines previously drawn around the tasks associated with the 
various shipbuilding trades were jealously guarded and any 
attempts at encroachment were met with opposition. 
Management's attempts to introduce more flexible forms of 
working had been, in the main, resisted, or met with token 
agreement with little or no change in practice.
The concept of functional flexibility, which became 
fashionable during the 1980's was, according to Edwards, 
particularly relevant to the problems associated with 
demarcation issues.
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"Task or functional flexibility embraces changes 
in working practices; the ending of demarcation 
lines so that, for example, production workers can 
do routine maintenance job; and the replacement of 
separate craft trades with one multi-skilled 
worker." (Edwards 1988 page ref.2).
He stressed that some form of change in working practices 
had been widespread and cited surveys conducted in 198 3 and 
1984 to support his view. These surveys indicated that 85% 
of responding plants had introduced significant changes in 
working practices over the previous three to five years. 
While these figures may appear to support the widespread 
impression that significant change had taken place in work 
organisation, they did not, in themselves, mean that 
manpower was being deployed more flexibly.
Functional flexibility was only part of the change process 
taking place in industry generally during the 1980's and
perhaps a more accurate method of measuring the significant 
changes associated with functional flexibility could be 
gained by analysing the criteria adopted by Atkinson. His 
criteria were based on the principle that a job is located 
on a Company's organisational structure by means of a grid 
on matrix as illustrated in figure 3.1. over.
In the grid, the horizontal lines represent the distinction 
between skill and occupational level, i.e. craft,
semi-skilled or unskilled. The vertical lines represent 
the functional area of work - i.e. production or 
maintenance. A job can therefore be represented on the
grid by a box. Some boxes cover more than one square and
not all squares will be contained in a box representing a 
job.
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Figure 3.1
The model, according to Atkinson (1986) is simplistic, but a 
useful device, firstly to distinguish between those kinds of 
changes which do represent functional flexibility and those 
which do not, and secondly, to distinguish between the 
various types of functional flexibility. The measurement of 
functional flexibility is, therefore, associated with a 
Company's ability to enlarge boxes in an organisational 
grid. This enhancement may take place in a sideways, 
upwards or downward direction as indicated in the examples 
illustrated in figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2
The three examples differ but are representative of the 
various types of increased functional flexibility. Example 
(A) illustrates what is termed as "sideways or horizontal" 
enlargement of a craft job. In this example functional
flexibility is increased at the same skill level by adding 
the tasks of an electrician to that of a fitter. The 
result is the multi-skilled craftsman referred to in the 
example as an electromechanical craftsman.
An upward enlargement of the job is cited as example ( B )  . 
In this example, the electrician adds a number of high level 
diagnostic electric skills; previously the preserve of a 
technician. The increase in functional flexibility is 
therefore in an upward direction, with the electrician 
taking on the more demanding tasks of the technician.
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Example (C) represents a downward enlargement of the job. 
In this example, a skilled machine setter no longer simply 
sets machines, but undertakes the semi-skilled tasks of 
operating the machine. This increase in functional 
flexibility is downward, with the skilled machine setter
taking on the less demanding semi-skilled tasks of the 
operator.
In shipbuilding functional flexibility, as will be
demonstrated in the models of manpower utilisation to be 
examined in Parts Three and Four, was considered as a means 
of breaching the strict demarcation boundries between the 
specialist trade structure. The changing and much more
competitive demands of the shipbuilding market place,
rendered these as restrictive and an obstacle to 
competitiveness. Platers waited on the services of welders 
and burners to carry out specialist tasks before they could 
progress fabrication work. There was, therefore, a need to 
horizontally enlarge the jobs of platers by adding the 
skills of welding and burning to that of their plating 
skills.
In this way, the platers would be able to progress 
fabrication work without the assistance of welders and 
burners and thus manpower utilisation and shipyard 
competitiveness would increase. Accordingly, the
enlargement of the job content which is the key to 
functional flexibility was totally appropriate to the 
shipbuilding industry. Atkinson recognises three factors 
which should be noted when examining changes in functional 
flexibility. These could be summarised as:-
a) The extent - how far will the worker expand 
or deploy his skills?
b) The duration - how much is flexibility called 
upon, continuous, permanent, when required, 
exceptional, or short term?
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c) Location - where in the organisation or what 
part of the organisation?
He also acknowledges that the main constraints on functional 
flexibility were usually associated with demarcation 
restrictions, training, and health and safety 
considerations.
3. NUMERICAL FLEXIBILITY
A second area of flexible working, appropriate to 
shipbuilding, is that of numerical flexibility which is 
defined as:-
"The ability of firms to adjust the number of 
workers or the level of hours in line with changes 
in the level of demand for them." (Atkinson 
1986 page ref.6).
This form of flexibility is not new to shipbuilding; the 
'labels' associated with it were new but the management of 
shipyards had been adjusting manning levels to suit work 
programme since the industry's inception. The cyclic nature 
of shipbuilding work meant that static employment levels 
could not be maintained throughout the build cycle. Large 
numbers of steelwork tradesmen were required during the 
early stage of construction and, at a launch many were 
dismissed at this stage and replaced by outfit workers who 
would complete the ship before they were paid off. The 
management of the shipyards may not have regarded what they 
were doing as numerical flexibility but to all intents and 
purposes it was.
Numerical flexibility would, therefore, appear to have 
considerable relevance to shipbuilding, given that it was 
based on the principle that as workload fluctuates, as is 
the case of the ships build cycle, employers respond by 
either changing the number of workers employed or by 
changing the distribution of worked time.
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In general this form of flexibility seeks to match labour 
supply more accurately with demand. It acknowledges that 
fluctuations may occur, indeed it is the duration of this 
fluctuation which influences the form of numerical 
flexibility adopted by a Company. For example, short term 
fluctuations are more frequently handled by the use of 
part-timers or overtime working. Long term fluctuations 
are more often met by the use of temporary workers or by 
increased shift-working.
Accordingly, numerical flexibility can vary depending on the 
circumstances, but, overall, four typical forms can be 
identified - temporary workers, part time worker, overtime 
and shift workers, and flexible working time. 
Shipbuilding's application of these forms of flexibility 
will be demonstrated in the four models of manpower 
utilisation to be examined in Parts Three and Four. 
However, an understanding of all four forms is required 
prior to this examination.
Historically, according to Meager (1985) the employment of 
temporary workers has been dominated by two trends:-
Firstly, a cyclical pattern of work in which an 
employer laid off temporary workers first in the 
downturn and rehired them in the upturn.
Secondly, a structural shift towards an increasing 
proportion of temporary workers due to the long 
term secular increase in the relative importance 
of sectors or occupations which use a relatively 
high proportion of temporary workers.
The first of the trends suggested by Meager could have an 
association with the shipbuilding industry where the work 
programme is cyclic, while the shift from manufacturing to 
service based industrial sectors is particularly important 
in the second of the trends.
Ii
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In both trends cited, the common factor was that temporary 
labour existed primarily as a means by which employers can 
meet their long-term labour requirements during workload 
fluctuations.
The second form of numerical flexibility, that of part-time 
workers, did not find much favour in shipyards. The 
research findings of Robinson (1984) indicated that
employers preference for part-time rather than full-time 
labour was essential to the adoption of more cost-effective 
policies dictated by pressure to improve efficiency in 
highly competitive conditions. In manufacturing
industries, the benefits employers derive from this 
particular form of numerical flexibility are gained from 
maximising the utilisation of capital equipment and from the 
ability to maintain continuous production without incurring 
premium rates for overtime or shift working.
The two key side factors which emerged from Robinson's 
research work into part-time working were:-
Firstly, that part-time working facilitates the 
cost-effective matching of manning to output 
fluctuations and enable fuller utilisation of 
fixed assets.
Secondly, that labour can often be cheaper per 
worked hour than comparable full time labour, 
particularly where premium rates are involved for 
full timers.
In contrast to this form of numerical flexibility, the use 
of overtime and variations of shift patterns are traditional 
approaches to securing greater flexibility in working time 
patterns. These were approaches practiced by shipbuilers.
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Atkinson (1986) indicated that the two are often intimately 
connected, in that, as demand increases, a Company may 
expand its overtime up to a point where it becomes economic 
to change the pattern of the shift. This form of numerical 
flexibility differs from those discussed previously, insofar 
as it takes the form of changing working patterns of 
existing workers rather than adding extra workers to achieve 
numerical flexibility.
The last of the four forms of numerical flexibility is that 
of flexible working time, an approach which had not been 
adopted by shipbuilding. This differs from the 
straightforward approach of changing shift patterns because 
it involves not only the re-scheduling of blocks of working 
time, but also re-organising the blocks themselves. The 
most prominently discussed notion of flexible working time 
concerns what is referred to an annual or contractual hours. 
In this notion, employees are contracted to work a 
predetermined number of hours over a year. Longer hours 
worked in one period are offset against shorter hours worked 
in another. The attraction for the employer is the ability 
to adjust the working hours to meet demand at no extra cost.
Overlaid on all the developments outlined previously in the 
long term, secular decline is the length of the working week 
and the need to adjust more readily to the changing demands 
of markets and customers. Therefore, in terms of providing 
a conceptual toolbox which will permit a better 
understanding of the phases of change in the Govan shipyard, 
as depicted by the four separate models of manpower 
utilisation, the review of the literature associated with 
numerical flexibility reveals that:-
Firstly, the cyclic nature of shipbuilding lends 
itself to the principle that as work fluctuates 
employers have responded either by changing the 
number of workers employed or by changing the 
distribution of worked times.
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Secondly, shipbuilding has long been regarded as 
an industry where overtime working has become the 
established norm. Putting aside for the moment 
the question of the efficiency of this practice, 
the fact remains that the use of overtime and 
shift working has long been a traditional approach 
to securing flexibility in working times.
Thirdly, the use of part-time workers and the 
notion of flexible working time, are two forms of 
numerical flexibility which have not been taken up 
by the management of the shipyards.
To conclude a review of the literature on flexible working 
the following section will be devoted to considering a model 
of the flexible firm developed at the Institute of Manpower 
Studies. The module draws into a simple framework the new 
elements in employers manpower practices, including those 
discussed in the previous sections.
4. THE 'FLEXIBLE FIRM"
The model of the 'flexible firm' developed at the Institute 
of Manpower Studies by Atkinson (1985) describes the main 
parameter of change in the areas of manpower utilisation and 
flexibility. It draws into a simple framework the new 
elements of manpower practices, some of which were the 
subject of the previous discussion, and distinguishes 
between a Company's 'core' of essential workers and the 
periphery who either perform routine operations or have 
skills which are readily available in the outside market.
This model will be of particular relevance during the 
examination of manpower utilisation Model Three - 'The 
Flexible Working Model', adopted by British Shipbuilding in 
the 1980's during nationalisation.
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As such, the model has some importance, insofar as it was 
developed as an analytical tool whose purpose is to identify 
four different types of flexibility; these being functional 
and numerical flexibility whose relevance and application to 
shipbuilding was discussed previously and two others 
referred to as distancing strategies and pay flexibility 
whose relevance and application we should understand before 
using the flexible form model as an analytical tool.
Distancing strategies, in simple terms, involves the 
displacement of employment relationships with commercial 
ones. Employers may opt to sub-contract rather than 
re-organise their internal manning practices. In 
shipbuilding sub-contracting work had long been an 
established practice. Many shipyards, including Govan,
sub-contracted painting, piping, electrical and engineering 
work. Indeed, as will be demonstrated in model three, 
British Shipbuilders, during nationalisation, adopted a 
strategy of sub-contracting 'cyclic work' at a time when 
they were declaring redundancies in the shipyards. The 
argument being that the 'cyclic work' could not sustain 
employment level and, as such, sub-contractors would be 
employed to carry out these tasks when required. Other 
activities, including catering, office cleaning and 
maintenance, were also sub-contracted.
The principal difference between the distancing strategies 
of British Shipbuilders and those adopted by other 
companies, was that the process of creating the distancing 
became more important than the commercial advantages 
offered. To explain - to encourage the move to sub-contract 
an activity such as catering, for example, the shipyard 
management had to ensure that the displaced shipyard workers 
were employed by the sub-contractor at rates of pay similar 
to those prevailing in the shipyard. The employees 
transferring to the sub-contractor were paid attractive 
redundancy payments and, as in the case of catering, took up 
their new employment immediately.
5 5 .
Functional flexibility is achieved in the core, 
supported by appropriate incentives and rewards, 
including the (implicit) guarantee of job security 
(or absence of threat of insecurity) which is 
possible because the peripheral group soak up 
numerical fluctuation in demand." (Atkinson 1985 
page ref.4 and 5).
The essentials of the 'Flexible Firm' are illustrated in
figure 3.3
T h e  flex ib le  firm
Cortaroup 
* v><'cllon,r
Trainees 
m employing bodio*
Source IMS
SOURCE: Atkinson (1995)
Figure 3.3
Consequently, the 'core' workforce or, in shipbuiding terms, 
the 'permanent' workforce is at the centre of the flexible 
firms' operations, and indeed, the model itself. The 
employer will bear the cost, including those associated with 
training and retraining, re-location, pay maintenance, 
pensions and career development etc. for these employees in 
order to secure functional flexibility.
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The employees will in turn receive benefits including those 
associated with employment security, access to a career,
sickness and holiday payments etc.
Surrounding the 'core' workforce in the model are the 
peripheral workers who are basically part-timers or 
temporary workers and they are not afforded the benefits of 
employment security. Indeed their numbers can be readily 
expanded and contracted to achieve numerical flexibility in 
line with the Company's manpower fluctuation. The outer
ring represents the adoption of distancing strategies and 
this part of the model contains sub-contractors, 
specialists, and the self-employed who are normally engaged 
on fee based contracts.
It is argued, according to Edwards (1988) that, in the
attempt to maximise its flexibility and minimise its fixed 
costs, a firm will aim to increase not only the functional 
flexibility of its core employees, but also the numerical 
flexibility of the periphery. The latter, as indicated
previously, can take the form of temporary or part-time 
working, or more fundamentally, the sub-contracting of a 
firms' activities. This may have been one of the aims of 
model three - the 'Flexible Working Model' adopted by 
British Shipbuilders.
Sub-contracting of mainstream activities, particularly in 
manufacturing and shipbuilding, is comparatively rare.
More common is the practice to sub-contract those parts of 
the operation associated with catering, cleaning and
transport. Accordingly, given that the shipbuilding
industrys performance was being adversely affected by 
restrictive working practices and demarcation issues, it was 
incumbent upon those with responsibility for improving 
performance and productivity to consider alternative methods 
of manpower utilisation. The alternatives considered
included some of the aspects of flexible working which have 
been previously discussed, and new approaches to 
organisation.
I
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The detail of the flexible working practices considered 
will, of course, be examined in Parts Three and Four and 
during this examination the 'Model of the Flexible Firm' 
will be used as an analytical took to determine to what 
extent flexible working was applicable or successful.
4. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Establishing a 'conceptual framework' drawn from theory 
particularly that discussed previously in Chapters 2 and 3 
and associated with 'job specialisation' and 'flexible 
working' and selected according to relevance for 
shipbuilding will enable developments from the 1950's/60's 
onwards to be looked at with a set of analytical tools which 
will help with the understanding of the central question, 
i.e. the progressive development and change of manpower 
utilisation policy and practice and associated role of 
industrial relations. In fact, four phases or models of 
manpower utilisation and industrial relations policy from 
the 1960's onwards will be identified. There is a need to 
be able to tackle the changes between the models and to make 
sense of them - hence the need for a framework or a toolbox.
One useful line of approach would be to borrow from Douma 
and Schreuder (1992), a conceptual framework based on the 
work of Coase (1937) and illustrated in figure 3.4.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK STRUCTURES
The Basic Concept
Division of Labour
Specialisation
Coordination
OrganisationMarket
SOURCE: Douna & Schreuder (1992)
Figure 3.4
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This basic concept recognised the great importance accorded 
to the division of labour. Adam Smith's famous example of a 
pin factory demonstrated that progressive division of labour 
led to productivity increases by having each man perform one 
specific task rather than many enterprises. Smith gave the 
following explanation:-
"This great increase in the quantity of work which 
in consequence of the division of labour, the same 
number of people are capable of performing is 
owing to three different circumstances; Firstly, 
to the increase of dexterity of every potential 
workman. Secondly, to the saving of the time 
which is commonly lost in passing one aspect of 
work to another and lastly, to the invention of a 
great number of machines which facilitate and 
abridge labour and enable one man to do the work 
of many." (Smith 1776 Page Ref.5).
Douma and Schreuder (1992) suggested that basically, when 
work is split into specific costs, tasks may be selected to 
suit the needs and capabilities of individuals. 
Specialisation in the task means that the individual becomes 
good at it and attention can be devoted to improving 
performance of the task. The individual specialist can 
learn from experience and use this experience to devise 
methods and instruments which will further improve the 
execution of the task.
Division of labour thus leads to specialisation, as 
illustrated in figure 3.4, and this allows for efficiency 
gains. In sport, for example, specialisation leads to 
higher performance levels but there is a cost. Choices have 
to be made and long hours of training has to be put in. 
Once specialised, high performance is restricted to a narrow 
range of options. Even an acclaimed athlete like Carl Lewis 
is restricted to running and jumping in athletic 
competitions.
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Specialisation allowed him to excel at these particular 
athletic events, but no coach would contemplate switching 
his assignment to shot-putt or pole-vault.
Douma and Schreuder (1992) argue, therefore, that 
specialisation has the disadvantage of restricting choice 
options. The limits of specialisation are reached when the 
satisfaction gained from higher performance is outweighed
but the disadvantage from too narrow an area of application
of the individual's skills with the result bordering on 
frustration. Individual limits are thus one boundary to 
increasing specialisation, but there is another boundary 
which could be labelled as coordination.
The framework, therefore, takes the division of labour as
its starting point. This division leads to specialisation
which allows for efficiency gains. However, with increasing 
specialisation there is a corresponding need for 
coordination to arrange the network of exchange between 
specialists. For example, Carl Lewis and three other 100 
meter specialist sprinters could, under relay conditions, 
record a faster time over 4 00 meters than say an athlete who 
covered the 400 meter distance on his own. The efforts of 
the 100 meter specialists would, however, have to be 
co-ordinated to ensure that their sprinting specialisation 
was maximised and not inhibited by baton changes etc.
Mintzberg (1989) developed a technology of organisation 
configurations which basically distinguished between the 
various types of coordination. This will be another 
relevant analytical tool when looking at the changes 
associated with the four models of manpower utilisation 
adopted at Govan from the 1960's onwards. He suggests there 
are six coordination mechanisms which be describes as:-
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a) Mutual adjudgment, which achieves
coordination by the simple process of 
information communication (as between two 
operating employees).
b) Direct supervision, in which coordination is 
achieved by having one person issue orders or 
instructions to several others whose work 
interrelates (as when a boss tells others 
what is to be done one step at a time).
c) Standardisation of work processes, which
achieves coordination by specifying the work 
processes of people carrying out interrelated 
tasks (those standards usually developed in 
the Technostructure * to be carried out in
the operating core, as in the case of work
instructions that come out of time and motion 
studies.)
d) Standardisation of output, which achieves
coordination by specifying the results of 
different work (again usually developed in 
the Technostructure *, as in a financial plan 
that specifies sub unit performance targets 
or specifications that outline the dimensions 
of the product to be produced.)
Footnote
* Technostructure is that part of the organisation 
where the analysis are located. They are the staff 
outside the hierarchy who plan and control the work of 
others.
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e) Standardisation of skills (as well as
knowledge), in which different work is
coordinated by virtue of the related training 
the workers have received (as in medical 
specialists - say a surgeon and an
anaesthetist in an operating room 
responding almost automatically to each 
other's standardised procedures.)
f) Standardisation of norms, in which it is the 
norms determining the work that are 
controlled, usually from the entire 
organisation, so that everyone functions 
according to the same set of beliefs (as in a 
religious order).
The six mechanisms developed by Mintzberg are, therefore, 
all ways in which work is coordinated within organisations 
and ways in which individuals communicate knowledge and 
experience. Conversely, they are the means by which 
employees learn what they need to know from one another to 
carry out their tasks.
Specialisation, therefore, as illustrated in figure 3.4, 
leads to a need for coordination. Douma and Schreuder 
(19.92) , however submit that there are two types of 
coordination which they describe as across markets and 
'within organisation'.
"Coase posited markets and organisations are 
alternatives for the execution of transactions.
On markets, the price system is the coordinating 
device. Within organisation, the price system is 
replaced by authority as a coordinating mechanism.
The question remains as to the circumstances under 
which the market will be employed for exchange
transactions and the conditions under which
organisation will be preferred." (Douma and
Schreuder 1992) .
Coase's answer was that this is determined by the relative 
cost of the transaction under these two alternatives. 
Transactions will typically be executed at lowest cost. As 
a consequence, transactions will shift between markets and 
organisation as a function of the transaction costs under 
these two alternatives.
On the labour supply of shipbuilding these distinctions will 
have relevance to the changes which were taking place 
between the four models. They will be particularly relevant 
when looking at the move away from the concept of the 
division of labour and job specialisation which formed the 
basis of model one to more open forms of functional and 
numerical flexibility which were a feature of the later 
models. These manpower utilisation changes were taking 
place in response to the fact that the U.K. shipbuilding 
industry's share of a more competitive shipbuilding world 
market was in decline.
PART THREE
i
Research Related to Three Approaches to Manpower 
Utilisation Adopted at the Go van Shipyard.
PREFACE
Part three of the work provides comprehensive research into three 
approaches to manpower utilisation adopted by those responsible 
for the management of the Govan shipyard. For the purpose of 
the research the approaches have been distinguished as
(a) Model One - The Classical Approach adopted 
when the shipyard was moving to the 
construction of iron and steel vessels at 
the beginning of the 1860's and maintained, 
under the management of Fairfield 
Shipbuilding Co. Ltd., until the shipyard 
went into receivership in the 1960's.
(b) Model Two - The Scientific Management 
Approach adopted for a two year period 
commencing 1966, when the shipyard was the 
subject of an 'Experiment' under the 
management of Fairfield Glasgow Ltd.
(c) Model Three - The Flexible Working Approach 
adopted when the shipyard was, for the 
decade up to 1988, part of the state owned 
nationalised shipbuilding corporation 
British Shipbuilders.
Initially, the aim is to put into an 'explanatory form of words', 
the suppositions related to the adoption of the traditional 
approach to manpower utilisation. Of particular concern are the 
specialist manpower and management structures and the 
organisational support functions.
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This part of the research, identified as Model One, is in two 
parts.
Part one, graphically detailed in Chapter 4, is concerned with:-
Firstly - the origin of the manpower who supported the 
shipyards growth and the relationship between this and 
the occupational distribution. This suggests that 
cultural background was a factor influencing manpower 
and management structures.
Secondly - the hypothesis associated with the concept 
of job specialisation and the manpower and management 
structures adopted on the basis of this hypothesis.
This aims to provide a descriptive insight into what 
may be regarded as traditional and restrictive working 
practices and bureaucratic management structures.
Thirdly - the assumptions underlying the traditional 
system of incentive payments adopted by the shipyard 
and their purpose in terms of manpower efficiency and 
shipyard competitiveness.
Part two, illustrated in Chapter 5, is concerned with:-
Firstly - the assumption related to the organisation 
functions established to support the shipyard manpower 
with drawings and information. This aims to ascertain 
the link between organisation and manpower 
utilisation.
Secondly - the presumptions allied to the creation of 
an organisation support function devoted to the people 
side of the business. The intention here is to 
determine the relationship between this support and 
the effectiveness of the shipyard workers.
Model one is a critical part of the research. In a sense the 
traditional approach to manpower utilisation formed the basis of 
the shipyard workers traditional values, working practices, 
attitudes and industrial relationships and was, therefore, the 
major influence on manpower effectiveness.
Secondly, the aim is to put into an analytical framework the 
context in which the Fairfield Glasgow approach moved away from 
the shipyard's traditional specialist working practices and 
methods of organising. This part of the research, identified as 
Model Two, is detailed in Chapters 6 and 7.
Chapter 6 is concerned with:-
Firstly - the theories linked to the move away from 
national to local bargaining arrangements and the 
concept of affording the trade union officials and the 
shop stewards a role in the management of the 
shipyard's change process.
Secondly - the philosophy that problems of redundancy 
and lack of job security were the root cause of the 
shipyard workers resistance to change and the 
proposition that shipyard workers counter productive 
attitudes can be influenced by job security.
In Chapter 7, the focus is as follows:-
Firstly - The notion that manpower utilisation and 
shipyard competitiveness were improved by the move to 
more open forms of flexible working brought about by 
concluding local industrial relations agreements.
Secondly - The belief that the words of industrial 
relations agreements could be translated into positive 
deeds by training.
Thirdly - The impression that manpower effectiveness 
was improved by the adoption of scientific management 
techniques that provided sufficient information to 
introduce measured day work incentive payments.
Model two was an important landmark at the Govan Shipyard from 
the point of view that both management and the trade unions were 
committed to introduce a range of far reaching changes to 
traditional manpower practices and management techniques in an 
experiment aimed at improving manpower utilisation.
The third model analyses the centralised approach to manpower 
utilisation adopted by British Shipbuilders. Of particular 
concern is the nationalised corporations Performance, Improvement 
and Productivity programme and its aims of increasing the output 
potential of those involved in the shipbuilding industry. This 
part of the research, identified as model three, is again covered 
in two chapters:-
Chapter 8 is concerned with:-
Firstly - The theories related to the development of the 
Performance Improvement and Productivity programme and the 
challenge that such a programme faced. This explores.the 
strategy adopted and the degree of difficulty associated 
with introducing the programme on a national basis.
Secondly - The coherent and comprehensive process adopted, 
to identify the industry's manpower constraints. This 
highlights areas where the removal of constraints could 
lead to productivity improvements and cost reduction.
Thirdly - The concept of establishing a central bargaining 
arrangement as a means of by-passing the local shop steward 
movement and concluding industrial relations agreements 
that would challenge the restrictive working practices, 
demarcation and overmanning and introduce more open forms 
of flexible working.
Chapter 9, is concerned with to:
Firstly - The strategy adopted at Govan to ensure that 
the national industrial relations agreements were 
fully understood by the shipyard's workforce.
Secondly - The proposition that health and safety 
performance could be improved and shipyard workers 
attitudes changed by training.
The significance of Model three is that the manpower utilisation 
policies and practices inherited by Kvaerner at the time of 
taking over the Govan Shipyard were products of this highly 
centralised approach that had the support of the British 
Shipbuilder's executive management and the national trade union 
officials and financed by extensive Government funding. Model 
three was the culmination of a long period of evolution of 
traditional work organisation in the shipyards, and its failure 
provided the launching pad for the new thinking and approached 
to be introduced by Kvaerner.
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CHAPTER 4: THE CLASSICAL APPROACH TO MANPOWER UTILISATION
MODEL 1/ PART 1
1. SHIPBUILDING MANPOWER
The establishment and the growth of the Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilding Industry was, as indicated earlier, supported 
by a large drift of workers from rural communities into the 
new urban shipbuilding communities and the industry itself. 
The flood of what could be termed, as "immigrant workers" to 
the burgh of Govan, whose shipyards built about a fifth of 
the Clydeside tonnage, was perhaps typical of this influx.
In little over 50 years the population of Govan grew 
from 9058 in the 1850's to 93,058 in 1907 and during 
approximately the same period 1860 to 1900 the shipbuilding 
tonnage completed by the Clydeside shipyards increased from 
100,000 to 500,000 tonnes. The massive growth in Govan's 
population was generally understood to be directly related 
to a large influx of "immigrant workers" who came to Govan 
and provided the manpower support for the rapidly expanding 
shipbuilding industry. This view supported by the census 
schedules of 1871 and 1891 and illustrated in figure 4.1.
BIRTHPLACE OF HOUSEHOLD HEADS
1871 1891
Govan 4.9 6.0
Lowlands Scotland 43.6 41.8
Glasgow 12.2 11.6
Highlands 19.9 11.8
Ireland 14.5 23.4
England 4.5 4.8
SOURCE: Campbell (1988)
Figure 4.1
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Firstly, the census schedules give details of the origin or 
birthplace of Govan's household heads and they confirmed 
that the vast majority of the population, some 95%, were 
born outwith the burgh.
Over 4 0%, came from the semi-industrial rural communities of 
Lanark, Renfrew and Ayr or, what was termed as, the 
'Lowlands of Scotland.' These rural communities had 
suffered severely over the previous generation, from the 
collapse of both handloom weaving and the Scottish Cotton 
Industry. As a result, families moved from the rural 
communities to the rapidly growing shipbuilding communities 
in search of work. These Lowlanders, who moved to the 
shipbuilding communities, entered the industry with some 
industrial experience, a familiarity with trade unionism and 
with a knowledge of industrial wage/labour employment.
Just over a third of the population came from either the 
famine stricken communities of West and North West Ireland 
or the croft areas of the Highlands. Many of them spoke 
English only as a second language. They had little 
knowledge of industry or trade unionism.
The population of Govan was, therefore, made up 
predominately of people born outwith the burgh, people who 
came to Govan from different backgrounds and cultures. 
These diversities, including the Highlanders with their 
presbyterian traditions, the Irish with the catholic 
traditions and the Lowlanders with their trade union 
familiarities.
Secondly, the census schedules gave details of the 
proportion of household heads employed in shipbuilding. 
This confirmed that over half of the household heads were 
employed in the shipyards and lends support to the view that 
the Shipbuilding Industry's remarkable expansion was largely 
responsible for the steady stream of immigrant workers to 
the community and the industry itself. It also shows just 
how dependent the industry was on the immigrant manpower as 
illustrated in figure 4.2.
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PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLD HEADS
EMPLOYED IN SHIPBUILDING
1871 1891
All Heads 42% 56%
Irish Born 47% 60%
Highland Born 52% 43%
SOURCE: Campbell (1988)
Figure 4.2
Furthermore, Campbell (1988) suggested that it was possible 
to identify the type of employment taken up by the immigrant 
manpower. He demonstrated this by, applying the
information from the census schedules to the general 
socio-economic groupings adopted by the Registrar General 
some years later in 1951. The results are illustrated in 
figure 4.3.
TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT TAKEN UP BY
IMMIGRANT GROUPS IN % TERMS
1871 1891
Social Economic Grouo 
1. Owners 3.7 2 .1
2. Managers 10.1 6.5
3. Skilled 38.4 33.2
4. Semi-Skilled 26.6 29.5
5. Un-skilled 20.9 28.6
SOURCE: Campbell (1988)
Figure 4.3
Campbell's analysis indicated that over half of the 
immigrant manpower were employed in the lowly paid job, the 
semi-skilled and unskilled categories. About a third found 
employment in the skilled workers groups and about a fifth 
in the work categories of Managers and Owners.
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He suggested that what he termed as the "culture cleavage" 
between the three major groups of immigrant workers had
severe consequences for their employment prospects when they 
entered the shipbuilding industry. According to Campbell
(1988) : -
"Although the vast majority of the household heads 
were immigrants, those coming from the Lowlands of 
Scotland secured a quite disproportionate share of 
the better paid employment." (Campbell 1988 Page 
Ref.7).
He supported this view by, once again, applying the census 
scheduled information to the general socio-economic grouping 
adopted by the Registrar General in 1951. The results
indicated that the Lowland Scots almost monopolised the 
immigrant workers share of the first two job categories, 
owners and managers. They also took the lions share of 
skilled manual jobs occupied by the three major immigrant 
groups. This indicated in figure 4.4.
THE INDIVIDUAL IMMIGRANT GROUPS
SHARE OF JOBS
BASED ON 1871 CENSUS SCHEDULES
Lowland Hiahland Irish
1. Owners 3.6 0 0
2. Managers 9.2 .8 .1
3. Skilled 27.9 8.5 1.9
4. Semi Skilled 16.4 6.5 3.7
5. Unskilled 7.7 4.4 8.8
SOURCE: Campbell (1988)
Figure 4.4
The Lowlanders monopoly of the better paid jobs may well 
have been reflective of the fact that they had industrial 
experience, trade union familiarity and skill which other 
immigrants did not. The Highlanders and the Irish were 
employed predominantly in semi-skilled and unskilled work.
I
I
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The proportion of unskilled or labouring jobs increased 
sharply between 1871 and 1891, as the industry moved towards 
full Iron and Steel Technology. The additional demands for 
these jobs were met entirely by the Irish and Highland born 
with the Irish, in particular, occupying a large share of 
the new jobs.
Accordingly, a large influx of immigrant workers from three 
major areas supported the expansion of the Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilding Industry.
The three immigrant work groups were sharply stratified 
in that:-
a) The Lowland workers, the group of immigrant 
workers who had previous industrial 
experience, principally gained the well paid 
skilled jobs.
b) The Highlanders, the immigrant workers with 
the presbyterian traditions, tended to move 
into intermediate bands of less secure 
semi-skilled jobs.
c) The Irish, the immigrants with the catholic 
traditions, were mainly dependent on very 
unstable, badly paid unskilled work and were 
taken on as needed.
The immigrant workers, therefore, entered shipbuilding at a 
time when the industry was growing and adopting a new 
approach to manpower utilisation. This new approach moved 
away from the concept of the multi-skilled shipbuilder to 
the principles of job specialisation.
Many new occupations were established as a result of this 
move and the effect of this had on the 'immigrant workers' 
occupations tended to be directly related to their culture 
cleavage.
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2. TRADE SPECIALISATION
In taking full advantage of the benefits offered by the 
industrial revolution the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, as 
indicated previously, altered the methods by which ships 
were produced and changed the way manpower was utilised. 
These changes introduced trade specialisation, a feature of 
manpower utilisation that remained more or less intact in 
shipbuilding for over one hundred years.
Mortimer (1973), in his history of the Boilermaker Society, 
a trade union whose membership represented the largest 
proportion of shipbuilding workers, argues that the main 
determinants of the shipbuilding industry's traditional 
approach to manpower utilisation were:
a) The development of steam power.
b) The building of ships from iron and steel
instead of wood.
c) Manufacturing in workshops.
d) The introduction of power generated machines.
His view was that before the industrial revolution, nearly 
everyone in Britain worked on the land. A small minority 
worked in towns and villages as hand craftsmen. However, 
with the coming of the Industrial Revolution, a growing 
proportion of the populaton were employed in factories. The 
manufacture of goods in these factories and industries, such 
as shipbuilding, was made possible by the development of 
steam power. This enabled the muscle power of human beings 
to be replaced by power generated from heating water and 
transforming it into steam. This transformation enabled 
mechanical work to be performed by machines:-
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"Machines were introduced, tasks were broken down 
to allow for the division of labour, and workers 
were employed together in large numbers in
factories and workshops. The range of goods which 
could be manufactured in this way was greatly
increased and productivity was much higher." 
(Mortimer 1973 page ref.25).
In theory, this meant that labour could be trained to carry
out single or specialist tasks rather than a range of tasks
and, in keeping with the doctrine of Adam Smith, they could 
perform more productively.
In order to make this type of workshop manufacture possible, 
other developments were necessary. Iron had to be obtained 
for making machinery, coal had to be mined to provide power 
for the new steam engines. New specialist skills had, of 
course, to be learned for the preparation, shaping, cutting 
and fabrication of metal. As such, the building of ships 
from iron and steel instead of wood and the introduction of 
the power generated machines brought about major changes to 
the shipbuilding industry.
Typical of these changes was a move away from a system 
whereby shipwrights were virtually the only shipbuilding 
trade. The shipwrights were multi-skilled workers who, on 
the basis of sub-contract, named their price for building 
ships. A former shipbuilder, Wigram, concluded:-
"The old wood-using industry had been run on 
virtual sub-contract lines, with Shipwrights 
naming their price, then building the ship." 
(Wigram 1867 page ref.15).
However, the much heavier demands of iron and steel 
shipbuilding and the introduction of new machines and 
technology meant that full profit could only be achieved if 
the workforce was transformed. A different approach to 
manpower utilisation, based on trade specialisation, had to 
be established.
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3. MANPOWER STRUCTURES
The manpower structures which emerged from the move by the 
shipbuilders to introduce trade specialism, split the 
industry's skilled workers into two basic work groups - 
metal users and outfitters.
The metal users, whose main function was to build the ship's 
hull, evolved from the craft of Boilermaking. Originally 
the Boilermakers purpose was to construct boilers for steam 
engines. Figure 4.5 illustrates the type of boilers 
constructed by boilermakers.
B O I L E R S  FOR M A R S H  fP F N P T N F C.
SQXUjRCEI Scotts (1906)
Figure 4.5
These boilers were made of plates of metal which were cut 
and bent to shape. The plates had then to be joined 
together to make them steam tight.
The craft of Boilermaking, as it originally developed, was 
an extremely wide one, calling for considerable skills in 
many different operations. These include plating, template 
making, rolling, planing, punching, shearing, bending, 
welding, flanging and drilling.
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It was also part of the Boilermakers trade to fabricate 
metal structures or machines.
The development of iron and steel shipbuilding was to
provide employment for tens of thousands of boilermakers 
whose skills seemed ideally suited to the metal ship 
construction. However, it was not as multi-skilled
craftsmen that boilermakers were employed in ship 
construction, their multi-skills were divided into separate 
specialist functions.
"Boilermakers had considerable skills in many 
different operations. It was not surprising 
therefore that a measure of specialisation began 
to develop. The employer recognised that
specialisation would help productivity". 
(Mortimer 1973 page ref.27).
This specialisation brought about a metal-using or 
Boilermaking trade structure which reflected the many 
different operational skills of the Boilermaker. The trade 
structure comprised the individual trades of Platers,
Riveters, Drillers, Caulkers, Template-makers, Markers-off 
and Welders.
Much of the manpower required to support the metal using 
trade structure came from the Highland immigrant work group 
who moved from semi-skilled occupation into the new 
rivetting and caulking trades. Trades which appeared to be 
ideally suited to the physique of the large brawny 
Highlanders as distinct from the much smaller Irish. The 
type of machines and equipment used by the specialist 
tradesmen known as platers as illustrated in figure 4.6.
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P L A T I N G  M A C H I N E  SHOP
S O URCE: Fairfield (1908)
Figure 4.6
These machines allowed the specialist platers to cut and 
bend the steel plates required to build the ships and, given 
the fact that some platers become specialists in this 
particular task, they could carry out the function with a 
greater degree of efficiency and, perhaps, faster than .a 
tradesman who only used the equipment occasionally.
"Some who today criticise the specialisation 
amongst Boilermakers overlook, or are perhaps, 
unaware of the circumstances in which it 
originated and developed. It was introduced and 
extended as a means to higher productivity". 
(Mortimer 1973 page ref.28).
The Shipwrights, probably the oldest established trade, and 
who built the hulls of wooden ships although, not initially, 
part of the boilermaker trade structure, still had a role to 
play in the construction of iron and steel ships. Their 
duties, in addition to fitting out, were associated with 
lining off, erecting, 'fairing' the steel skeleton of the 
ship and launching it.
The cyclic nature of shipbuilding meant that the metal-using 
trades build the ship's hull and they are followed, at a 
later stage in the build cycle, by a work group known as the 
"Out Fitting" trades. The emergence of this work group owes 
much to the developments discussed earlier by Mortimer. A 
new group of workers, many from the Lowland immigrant group, 
came into existence to perform these specialist tasks. 
These became the trades which formed an outfit trade 
structure. They included Turners, Fitters, Moulders, Smith 
and Millwrights who were sometimes known as mechanics.
In addition to the outfitting trades mentioned, there was 
also an assortment of others such as, for example, Joiners, 
Electricians, Plumbers, Sheet Metal Workers, Tinsmiths, 
Painters and the Sawmill trades who found employment in the 
shipyards. In essence, therefore, the Iron Shipbuilding 
Industry developed as a specialist Tradesman's industry. 
Man, perhaps, being an approriate word. There were very few 
women in this trade structure, the exception being those 
involved in the trades of French Polishers and Upholsterers.
"This yard (Fairfield) has a typical shipbuilding 
trade structure. The majority of the labour 
force are tradesmen. The semi-skilled category 
is relatively small. The helpers or semi-skilled 
tend to attach to, and work with tradesmen. The 
women shown are French Polishers. The yard 
employs over 500 boys, most as apprentices, 
although about 100 are pre-apprentices". 
(Robertson 1960 page ref.75).
Shipbuilding was a tradesman's industry. The tradesmen were 
single trade specialists and large numbers of apprentices 
were recruited to provide a continuous supply of specialist 
tradesmen. The semi-skilled workers were but a small 
minority of the workforce.
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In summary, the traditional approach to manpower utilisation 
involved:-
a) The adoption of the principles of trade
specialism as a means of improving
productivity.
b) The creation of craft and trade structures 
which split the skilled workers into two
basic workgroups - metal users and 
outfitters.
c) Reliance upon apprentice training as a source 
of manpower supply for the specialist trades.
4. MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
To manage and supervise the labour force, the individual 
shipyards developed what was described as a hierarchy or 
bureaucratic structure.
"Yard hierarchy could be a complicated affair with 
some variation from time to time. All were
bureaucratic in structure with clearly defined 
systems of accountability and routes of
communication. Every man, in theory, knew to 
whom he was responsible and a detailed job
description gave him a clear idea of what was
expected of him." (Castle 1988 page ref.30)
A general outline of the management structure, for what was 
essentially the production function, is illustrated in 
figure 4.7.
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TYPICAL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE 
FOR PRODUCTION AT 1900
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I
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SOURCE: Castle (1988)
Figure 4. 7
The production function was divided into three areas - 
Engineering, Shipbuilding and Boilermaking. The trades 
associated with each of these areas were grouped under an 
appropriate Manager. For example, the Engineering Manager 
had, at his disposal, a group of tradesmen consisting of 
Turners, Fitters, Engineers, Brassfinishers, Pressers, 
Boilermakers etc. To assist him in the management and 
supervision of this manpower, he was supported by a 
bureaucratic structure consisting of departmental managers, 
foremen, underforeman and changehands each with, what Castle 
describes as, clearly defined responsibilities and channels 
of communications.
The position of foreman was regarded as particularly 
important in terms of the shipyards' performance and indeed 
its ability to effectively utilise its manpower. The 
foremen were given relative privileges which included 
security of employment, access to benefit schemes and 
company housing. These foremen were normally selected on 
the basis of their ability and trade background.
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A plater, for example, would be selected as a chargehand or 
assistant foreman, and further up the structure, the foreman 
plater would be selected from those who were assistant 
foremen. Accordingly, the job specialisation which was 
inherent within the craft and trade structure was also 
reflected in the management and supervisory structures. In 
theory, these foremen knew exactly what authority and 
responsibilities they had, even though they had little or no 
training for their supervisory role. They had the right to 
"hire and fire" manpower to suit the fluctuating demands of 
the shipbuilding market place in an industrial environment 
free from employment protection legislation. Indeed, 
Campbell (1988), by implication, illustrated that this 
authority to "hire and fire" was a major factor in terms of 
the shipyards' ability to effectively utilise its manpower.
"The violent fluctuations in shipbuilding demand 
were used to create what were effectively two
grades of workmen, a permanent core of skilled
workers and a much larger body of workers who were 
hired and fired as needed." (Campbell 1988 page 
ref.16).
The delegated authority to "hire and fire" gave the foreman 
a major control over his manpower and, indeed, the way it 
was utilised. The foreman also had a major influence on the 
shipyards' production performance and the earnings level of
his workforce, through his control of incentive payment
systems such as "piece work". This is, perhaps, best 
illustrated by quoting from an essay written in 1857 by an 
un-named Boilermaker and included by Mortimer (1973), in his 
work devoted to the history of the boilermakers.
"If the men cease work and take shelter for a 
short time until the storm abates, they are found 
fault with by the foreman or the master, who tell 
them plainly that they cannot afford to pay them 
to stop skulking there, they must either work in 
the rain or go home.
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The result is that the men agree to work 
piece-work, so that the master may lose nothing 
through their waiting for a few hours occasionally 
and that the men may have an opportunity by a 
little extra exertion in good weather of making up 
their lost time in bad weather.” (Boilermakers 
1857).
In effect, under the piece work system the shipyard workers 
were not paid when they ceased work due to inclement weather 
and they worked extra hard when the weather was good to make 
up for lost time.
The importance of the foreman's role and, indeed, his 
application of the piece work systems, were also considered 
by the former Personnel Services and Safety Manager of Govan 
Shipbuilders as vital factors of the industry's approach to 
manpower utilisation, particularly from its inception to the 
I960's. In an unpublished report the manager, who was first 
appointed a foreman in the industry in the 1950's, wrote
"The foreman exercised a range of options to 
engage or reject labour and to have his 
instructions carried out. Not least of these 
options was the control of the piece work system, 
under which, in the case of a welder for example, 
output could be measured and paid for at a certain 
pace. The foreman was allocated responsibilities 
which included the duty to allocate work based on 
the skills available in his workgroup, fix rates 
of pay, plan the job, and control the quality of 
workmanship. The authority vested in the 
foreman's job allowed him to order the worker to 
carry out rework without compensation in cases of 
poor workmanship, and to hire and fire to meet 
production demands." (Yuill 1990).
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Through the piece-work system, the foreman effectively 
controlled and eliminated payments for lost or ineffective 
time. He could also afford his workers an opportunity to 
make up their lost time and earnings by extra exertion.
The main characteristics of the Upper Clyde shipbuilding 
industry's management and supervisory structures could, 
therefore, be summarised as:-
a) The creation of a management and supervisory 
structure based on trade specialisation which 
was reflective of the craft and trade 
structures.
b) Clearly defined systems of accountability and 
routes of communication.
c) Detailed job descriptions with delegated 
levels of authority and responsibility.
Within the structure, the role of the foreman was critical 
to production performance and manpower utilisation. An 
important factor of this was the operation of incentive 
payment systems, the detail of which will be discussed in 
the concluding sections.
5. INCENTIVE SYSTEMS
Incentive payment systems had been traditional in many parts 
of the textile, mining, engineering, and shipbuilding 
industries. The systems practiced in shipyards,
particularly during the period from the industry's inception 
to the 1960's, had a close relationship to the trade 
groupings. Outfit trades had bonus systems while the 
Boilermaking trades had payment by result systems known as 
"piece work".
Both systems were considered to be influential factors in 
the industry's traditional approach to manpower utilisation, 
in that, they provided an incentive to increase production 
outputs and employees earnings. Bonus systems operated on 
the basis that a worker was paid a guaranteed minimum wage, 
and in addition, a bonus derived from the hours saved in 
producing a particular job. The bonus was paid when the 
actual time taken to do the job was less than the time 
allowed.
"Payment by merit to the tradesman is adopted as 
far as possible. In the engine works the bonus 
system - first adopted in 1902 - is extensively 
applied. The arrangement is satisfactory from 
the point of view of tradesmen, employer and 
client." (Scotts 1906 page ref.90).
Long experience had enabled the Scotts' Shipbuilding Company 
to set equitable standard times for many operations. 
Having set these times they guaranteed that the times would 
not be altered unless entirely new machines were introduced 
that greatly influenced the rate of production.
Under the Scotts' bonus scheme an employee who required the 
full time or more than the time set as the standard for a 
job was paid his full guaranteed wage. However, if he 
completed the work in less than the standard time, his rate 
of wage per hour increased in direct proportion to the 
saving in time - the shorter the time taken, the greater the 
rate of bonus.
"The bonuses earned range as a rule from 20 to 3 0 
per cent over the time rate wages. To quote 
actual cases, a workman who saves 26 hours on a 
job for which the standard time is 134 hours, 
increases his wages for the fortnight by 14s. 
while they money saves to the employer is only 
2s.9d. He who saves 3 0 per cent on time adds 21s. 
to his fortnights wages." (Scotts 1906 page 
ref.91).
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Reductions in the time taken was not attained at the expense 
of qualify, the premium job was carefully inspected and only 
those satisfying the quality standards attracted bonus 
payments. The employee was careful, therefore, to avoid 
risks which would result in a quality failure and a loss of 
the reward for his work. The reductions were mostly due to 
the exercise of foresight and ingenuity on the part of the 
employee who was ever on the alert to ensure that he would 
not have been kept waiting for materials to enable his work 
to progress.
From the Company point of view, the bonus scheme produced 
gains. These took the form of increased production from a 
given number of machines and men, from what was termed a 
'constant establishment expenditure' - rent, rates, taxes 
etc. and the reduction of ineffective or lost production 
time. Even though there was an increase in wages paid to 
the men, the advent of the bonus scheme reduced the cost of 
production which in turn encouraged capital expenditure on 
improved methods and appliances.
Concurrent with the adoption of the bonus system there was a 
great increase in the cutting speed of tools from the new 
appliances which augmented the increased rate of production. 
Some indication of the increased economy resulting from the 
bonus system and from the 'speeding up' of tools as compared 
with the former systems is provided by the following 
illustration:-
"A typical job, which had formerly occupied 
eighty hours, was, after experience, given a 
standard time of sixty hours. When first carried 
out under the bonus system the time actually taken 
was forty-five hours, the labour cost being 
reduced from £2.13s.4d. to £1.17s.6d. under the 
bonus system, while the wage of the worker was 
increased by 2d. per hours." (Scotts 1906 page 
ref.92).
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In addition, it was stated that subsequently, a repeat of
the job was machined by the same men who, confident that the
time allowed would not be reduced, finished the work in
thirty nine hours, saving twenty one hours on standard
times. This reduced the cost to £1.15s.0d. and increased 
pay by 2.8d per hour.
In successive fortnights after the introduction of the bonus 
scheme, the percentage of time saved in Scotts steadily 
advanced from 16 per cent to 47 per cent. The pay of the 
workmen increased by 75 per cent and over the same period 
the saving to the Company was 50 per cent.
The introduction of a bonus scheme into Scotts had major 
benefits, particularly in terms of the Company's ability to 
utilise its manpower and machines more productively. This, 
in turn, reflected in the competitive position of the 
Company.
"The client profits, as the contract price is 
reduced without any diminution in the satisfactory 
character of the work done; indeed it is probable 
that this is improved because of the special 
inspection to ascertain if the bonus has been 
conscientiously earned. A lower contract price, 
therefore, is possible and this places the firm 
both directly and indirectly in a better position 
in competition in shipbuilding." (Scotts 1906 
page ref.93).
The benefits derived from the introduction of the bonus 
scheme, therefore, created a climate in which the Company 
obtained more work, thus ensuring more constant employment 
for the workforce. It also provided the additional 
inducement of higher wages for the capable and diligent 
workers.
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6. PIECE WORK INCENTIVES
The Boilermaking trades, as indicated previously, had an 
incentive payment by results system known as 'piece work'. 
At its most basic, workers under the piecework scheme were 
paid in proportion to the amount they produce on the basis 
of a price list set by the Company. The advantages of the 
piecework system were firstly, that it was simple to operate 
and secondly, the worker had an incentive to increase 
production outputs and increase his individual earnings.
There were, of course, difficulties in setting such a price 
list. These difficulties, according to Robertson (1960) 
were associated with the measuring of output when the unit 
of production was not standardised and these can be 
illustrated by a piecework scheme for shipyard welders
"Since some standardisation is possible in welding 
work this is not an example of the problem at its
worst, which occurs when one only of a particular
job is undertaken and it is necessary to try and 
price or time it for payment purposes." 
(Robertson 1960 page ref.82).
Prices or times, he stressed, could be set for each of the 
standard types of weld - butt, fillet etc. After this work
was done however, standard corrections were required for (a)
weld position since welding downhand is easier than welding 
in the vertical or overhead positions (b) thickness of 
plates to be welded (c) size and type of electrode (d) 
number of runs of weld required (e) types of plates to be 
welded (e.g. armoured).
The existence of such variations complicated the pricing of 
work. Welders had to work outside and in awkward corners. 
Slight discrepancies in measurement and the fitting of 
plates placed a requirement on welders to create good welds 
from badly fitting steel plates.
The example, cited earlier, illustrates the practical 
problem of allowing factors outwith the worker's control to 
influence his earnings. These factors included faulty 
electrodes or conditions under which the work was to be 
performed, weather etc., all of which affected output but 
could not be readily allowed for. Under this type of 
incentive scheme a welder, as indicated in a previous 
section, was allocated work by the foreman and his earnings 
were influenced by the type of work he was given and the 
conditions, including the weather, under which the work was 
to be performed.
The system, therefore, had disadvantages in that the 
workers' earnings were unstable and were often reflective of 
production outputs. As such, earnings were low when 
production output was low and high when production output 
was high. The quality of work was liable to suffer at the 
expense of quantity of output.
In summary, shipbuilding incentive payment systems
a) were closely associated with the craft and 
trade structures.
b) reduced payment for ineffective and lost 
production time.
c) rewarded effort, ingenuity and foresight.
d) were an important tool in the industry's 
approach to achieving efficient manpower 
utilisation.
The foreman was a major influence in the operation of the 
incentive payment systems, insofar as he allocated the work 
to the shipyard workers under his control and could, 
therefore, influence the earnings of his individual workers.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
The shipbuilding industry's classical approach to manpower 
utilisation could be described as simplistic and 
self-motivating. Simplistic, from the point of view that it 
was based on Adam Smith's theory of job specialisation 
whereby burners were employed to burn, riveters were 
employed to rivet steel plates together and welders welded. 
The approach was, therefore, simply designed to make the 
best use of the people in the shipyard and based on the 
theory that every shipyard worker was a specialist. As 
such, each knew exactly what his job was and what was 
required to be done.
Arguably, the concept meant that the job specialist could do 
the job much quicker and to a higher standard than the non 
specialist. The specialisation theory extended to the 
structure adopted by shipyard management to supervise the 
workforce and to add credibility. This would not be 
considered as unreasonable given that it would be rational 
to suppose that platers, promoted from the shop floor on the 
basis of their specialist skills and knowledge, were the 
best people to supervise a group of specialist platers.
It could be argued, however, that this dependency on job 
specialisation, as the principal factor of manpower 
utilisation and resourcing, resulted in the creation of 
demarcation boundaries between the various specialist 
trades. This gave rise to the perception and practice that 
only job specialists could operate within these boundaries 
and, this in turn, limited the mobility and flexibility of 
the shipyard workforce.
The classical approach could also be described as self 
motivating in the sense that incentive bonus payments were a 
principal factor of workforce motivation insofar as these 
payments were associated with individual performance.
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Arguably, the theory was that the more work the shipyard 
worker completed the more his pay increased. Workers would 
not have to be 'policed' at the work place and, in this 
context, it would be logical to assume that the urge to 
increase the take home pay was sufficient motivation to keep 
them working until the whistle signalled the end of the 
shift.
Accordingly, the Shipbuilding Industry's classical approach 
to manpower utilisation, was particularly suited to its 
'time frame' given that it operated in a highly labour 
intensive and basic industry untroubled by international 
competitive demands of the market place during the late 19th 
and early 2 0th century. However, its appropriateness to 
that 'time frame' should not disguise its built in flaws, in 
that it 'restricted' the mobility and flexibility of the 
workforce in the interest of job specialisation.
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CHAPTER 5: THE CLASSICAL APPROACH TO ORGANISATION
MODEL 1, PART 2
1. TECHNICAL FUNCTIONS
Classical organisational functions were created by the 
builders of iron and steel ships, in order to secure 
efficiency in the design and construction of ships and 
machinery.
"Organisation and administration are as important 
factors in securing efficiency as the mechanical 
methods and appliances are adopted." (Scott 
1906 page ref.88).
Shipbuilders regarded organisation as a process to ensure 
that they made efficient use of workspace, equipment, 
materials and manpower. Part of the organisation process, 
taking account of the different types of specialist tasks 
and operations was performed on the production assembly 
floor. By the latter part of the nineteen century, 
shipyards had established technical and administration 
departments to carry out these organisation processes. The 
existence of these departments was revealed at Fairfield in 
the early part of the 2 0th century.
"The interior of the office building is arranged 
for managerial, estimating, cost, supply and other 
branches of a well organised administration and 
for designing, drawing, tracing and photographic 
departments for both shipbuilding and 
engineering." (Fairfield 1908 page ref.91).
The design, drawing and tracing departments and the moulding 
loft were generally understood to be the principal technical 
departments. These departments were created as a means of 
discharging responsibility for ship design and to ensure 
accuracy and expedition in construction.
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The shipbuilders recognised that they had a responsibility 
for the design of every ship constructed by them. In 
creating a design department they also recognised that 
success would be rendered more certain by:-
a) Possession of carefully collated records.
b) An organised system of working up all data.
c) Tackling new problems.
d) Making new calculations regarding any
scientific question.
e) Studying the contemporaneous work as 
described in technical press and in papers 
read at technical institutions.
This continuous investigation produced a wealth of 
suggestions which enabled the heads of the respective 
departments to determine how far practice could be improved. 
The design staff were supported by a well selected technical 
library and work was initiated in drawing offices by a work 
group who operated under the job title of Draughtsman as 
illustrated in figure 5.1.
S H I P Y A R D  D R A W I N G  O F F I C E
S O URCE: Fairfields (1908)
Figure 5.1
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The "Printed Instructions to Draughtsmen" throws light on 
the general principles which influenced this work group. 
This reads
"Every little detail should be definitely attended 
to on the drawings and not left to the judgement
of the men in shops. Remember that it is usually
the unexpected which happens, and that the want of 
a split pin may cause a breakdown." (Scotts 
1906 page ref.89).
In making drawings or sketches for the production shops or 
for ordering material, the draughtsmen were encouraged to 
assume that those who had to interpret the instructions had 
no knowledge of, or information concerning the work in 
question, except what was contained in the drawing. This 
ensured that all information issued from the drawing office
was complete and that no work was done in the production
shops without drawing office instructions. The draughtsmen, 
in designing work, arranged details so as to fully utilise, 
as far as compatible, the special machine tools available 
and the system of gauges, templates, and jibs which were 
extensively applied in the production shops. Located in 
close proximity to the drawing offices was the tracing 
office, a technical department which was unique, in as far 
as it was resourced by women - illustrated in figure 5.2.
TRACING DEPARTMENT
S O U R C E : Fairfields (1908)
Figure  5 . 2
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The Tracers role was to trace all the draughtsmens' work on 
to, what was termed "Blue Prints", from which the drawings 
could be reproduced.
Accuracy and expedition in construction depended largely on 
the work done, not only in the drawing office, but also in 
the mould loft. A group of workers known as "Loftsmen", 
used the draughtsmens' drawings and "layed off" the ships 
lines on the floor. All lines fair were made "eye sweet". 
A temporary scrieve board was built in the loft. On this 
the loftsman reproduced the markings of every unit. These 
boards were subsequently taken to the frame-bending slabs 
and used to guide the platers in forming material to the 
required shapes. Moulds were also made for heavy castings 
and for units such as stern-post, stem etc. The mould loft 
is illustrated in figure 5.3.
M O U L D I N G  L O F T
S O U R C E : Fairfields (1908)
Figure 5.3
The loftsmen adopted a system of templating where work was 
accelerated on the building of the ships hull without losing 
any of the efficiency.
For example, by the judicious use of a single mould or 
template, 90 per cent of plates on any of the decks of a 
ship could be marked, punched, planed and otherwise made 
ready to go into position before the ship was even framed. 
All moulds and templates were stowed away after use and were 
available if a duplicate order was received.
The staff of the technical departments, with the exception 
of the tracing which, as discussed earlier, was staffed by 
women, were recruited from the production shop.
"The great majority of vacancies in technical 
staff are filled by apprentices who have spent 
three and a half years in the shops and who are 
chosen as a result of examination and of 
satisfactory record in the shop." (Scotts 1906 
page ref.90).
Even at the turn of the century, financial facilities were 
afforded to apprentices and to progressive workmen to attend 
special classes and the possibility of a transfer to the 
technical departments was an incentive to the willing 
apprentices.
Accordingly, the shipbuilding industry's traditional 
approach to organisation included the creation of a 
technical function to support the production process and 
aimed at:-
(a) Securing efficiency through mechanical 
methods and appliancies.
(b) Discharging responsibilities for ship design 
and ensuring accuracy and expedition in 
construction.
(c) Providing detailed drawings; sketches and 
templates etc., that ensured full utilisation 
of the shipyard's manpower and facilities.
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As indicated earlier, in addition to the technical function, 
shipyards also established commercial functions as a means 
of organising their operations.
2. COMMERCIAL FUNCTION
Foremost amongst the commercial activities was that of 
estimating where, according to Fairfield (1908), the most 
complete and descriptive records of costs, rates, wages 
etc., were kept on a record system. This enabled reference 
to be made on the costs of steel units and other contract 
details. It was also possible, by a simple process of 
comparison, to effectively check the economy of design and 
manufacture without having to pay a high premium.
Other commercial departments concerned themselves with well 
organised administration including, timekeeping, wages and 
costs and material supplies - illustrated in figure 5.4.
R E C E P T I O N  FIF M A T F R T A I
S O UR CE: Fairfield (1908)
Figure 5.4
The technical and commercial departments tended to be the 
principal function who supported the production process 
during the first part of the twentieth century, when 
shipyard plant was unsophisticated and construction 
proceeded at what, today, would be considered a leisurely 
pace.
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Indeed, during this period great reliance was placed on 
craft skills and any errors were usually due to individual 
lapses and not inherently prone to persistent recurrences.
The introduction of electric welding into the shipbuilding 
production process, however, brought about changes and the 
emergence of departments associated with production planning 
and quality control. These departments were of American 
origin and were introduced during the second world war when 
there was a need to build ships quicker and in greater 
numbers. This meant that production schedules had to be 
planned in detail.
There was also a growing requirement to construct thousands 
of large sections of ships hulls in workshops far removed 
from the final assembly area. This gave great impetus to 
the establishment of accuracy dimensional standards by the 
individual shipbuilders and the creation of Quality Control 
Inspection functions. It was, however, a decade after the 
end of the 1939-45 war before the Upper Clyde shipbuilders 
recognised the value of introducing such planning and 
quality functions.
By 1960, however, the Clyde based industry had introduced 
some highly sophisticated plant and equipment, production 
rates increased, and the size of ships had grown enormously. 
Moreover, quality failures were having an adverse effect on 
production and the discovery and rectification of such 
defects were affecting the reputation of the shipbuilders. 
The response of the bigger shipyards was to establish 
Planning and Quality Departments.
Shipbuilding construction methods and techniques were 
developed further throughout the 1960's and beyond. Much 
of this development took place in the expanding Japanese 
shipbuilding industry which placed more and more emphasis on 
Planning and Quality. These further developments and the 
shipbuilding industry's response to them, will be the 
concern of a future discussion associated with models two 
and three.
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The shipbuilding industry's classical approach to 
organisation, therefore, included the creation of functions 
known as 'commercial' and was aimed at:-
a) Providing a system to keep complete and
description records of costs, rates and
wages, etc.
b) Enabling reference to be made in the costs
of steel units and other contract details.
c) Providing a system to effectively check on 
the economy of design and manufacture.
d) Producing information for future improvements 
and estimates.
By the 1960's, the shipbuilders had established organisation 
functions directed to production planning and quality 
control in response to the industry's requirement to build 
large sections of ship hulls in workshops, far removed from 
the final assembly area.
3. PERSONNEL
Shipbuilders created technical and commercial organisational 
functions to secure efficiencies from the application of 
mechanical methods and appliances but, in themselves, these 
functions were not specifically designed or created to 
address what could be loosely termed as the 'people or human 
resource side' of the business. The more forward looking of 
the shipbuilders realised, however, that securing 
efficiency, particularly in a highly labour intensive 
industry, was dependent on more than just mechanical methods 
and appliances.
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Efficiency in these areas was related to the effectiveness 
of the people who were employed to operate the machines and 
appliances. It required a more human relations approach to 
organisation insofar as the shipyard workers brought their 
own needs and values to the organisation. As such, an 
organisational function known as 'Personnel' was 
established. The prime objective of the function being to 
integrate the needs and values of individuals to those of 
the Company.
Perhaps the Linthouse shipyard of Alexander Stephen best 
illustrates the industry's traditional approach to 
organisation related to the people or human resource side of 
the business. Stephen's yard was considered to be one of 
the more forward looking shipbuilders. They realised that 
experts were required to look after what they termed as 
their most important element - the human element. As such, 
they introduced a function known as "Industrial Welfare" 
into the organisation at the beginning of the twentieth 
century.
The importance of welfare work was, according to the author 
of 'Alexander Stephen and Son Ltd.', only recognised during 
the first world war although it had, perhaps, existed even 
in the nineteen century. He suggested that welfare work was 
not altogether an alien concept. Indeed, before the 
beginning of the twentieth century, when workshops were 
small, it was acknowledged that part of a good employer's 
responsibilities was to care personally for the well being 
of his individual employees. The objective of welfare work 
when introduced, therefore, was to restore that care in 
larger establishments. The only way to achieve this, on the 
much larger scale, was to set-up special arrangements for 
that purpose.
"At Linthouse in 1918, the Directors realised that 
just as they required experts to look after
machinery and caretakers for buildings, so they 
must have technicians to look after the most 
important elements of all - the human element." 
(Carvel 1951 page ref.156).
Stephen's, therefore, came to believe that, like machines, 
people required experts to take care of their welfare and 
other needs and who would ensure that the shipyard workers 
were trained to effectively carry out their tasks. Experts 
who would ensure that the work areas were safe and, as such, 
the shipyard workers could carryout tasks, safe in the 
knowledge that they would not be maimed, injured or killed, 
as a result of doing so. In other words, like machines, 
people had to have care and maintenance to ensure that they 
operated efficiently. Failure to provide this care would 
result in inefficiency and, perhaps, even a production
breakdown.
Initially, Stephen's set-up an officially recognised 
committee to deal with welfare work which was generally 
associated with complaints and grievances relating to 
working conditions. The committee also provided a
continuous communications channel between the Company and 
the employees.
"Underlying the move was the recognition of the
human worth of each individual from Manager to 
apprentice and office boy, and the determination 
that the condition under which a man earned his 
livelihood should help rather than hinder his 
attainment of a full and satisfying life."
(Carvel 1951 page ref.156).
In effect, the move to set up the committee was a determined 
effort by Stephen's to recognise that the conditions under 
which a man performed his work was an influential factor of 
his satisfactory performance.
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Good conditions would influence a good performance and poor 
performance would be reflective of poor conditions.
The next step was to move away from the committee type 
situation and appoint a Welfare Supervisor. His work in 
those days came mainly under the heading of what was called 
"Works Housekeeping" - the provision of meals, attention to 
cleanliness and the care of illness and accidents. As the 
role of Welfare Supervisor expanded, he became involved with 
issues associated with working conditions, statistics of 
sickness, labour turnover, timekeeping and absenteeism. As 
such, the Welfare Supervisors role started to take on many 
of the tasks which are now regarded as Personnel activities.
4. TRAINING
By 1919 the activities of the Stephen's welfare arrangements 
were broadened to include the Training of Apprentices.
"The activities of the welfare department were 
broadened still further and among the most 
important considerations of the department was the 
training of apprentices and means of aiding their 
development." (Carvel 1951 page ref.162).
Apprentice training was the means by which the industry 
secured a continuing supply of specialist craftsmen for 
their craft and trade structures. Young men from the 
shipbuilding communities, on leaving school, sought a highly 
valued apprenticeship in shipbuilding as a means of securing 
their future. It was the welfare supervisor who selected 
and engaged the young men who would become the industrys' 
apprentices and it was he who monitored the apprentices 
progress and also issued them with apprenticeship lines when 
their time related apprenticeship was ended.
102.
The Stephen's workshops were suitably equipped for the 
training of these apprentices and, where it was found
necessary, special instructors were appointed to train and 
supervise the work of the apprentices. Alas, the Stephen's 
approach to apprentice training was not the norm and the
training of apprentices in other shipyards did not have the
support of special instructors. They had to rely on their
own initiative or their good fortune to be apprentices to a 
craftsman who may, or may not, have been concerned with 
their training and development.
The role of training gained a boost in 1942 when, what was 
termed as Joint Committees, were introduced into the 
shipbuilding industry as a result of a common agreement 
between Government Employers' Organisation and trade unions. 
The purpose of the Committees' was to consider methods of 
improving productivity, preventing bad workmanship and 
eliminating waste. They also dealt with other practical 
problems identified by complaints from the management or the 
shipyard workers.
In the Stephen's Committees' early days, considerable time 
was given to discussing the recruitment and training of 
apprentices and, in particular, the stage of apprenticeship 
at which specialisation should begin. This would imply that 
the- Stephen apprenticeships appeared to be initiated with 
broader based training and followed later by specialist 
craft training.
Interestingly, the Committees' at Stephen's, considered 
training to be about more than simply training apprentices - 
as illustrated in figure 5.5.
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A P P R F N T I C E  t r a i n i n g  s c h o o l
SOUR CE: Carvel (1951)
Figure 5.5.
Training included developing training schemes to eguip 
adults and supervisors.
"Attention was also given to preparing and 
developing training schemes to eguip personnel as 
potential leaders and foremen of the future." 
(Carvel 1951 page ref.162).
Training was not simply confined to apprentices. It 
included "eguipping personnel as potential leaders and 
foremen", shipyard employees who had to perform critical 
functions, if organisational efficiency was to be achieved, 
employees who reguired to acguire new skills and knowledge 
as part of the eguipment required to perform their functions 
at an effective level. The Stephen's approach, recognised 
this and, moreover, acknowledged that leadership training 
was an essential ingredient of organisational efficiency.
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5. HEALTH AND SAFETY
The Directors of the Linthouse yard, by 1920, were directing 
attention to Health and Safety of the employees by 
encouraging what was described as safety alertness amongst 
their employees.
"The Directors encouraged employees by awarding 
trophies and prizes, because they appreciated that 
the best way to prevent accidents at work 
consisted of the alertness of all workers, and 
this, in turn, depended on their general health 
and happiness." (Carvel 1951 page ref.158).
The overall objective was to reduce the risks of shipyard 
workers being injured, maimed or killed in the processes 
associated with building ships. In keeping with this end, 
instructions were given in "Safety First" principles and 
first aid classes were organised. Suitable rewards were 
offered for suggestions, both for reducing accidents and 
increasing the efficiency of the works. The theory was that 
a work area, free from hazardous obstructions and safety 
risks, would also be a work area which shipyard workers 
would work more efficiently insofar as they would not lose 
time off the job due to accidents, or time off their work 
through injuries. A clean, tidy and safe work area being 
associated with organisational efficiency.
The Stephen's approach and concern for the care of the 
health and safety of their employees was not general 
throughout the Upper Clyde.
"Working conditions were spartan in most of the 
Shipyards though some yards were known to be worse 
than others. Until the late 1950's, or early 
60's, there were no mid-morning tea breaks and no 
canteens either." (Castle 1988 page ref.29).
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Castle further pointed out that little attention was paid to 
one aspect of health in particular, the provision of 
toilets:
"The older yards retained toilets fitted with a 
curved spiked bar attached to a pipe connecting 
the bowl to the cistern as a deterrent to would be 
laggards." (Castle 1988 page ref.30).
Toilets with spikes on the pipe connecting the bowl to the 
cisterns, in an effort to stop the shipyard workers from 
leaning back with some degree of comfort when going to the 
toilet - perhaps emphasising the lack of a human approach to 
organisation. However, this was the typical shipbuilders 
traditional attitude to their workforce and may explain the 
industrys' poor industrial relations.
The attitude of these less forward looking shipbuilders 
changed somewhat from the early 1960's. Prompted by 
legislation, and the introduction of the Shipbuilding 
Regulation of 1960 and the Factories Act of 1961, the 
approach to the health and safety of shipyard workers was 
more formalised. Implicit, within the legislation, was a 
requirement to maintain a 'safe' place of work and to 
appoint a 'Safety Officer' whose sole function would be 
related to safety activities.
6. PARTICIPATION AND INVOLVEMENT
Ensuring a safe place of work was not a process that could 
be carried out by a shipyard management in isolation. It 
was a process which required the participation and 
involvement of the shipyard workers. The type of 
participation and involvement that was introduced into 
shipbuilding in 1941 and known as the "Joint Councils".
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The Joint Councils of 1941, were introduced as a result of a 
common agreement between Government, Employers Organisation 
and Trade Unions. The purpose was to consider methods of 
improving productivity, preventing accidents, bad 
workmanship and eliminating waste. They also dealt with 
other practical problems identified by complaints. The 
agreement for the functioning of these Committees was 
limited in time to the duration of the war or, at most, 
until the "essential work orders" were withdrawn in 1945.
However, at Stephen the work of the Joint Councils extended 
beyond that point. They established a Shipyard Joint 
Council after 1945. The Council first met in March 1946 
and, in terms of the shipbuilding industry, this marked the 
inauguration of the first Shipyard Joint Council outwith the 
remit of the "Essential Work Orders Provisions" in Scotland. 
Addressing the opening meeting at Linthouse, the Stephen 
Director who presided, outlined the scope and function of 
the Council.
"Our concern is different, for the only 
restriction laid on us is the avoidance of topics 
which are the subject of trade union agreement.
We are concerned primarily with the efficiency of 
it - two subjects which go hand in hand, so that 
neither can be achieved without the other." 
(Stephen 1951 page ref.160).
He further pointed out that the shipyard Joint Council was a 
forum for joint consultation between management and the 
shipyard workers:-
"This joint consultation is not merely window 
dressing or 'eye-wash'. We, the management, 
really believe that you are entitled to have a 
voice in these aspects of the business and they 
are many in which your skill and experience make 
your opinions of value". (Stephen 1951 page 
ref.160).
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He appeared to recognise the expertise that the shipyard 
workers possessed. They, perhaps better than anyone else, 
had the skills and experience in the workplace and this gave 
them a knowledge of 'best practices' - as such their views 
on methods of improvement were important. Joint 
consultation was the Stephen's way of tapping this vast 
reserve of knowledge with the aim of improving productivity.
The statement on the Joint Councils work was accompanied by 
an announcement of Labour Policy which made it clear that 
the Company aimed at an equitable distribution of the 
benefits which resulted from joint consultation and the 
co-operation of employees. There was an assurance that 
everything would be done to provide continuity of employment 
and, where possible, to promote those who had proved their 
capacity. In effect the establishment of the Joint Council 
had all the ingredients of what, in the 1980's became known 
as Industrial Democracy, Worker Participation and Profit 
Sharing.
The far sighted approach of Alexander Stephen to 
participation and involvement and, indeed, their overall 
approach to the People or Human Resource side of the 
business was not universally practiced throughout the
shipbuilding community. In fact Stephen's were one of the 
few. shipbuilders who attempted to integrate the needs and 
values of their employees with that of the shipyard. With 
the great benefit of hindsight it is now, however, 
recognised that well organised and productive organisation 
functions devoted to the human resources side of the 
business, greatly influences manpower effectiveness and 
performance.
Indeed, in the three models of manpower utilisation, the
Fairfield Glasgow Experiment, the British Shipbuilders
P.I.P. Initiative and the Kvaerner Govan Approach, which 
will be discussed in detail in future chapters, the role of 
Personnel and its individual component departments was
central to the change process associated with increased 
efficiency.
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In all three models the organisational business plans were 
underpinned by industrial relations agreements and supported 
by effective training programmes. As such, they were 
brought to fruition through the effectiveness of the 
Personnel, Industrial Relations, Training and Health and 
Safety Departments. Shipbuilders, therefore, created a 
Personnel function aimed at:-
a) Caring for the well being of individuals and 
integrate their needs and values with those 
of the organisational objectives.
b) Dealing with complaints and grievances 
relating to working conditions and providing 
a continuous communications channel between 
the Company and the employees.
c) Directing attention to Health and Safety and
attending to works housekeeping, the 
provision of meals, cleanliness, care of
illnesses and accidents.
d) Recruiting, selecting and training
apprentices and developing training schemes 
for all employees including programmes for 
potential leaders and foremen.
e) Collating statistics on sickness, labour
turnover, timekeeping and absenteeism.
f) Providing a forum for joint consultation and
co-operation between the Company and the
employees.
Part of this joint consultation process considered methods 
of improving productivity, preventing accidents, bad 
workmanship and eliminating waste.
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These joint consultations aimed at establishing mutual 
respect and confidence on both sides of industry which would 
lead to further innovations associated with manpower 
utilisation and flexibility.
7. CONCLUSIONS
It could be argued that the shipbuilding industry's 
classical approach to organisation developed, through 
necessity, on an adhoc basis. Necessity in the sense that 
the early builders of iron and steel ships recognised the 
need for securing efficiency in mechanical methods and 
appliances and a requirement to support their manpower with 
accurate information. Adhoc, from the point of view that 
organisational support functions, commercial, personnel and 
planning were simply added to the structure as the size and 
degrees of sophistication of the vessels to be constructed 
increased.
The establishment of organisation support functions, 
however, had considerable merit, from a manpower utilisation 
point of view, given that:-
(a) In addition to securing design efficiency, 
the technical organisational function also 
produced drawings detailing the structures or 
appliances to be constructed and the parts 
required for the work. This was rather akin 
to the approach adopted by the producers of 
the modern self assembly 'flat pack' 
furnishing units. A drawing gives the 
assembly procedure and details of the 
materials to be used during the assembly 
process. Providing all the materials and 
equipment are available, it would be 
reasonable to assume that no time would be 
lost during assembly and normally the unit 
would be built accurately.
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However, if the detailed information is 
deficient or materials are missing or mislaid 
then, presumably, time will be lost searching 
for the missing materials and this adds time 
to the assembly process. In a shipbuilding 
context this type of lost time means that 
unnecessary manhours are added to the
completion of ships. Therefore, an 
organisational function which reduces or 
eliminates lost time, improves the
utilisation of manpower and, thereby,
contributes to shipyard efficiency and
competitiveness.
(b) Initially, shipyards were small uncomplicated 
units where the managers knew their employees 
and took time to care for their individual 
needs. They were transformed into large 
complex operations employing thousands of 
people, in any one site, as the size of the 
vessels and levels of ship sophistication 
increased. Under these circumstances, it was 
reasonable for the managers to conclude that 
they had to delegate responsibility for the 
care and maintenance of their employes to an 
organisation. It was, therefore, logical 
that an organisational function was created 
to deal with the 'people' aspects of the 
business, growing in importance as employment 
and health and safety legislation placed 
significant demands on shipyards and their 
management.
This completes the account of the 'classical' model of 
manpower utilisation which, after a century of experience 
(1860 to 1960), still retained the essential ingredients of 
its early phases - specialisation of function in production 
and management - traditional craft system and demarcation, 
adoption of incentive payment systems etc.
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It was, however, still an evolving system taking account of 
larger scale new ideas and new technology, notably the 
influence of thinking on welfare, personnel, health and 
safety and consultations.
A new wave of thinking, as depicted in Model Two - 'the 
Scientific Management' model and associated with concerns 
about the treatment of employees, lack of achievement in 
productivity and the increased competition in the 
shipbuilding markets, produced the next stage of 
development.
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CHAPTER 6: THE SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT APPROACH TO INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 
MODEL 2, PART 1
1. THE AIMS
The 'Fairfield Experiment' (1966-67), with its Government, 
private enterprise and trade union shareholding, was
intended as a five year experiment, but events, and in 
particular, the establishment of the Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilding group, curtailed the duration of the experiment 
to slightly less than two years. Despite its short 
duration, the 'Fairfield Experiment' was, however,
significant, in that it provided an opportunity to introduce 
new management techniques and communication systems into 
what had hitherto been a traditional craft industry.
Furthermore, throughout the period of the experiment, 
determined efforts were made to resolve the shipbuilding 
industry's problems and, in particular, those associated
with industrial relations and manpower utilisation policies.
Described by its founding chairman, Sir Iain Stewart, as the 
"Fairfield Industrial University", the experiment was, in 
his opinion, an opportunity to do something worthwhile in an 
ailing industry which provided work and employment for 
hundreds of thousands of people in Companies' associated 
with building ships.
Stewart, who inherited an organisation characterised by the 
problems of manpower utilisation outlined in the last 2 
chapters, recognised that a poor approach to industrial 
relationships between management and labour had been a major 
obstacle to performance, not only in shipbuilding, but in 
industry generally. This obstacle had an adverse effect on 
the economic growth and prosperity not only of industry but, 
in general, of the country at large.
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The founding Chairman believed that Fairfield would be an 
ideal "Proving Ground" for an experiment to address and 
tackle the major obstacles associated with this poor 
approach to industrial relationships. Some five years after 
the experiment ended he supported the original idea of 
setting up the "Proving Ground" at Fairfield by citing an 
independent study carried out by the International Institute 
for Economic Research. Quoting from the report and 
comparing the growth within Britain with that of its 
international competitors he said:-
"The truth is that wherever the rate of growth has 
significantly exceeded ours, one may find in one 
form or another, a distinct superiority in the 
behaviour of labour as compared with ours and this 
superiority is mainly due to superiority either in 
practices of management or in Government policy or 
in both, in the approach to the influences which 
determine whether workers are willing or unwilling 
partners in the industrial process. There can be 
little doubt that the British malady of sluggish 
economic growth reflects fundamental failures in 
the handling of natural resources which on the 
precept of theory and by the example of practical 
success holds the key to growth, namely labour." 
(Stewart 1972 page ref.56)
He, therefore, was not alone in believing poor industrial 
relations had been the major obstacle to growth and 
prosperity during the 1950's and 1960's. Further, he 
believed that the problems of redundancy, caused by the 
drive for a more effective use of manpower, had to be solved 
to the satisfaction of the labour force before it could be 
hoped to improve industrial relations. He believed that 
redundancies, associated with modernisation, were at the 
root of shop floor resentment and resistance to the change 
process.
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However, according to Stewart, the British labour force 
could be counted on to change their behaviour, and their 
non-co-operative attitude to change, if they were given the 
right leadership, security and the dignity they desired:-
"It is useless to look to the workers themselves 
for the remedy for their counter-productive 
attitudes. Fundamental changes will not take 
place unless policies and practices both of 
management and of the Government are resourcefully 
shaped to produce them. It is best to place 
responsibility here because placing it with the 
workers will simply produce non significant 
results." (Stewart 1972 page ref.59).
He, therefore, felt that workers behaviour and counter 
productive attitudes could be changed if they were given the 
chance to work with superior management on plans and 
processes associated with improving efficiency and 
productivity without the risk of being thrown, as a result, 
on the scrapheap of unemployment.
This viewpoint perhaps, rather surprisingly considering the 
state of the Upper Clyde shipbuilding industry of the 
1960's, was not universally welcomed. Indeed, the
philosophies of the 'Fairfield Experiment' were deeply 
resented by the shipbuilding community at large and, as 
such, the enterprise was regarded as a dangerous rogue 
elephant.
Despite these rejections the founding Chairman recognised 
that Fairfield presented a unique opportunity to carry out a 
basic experiment in industrial relations in a traditional 
industry. The 'Fairfield Experiment' of 1966 was, 
therefore, set up as a "National Proving Ground" whose 
principal aim could be summarised as:-
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(a) To first and foremost establish a testing
place for management and the objective was to 
produce a transformation in the workers 
behaviour and counter productive attitudes.
(b) To remove from the industry the major
obstacles to growth and prosperity.
(c) To secure lasting profitability for Fairfield
as a shipbuilder.
(d) To prove to the nation that properly 
financed, planned and an understood approach 
to regular employment and training schemes 
for re-employment could result in 
profitability through real co-operation.
It was, however, acknowledged that Fairfield was being set 
up at a time when the risk of redundancy was increasing. 
Uncompetitive shipyards were closing. Moves to modernise 
those remaining threatened the shipyard workers' highly 
valued traditional working practices, manning levels and 
specialist craft and trade structures. One of the key 
components of the Fairfield strategy was, therefore, to 
provide an industrial relations forum where management and 
trade union at Fairfield could discuss these and other 
threats to job security, in isolation and in the spirit of 
co-operation and trust.
2. ATTITUDES AND REDUNDANCY
A fundamental principle of the Fairfield Glasgow 
philosophy, and indeed, the Company's approach to industrial 
relations was based on the founding Chairman's belief that 
the problems of redundancy were the root cause of shop floor 
resentment and resistance to change.
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Indeed, this resistance was particularly evident in changes 
associated with any drive to increase the efficiency of 
manpower utilisation. However, Stewart's belief was that 
the workers' behaviour and counter-productive attitudes to 
change could be influenced if they were given the chance to 
work with management on plans and processes associated with 
improvements without the risk of being turned, as a result, 
on the scrapheap of unemployment:-
"A big factor in the attitude of labour was 
killing the redundancy bogey. Once we got them 
accepting discipline and had started loading them 
with work we guaranteed them employment for three 
years and that took the heat off. We were 
guaranteeing to establish with training and 
re-training, flexibility and mobility provided we 
could make that work and turn an unprofitable
Company into a profitable one." (Stewart 1971 
page ref.132).
The killing-off of what was termed as the "redundancy bogey" 
was recognised as critical to changing the behaviour and 
counter-productive attitudes of the Fairfield workers. 
This, indeed, before any manpower utilisation policies aimed 
at transforming Fairfield from an unprofitable into a
profitable shipyard could be introduced.
The cyclic nature of shipbuilding and the traditional way in 
which manpower was used, see reference above (Chapter 4 
Sect.3) meant that redundancy had become an integral part of 
the business. The launch of a ship inevitably signalled
that the work of those trained in steelwork trades was all 
but finished and their jobs redundant. Outfit workers, 
recruited after launch, took over the finish of the vessel 
and when the ship sailed from the yard they, like the
steelworkers before them, found their places in the 
unemployment queues.
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This tradition was probably acceptable when there were many 
yards on the Upper Clyde, at different stages of work and 
with healthy order books. Redundancy from one yard meant 
moving to another yard, but in the same local labour market 
and using the same skills. But with the shortage of yards 
and with those remaining having thin order books, the 
prospect of full employment through mobility, became 
increasingly difficult to achieve.
Insecurity, fear and resentment feelings, which helped
mould, what has been previously described as, 
counter-productive attitudes, were all by-products of this 
redundancy bogey. These feelings gave rise to a resistance 
of any new ideas which, on the surface, appeared to be aimed 
at reducing employment prospects. Moreover, the fear of 
unemployment created situations where Unions defended
overmanning and a job supported two or three workers instead 
of one. The reality of this was that the industry became 
uncompetitive, shipyards closed and the Upper Clyde
shipbuilding industry was in decline.
The magnitude of what Stewart had called the 'redundancy 
bogey' is, perhaps, best illustrated by the Company's labour 
turnover statistics for 1966 and a shop stewards comment 
quoted in Paulden (1969).
"The shop steward explained that every time a new 
ship hit the water a batch of men would be paid 
off. So, a few weeks before, if another yard was 
busy on a new order, half the lads would leave to 
get in there first and be sure of a few months 
more work at the other company. If there weren't 
any other ships coming along on the Clyde, then 
they'd say 'well let's get what we can out of this 
one. The way the men looked at it, according to 
the shop steward, was that it was in their 
interest to keep the ship delayed and keep 
themselves in work." (Paulden 1969 page ref.70).
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In both instances cited by the shop steward, a ship nearing 
completion was held back because the men stretched the work 
out or because there were not enough men, suddenly, to 
finish the job. Therefore, by offering some job security, 
and by establishing trade union participation with the 
management processes of the Company, Stewart tackled firstly 
the redundancy bogey and thereafter provided a platform for 
workers to work with management on plans to improve manpower 
utilisation.
The strategy of offering job security to a labour force of 
3,500 had a considerable impact on labour turnover, as 
illustrated in figure 6.1. From a monthly peak of 136 in 
June 1966, turnover dropped dramatically and the monthly 
peak for the following year was 30, reached coincidentally 
in June 1967.
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Figure 6.1
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It would, however, be foolish to suggest that the turnover 
problems were resolved entirely by the Fairfield approach to 
job security, of course they were not. Another influential 
factor was the shrinking Upper Clyde shipbuilding industry 
and the fact that job opportunities were limited by the 
reduction in the number of shipyards. As such, the shipyard 
workers' ability to move from one shipyard to another was 
restricted.
The Fairfield approach of offering job security as a means 
of changing the shipyard workers behaviour and 
counter-productive attitudes was, therefore, aimed at:-
(a) Killing off the redundancy bogey.
(b) Reducing the shipyard's labour turnover
problems, which resulted in workers
stretching out work as the ship neared 
launch or completion.
(c) Reducing the shipyards labour turnover
problems associated with workers leaving the 
shipyard to take up new employment with a 
longer time horizon at critical times before 
the ship launch or completion.
The approach was also aimed at providing a platform for the 
shipyard workers and management to work together on plans to 
remove Fairfield's manpower constraints.
3. MANPOWER CONSTRAINTS
Even though the turnover problems had been partly resolved, 
it was recognised that the problems of removing Fairfield's 
manpower constraints would still be difficult. These 
problems included job demarcation, overmanning and a lack of 
supervisory control:-
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"Jealousy over jobs meant strict demarcation, not 
only between unions, but also between trades 
inside the same union, "one man one job" had been 
the slogan for 150 years and is applied, for 
example, to the ten or more distinct trades within 
the Boilermakers Society, so that a shipwright
could not drill a hole, a blacksmith was not 
allowed to weld. There were caulkers, platers,
shipwrights, welders, riveters, holders-on, and 
sheet iron workers, all with strict limitations on 
what they were permitted to do." (Paulden 1969 
page ref.71).
Paulden explained how it took three men all afternoon to fix 
an electric cable on the ship's bulkhead. The electrician 
would go and find a driller. His foreman would contact the 
foreman of the drillers and ask for a man to be sent. When 
the driller had been spared and had drilled the couple of 
holes, the electrician would then ask his foreman to locate 
a caulker to prepare the holes for his fixture. The same
procedure was repeated and then at last, after the various
breaks and delays, the electrician was allowed to install 
his cable.
This type of demarcation was, of course, having an adverse 
effect on the Fairfield competitive situation and, as such, 
was a principal manpower constraint. However, James 
Houston, the Production Services Director at the Yard, 
stressed that the management at Fairfield were not against 
demarcation completely. The specialist craft and trade 
structure was respected, but there had to be a greater 
degree of flexibility for the specialists to do simple tasks 
to progress their jobs. He maintained:-
"We are all for some form of demarcation, but in 
management language we call it specialisation. We 
do not want the electricians to fix our plumbing 
and we do not want the welders to build our wooden 
decks.
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What we want is for an electrician to be able to 
drill a simple hole when he is fixing a lamp, just 
as any householder would be competent to do. When 
there is no work left for the sheet metal worker, 
we want to be able to train him as a plater or as 
a welder where there is a shortage of men." 
(Houston 1969 page ref.121).
Paulden described how manpower was also constrained, due to 
the lack of proper control and supervision, one batch of men 
would spend a day fitting cabins with formica walls and 
ceilings, later along came electricians to lay the cables 
behind the walls. The formica would have to be ripped out 
and then put back again the following day, doubling the cost 
of work. There were complex systems of pay differentials so 
that as many as 500 rates of pay were running concurrently 
in the Company and these too were creating problems of 
manpower utilisation.
"So jealously did the men guard their 
differentials and guard the available work, that a 
main theme of union activity was a fight against 
changes - against changes in rate structures, 
against the loss of work to another type of 
tradesman, against the loss of an exclusive right 
to a certain type of job". (Paulden 1969 page 
ref.70).
The jealous defence of jobs by unions and the rigid 
demarcation principles even prevented men moving from 
defunct trades such as riveters, into the booming trades, 
and a spirit of suspicion had been fuelled by the fear of 
unemployment if a job was lost. Consequently, a major part 
of the drive to improve manpower utilisation was to remove 
the suspicion and fear of unemployment and replace it with 
trust, confidence and job security.
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The principal manpower constraints at Fairfield could, 
therefore, be summarised as:-
(a) The problems of strict demarcation and the 
notion of 'one man one job' which inhibited 
the shipyard worker's ability to practice a 
trade outwith his own trade boundaries.
(b) The problems of overmanning which meant that 
several tradesmen had to perform their own 
individual specialist tasks on a job which 
could have been performed by one man.
(c) The problems of lost manhours, due to the 
shipyard workers of one trade waiting on the 
services of another.
(d) The problems associated with the lack of 
control and supervision of work, which 
resulted in rework and doubled the costs.
(e) The problems of complex and chaotic pay 
differentials which resulted in trade unions 
claiming exclusive rights to certain jobs and 
resisting the loss of this work to another 
trade.
(f) The demarcation principles which prevented 
workers moving from defunct to booming 
trades.
These manpower constraints were, of course, associated with 
the specialist craft and trade structures and many of these 
constraints had been embodied in the shipbuilding industries 
collective bargaining agreements. In effect, the 
specialisation requirements which were originally introduced 
as an aid to efficiency had become too highly structured and 
fragmented, and were characterised by virtually watertight 
compartmentalisation.
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The problems of management, in trying to coordinate this, 
became increasingly more formidable. At the same time, the 
competitive condition of the industry world wide had 
tightened in such a way as to make this rigidity and 
compartmentalisation insupportable in economic terms. The 
division of labour had gone well beyond what the new market 
place would actually bear.
4. AGREEMENT AND OWNERSHIP
During the 1960's, the activities associated with industrial 
relations were regulated by collective bargaining 
agreements. These agreements were not made between the 
management and workers of the individual shipyards, but 
between the Shipbuilding and Shiprepairers National 
Association and the Confederation of Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Unions. However, employees were dissatisfied 
with this approach. They expressed this dissatisfaction in 
many different ways. These included, complaints, formal 
grievances, industrial disputes, absences, lack of
commitment to work, and a lack of concern for quality and 
economic realism.
An extreme example of this dissatisfaction, cited earlier by 
Wilson (1972), was industrial disputes, an activity which 
became more and more commonplace in the shipbuilding
industry of the 1960's. Indeed, by 1965, the number of
days lost through strikes was, on average, some 5 times 
above the national average. The significant difference 
between shipbuilding's record and elsewhere, was on issues 
of job demarcation which were three times more important in 
shipbuilding as compared to other industries.
It was not surprising, therefore, that one of the principal 
aims of the 'Fairfield Experiment' was to change this poor 
approach to industrial relations and prove that the
management and workers of the shipyard could work together 
and create industrial relationships that would benefit the 
Company, the workers and the community at large.
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An important feature of this was a move to replace multi 
employer bargaining with company bargaining.
According to the founding Chairman:-
"If we were to have the freedom to experiment with 
new ideas, it is vitally important that we should 
be able to negotiate with the unions in isolation 
from National Agreements and so re-negotiate the 
Rule Books." (Stewart 1968 page ref.107).
Fairfield required the freedom to negotiate with the union 
in isolation, to ensure that industrial relations agreements 
were related to the Fairfield business plans and, as such, 
addressed specific shipyard problems. This part of the 
approach could be loosely termed as seeking local ownership, 
to ensure that the managers and the trade unions at 
Fairfield concluded agreements which reflected their views 
and their thoughts, and related directly to their local 
situation. Furthermore, having previously obtained the 
verbal pledge of co-operation from the trade unions at 
National, local and shop floor levels, Stewart hoped that, 
in time, Fairfield the "Proving Ground", through well angled 
publicity, would not be regarded as an ordinary shipyard, 
that it would be appreciated and used by the Government as 
Britain's first industrial laboratory for industrial 
relations.
To create the correct industrial relations climate, the 
founding Chairman set the following objectives for the 
'Fairfield Experiment'.
Firstly, that in isolation from the cumbersome 
national negotiating machine and with direct 
communications the trade unions would co-operate 
with modern Management techniques in promoting 
higher productivity through genuine productivity 
and wage related agreements.
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In effect this was a high pay, high productivity 
strategy and meant that as time went on, earnings 
would rise and fall in accordance with accurately 
measured productivity.
Secondly, that in such an environment, orders 
would be forthcoming to such an extent that the 
venture would be ready for a market quotation 
after a period of five years.
Thirdly, that through craft re-training and 
planned re-employment within the experiment the 
work force would be adjusted to suit the work 
load, the weak traditional negotiating expediency 
of "no redundancy" guarantees would be avoided, 
and in due course redundancy itself would be 
acceptable Nationally as a respectable feature of 
healthy industrial activity.
5. PARTICIPATION AND COMMUNICATION
What actually happened at Fairfield, according to Stewart, 
was that Government provided his enlightened colleagues with 
a National Laboratory within which they conducted a 
revolutionary experiment of national significance in many 
forms of industrial activity with the full co-operation of 
the trade unions. These experiments included trade union 
representation on a part-time board which contained no 
shipbuilders, trade union investment in equity, full time 
shop steward convenership, and radical changes in methods of 
negotiation and communications. He wrote:-
"At Fairfield we had a two-tier board system. We 
had a policy board of which I was part-time 
chairman, and on which two executives also sat.
The rest were outsiders, a merchant banker, other 
industrialists and two leading trade unionists.
This board established policy and left management 
to implement it.
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Now the executive management board has three 
trade unionists sitting in. In other words, 
management reached decisions after knowing what 
the trade unionists thought about it. So you had 
trade unions involved in management decisions 
without being responsible for them at policy and 
executive levels. But if there were any 
management troubles it was the management board 
that carried the can. Trade unionists were not 
party to those decisions." (Stewart 1971 page 
ref.131).
The trade unions were thus involved on the Board of 
Directors, they participated in the Executive Management 
Committee and on the Central Joint Council. These 
approaches to trade union participation had differing 
degrees of success. On the Board of Directors, for example, 
there were two trade union members. According to the 
Shipyard Director
"Both members had National Executive authority and 
they proved excellent Directors, making as good a 
contribution as anyone, but it was almost entirely 
irrelevant that they had come from the top of a 
trade union rather than from, say, the top of the 
personnel side of a big company. This followed 
from the fact that they did not represent the men 
in Fairfield, there being eleven other unions and
loyalty to a man's own union is vastly greater
than his loyalty to unionism." (Blanford 1969 
page ref.4).
Moreover, he pointed out that the two Directors did not work 
in Scotland and so they were not personally known even to 
the members of their own union. He further observed that 
the communications structure within the unions did not make
it easy for these Directors to influence the rank and file
in the Company or to be influenced by them.
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Accordingly, it may be concluded that while senior trade 
union officials could make excellent Directors, their 
appointment had little relevance to direct participation.
Another form of trade union participation was practiced by 
the Executive Management Committee consisting of a General 
Manager as Chairman and 10 or so Executive Managers from the 
major departments, the Yard Convener and the Conveners of 
the A.E.U. and Boilermakers. This committee discussed all 
innovations and progress reports submitted from each of the 
shipyard's Executive Managers. New policies were usually 
submitted to the Committee in the form of a draft report for 
discussion.
The first few months of the Committees' life, according to 
Shipyard Director, were difficult. Neither side felt free 
to speak their mind in the presence of the other. 
Nonetheless, both sides benefitted from learning how the 
other thought and valuable advice was given by the Conveners 
and accepted. There were, however, problems with this 
approach to participation:-
"One problem with which the Committee had to live 
with was that the Conveners could get information 
to their shop stewards and thus to the men much 
more quickly than Managers could reach their men 
through their Foremen." (Blanford 1969 page 
ref.5).
This particular problem had quite clear implications for the 
relationship between the foreman and his men and created a 
situation whereby the shop steward and not the foreman 
became the "fountain of knowledge". Further, a notable 
feature of the Committee was that the Conveners had a 
clarity about their role; a clarity which contrasted with 
the fogginess of Management thinking.
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The Conveners saw their role as that of elected 
representatives who wished to know about, and to comment on, 
Management procedures and decisions. On no occasion did 
they want to decide or to take part in managing the 
business.
Blanford, however, acknowledged that notwithstanding the 
merits of the other forms of involvement and participation 
the most successful form to emerge from the 'Fairfield 
Experiment' was that practiced by the Central Joint 
Committee. This Council consisted of one member from each 
of the thirteen unions of employees in the yard and four 
members of management.
The Chairman, normally a General Manager, was appointed by 
the Management and the Secretary was appointed by the trade 
union members. Each union member had national executive 
authority. The management members were the General 
Manager, a member of the Main Board, the Executive Manager 
of Management Services and the Personnel Manager.
The Central Joint Council was credited with influencing the 
thinking of top management, who, through this forum, were 
made aware of the ideas which could be easy to implement and 
these which would be difficult. The trade union officials 
also benefited in that they came to know the top management 
of the Company as people, as opposed to just names and job 
titles. Moreover, they came to realise that if management 
were, in their view, making mistakes, at least the motives 
behind the mistakes were known and honourable.
"The most important result was that the shop 
stewards and many union officials grew to consider 
that to exploit the mistakes of trusted managers 
was 'below the belt' and grew to inform managers 
when they thought it probable that a mistake was 
going to be made and so to help to avoid trouble." 
(Blanford 1969 page ref.5).
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Thus, a trusted manager was seldom surprised by the action, 
or reaction of his men, since his shop steward had warned 
him in advance. This relationship worked both ways and 
became the oil which, according to Blanford, made the 
industrial relationships between the Management and the 
workforce run smoothly.
It can, therefore, be concluded that participation at 
Fairfield was not mainly a matter of techniques or having 
trade union directors. It was a result of a determination 
on the part of the top management to inform and to listen to 
the views of the workforce, their shop stewards and their 
trade union officials. Out of these dialogues grew 
understanding, and out of understanding came trust and 
involvement.
6. THE SHOP STEWARDS ROLE
A key feature of the Fairfield approach to industrial 
relations was the role of the local shop stewards, elected 
by the shipyard workers to represent their views in 
discussions with management. As individuals they were 
regarded by the shipyard workers as the custodians of the 
working practices associated with the individual trades and 
whose prime responsibility had been to protect the trade 
boundaries from encroachment by other trades.
As such, the welder shop stewards, for example, would defend 
the territories of the welders and ensure that other trades, 
such as platers, were discouraged from using welding 
equipment. This equipment was regarded by the welders as 
their "birthright" and any attempt by other trades to use 
the equipment to progress their work would be strongly 
resisted and inevitably lead to a demarcation strike.
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The role of the shop steward in shipbuilding was, however, 
fraught with danger. He tended to be regarded by management 
as a 'trouble maker', a negative influence who, inevitably, 
was at odds with supervision and management as he bargained 
with them on issues associated with adverse working 
conditions, overtime rates, working practices and 
disciplinary offences.
This tended to place the shop steward at a disadvantage in 
terms of job security and restricted his ability to gain 
employment. He was one of the first to be paid off when 
jobs had to be shed and, normally, one of the last to be 
employed when work was plentiful. 'Who wants to employ a 
known trouble maker?' was the normal reaction from the 
shipbuilders.
There were regular meetings for the full shop stewards 
committee, and the executive committee of shop stewards. 
However, difficulties arose with the amount of time some 
shop stewards spent on their affairs, which varied from an 
hour a day for some to all day for others.
Investigations carried out by the Company showed that around 
25 hours a month was considered reasonable, this being an 
average of about an hour per day. Managers and Foremen 
found it difficult to tackle shop stewards on this matter 
although those who did, according to Blanford, got results 
and co-operation.
Accordingly, the Fairfield approach to industrial relations 
included:-
a) The acknowledgement by the Company that the 
trade unions had a vital role to play in the 
industrial relations process. This
demonstrated by the appointment of full time 
conveners and the payment of shop stewards 
for time spent on trade union activities.
b) The establishment of a participative approach 
to industrial relations, an approach in which 
top management informed and listened to the 
views of the workforce, shop stewards and 
trade union officials.
c) The creation of an understanding between 
management and the workforce, and out of this 
understanding came trust and involvement.
d) The introduction of clear lines of command 
and of communication, including the 
establishment of negotiating, grievance, 
disciplinary and other essential procedures.
The Fairfield approach to industrial relations, therefore, 
provided a platform for the introduction of manpower 
utilisation and flexibility policies.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The Fairfield approach to industrial relations was radical 
and revolutionary. Radical, in the sense that it afforded 
the trade union officials and the local shop stewards a role 
in managing the shipyard's change process. Revolutionary, 
from the point of view that it signalled a move away from 
the traditional centralised national bargaining arrangements 
to a local shipyard centred industrial relations framework.
Arguably, this move was a serious attempt by the Fairfield 
management to mend the industrial relations wounds that had 
hitherto existed between the management of the shipyard and 
the trade unions. These wounds inhibited co-operation and 
created 'them and us' entrenched attitudes that, constrained 
attempts to increase shipyard competitiveness at a time when 
uncompetitive shipyards were closing and vast numbers of 
shipyard jobs were being lost. Indeed, on the Upper Reaches 
of the Clyde no fewer than 8 of the 13 shipyards closed in 
the period 1957 to 1965.
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The Fairfield approach, therefore, had considerable merit 
insofar as:-
(a) There was sufficient evidence to suggest that 
the national bargaining arrangements had 
become cumbersome and bureaucratic. The 
agreements produced from this forum had 
little by way of local identity and did not 
address the problems that were inhibiting 
Fairfield's manpower utilisation and 
competitiveness. Therefore, given that the 
national arrangement was fundamentally flawed 
the move to a local framework had merit.
(b) It could be argued that the move to a local 
industrial relations framework enabled 
Fairfield to adopt new working and management 
practices without the difficulties of having 
to convince shipbuilders and trade union 
officials nationally of the merits of the new 
practices. In this context a local framework 
was, therefore, logical from the point of 
view that it gave Fairfield the opportunity 
of breaking with tradition and rewriting the 
'rule book'.
(c) Controversial though it was, the move to 
create on active role for the shop stewards 
in managing the change process had 
credibility. The shop stewards were the 
critical communications link with the 
shipyard workers and a powerful voice in the 
shipyard. Given, therefore, that the changes 
Fairfield intended to introduce were radical, 
it was logical that the shop stewards 
involvement and commitment was secured and 
their powerful voices used to support the 
change process.
The more cynical would argue that the Fairfield approach to 
industrial relations was simply management abdication. They 
would suggest that what really happened at Fairfield was 
that management gave up their right to manage the shipyard 
and left themselves at the mercy of the shop stewards and 
the trade union full time officials. Others could conclude 
that the Fairfield approach to industrial relations was far 
sighted. They could argue that the involvement of the shop 
stewards in the management of change although controversial 
was essential, given that their ownership and commitment was 
an integral part of the change process.
CHAPTER 7: THE SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT APPROACH TO MANPOWER
UTILISATION AND ORGANISATION 
MODEL 2, PART 2
1. FLEXIBILITY AGREEMENTS
The Fairfield approach to industrial relations had provided 
a platform to conclude agreements that were aimed at 
introducing more open forms of flexible working as a means 
of improving manpower utilisation and effectiveness. The 
management at Fairfield, in co-operation with the trade 
unions, set out to tackle the problems of demarcation and 
restrictive working practices.
"We signed flexibility and interchangeability 
agreements with all three major working groups.
Some people outside the industry have been 
surprised at the apparent ease with which these 
agreements have been reached. It is only fair to
point out that we inherited a group of badly
frightened men who avoided the labour exchange
queue by the skin of their teeth. Fright, though 
infinitely undesirable, eased the atmosphere in 
which to negotiate new ideas, originally, 
particularly our procedure and demarcation 
agreements." (Reid 1967 page ref.33).
The first of the flexibility agreements was offered by the 
boilermakers, who had put a great deal of detailed work into 
an agreement on the relaxation of working practices. In 
effect, this agreement relaxed the demarcation boundaries 
surrounding the various boilermakers trades. Ironically,
it moved away from the Adam Smith theory of job 
specialisation, a theory on which the boilermaker trade 
structure was originally created, and moved to what Atkinson 
(1986) would have described as functional flexibility.
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Within the concept of the (Relaxation of Working Practices) 
agreement, the main boilermaker trades of platers, 
shipwrights, drillers, welders and caulkers etc., could do 
the work of each other in order to progress work and, as 
will be demonstrated in Section 2, were trained to do this. 
A designated number of what was termed (R.O.W.P.) burning 
and welding gears were located in each work location and 
used as and when required. This agreement, according to 
John Chalmers, General Secretary of the Boilermakers, 
abolished demarcation between the different trades within 
the union.
"It goes far beyond anything which has taken place 
in any other British yard. It marks the end of 
demarcation. It is a far reaching agreement, 
representing the complete relaxation of the 
present working practices within the steel trades 
in the yard." (Chalmers 1969 page ref.109).
At the time the Fairfield Glasgow relaxation agreement for 
steel trades was the most advanced flexibility agreement in 
the United Kingdom shipbuilding industry. Indeed, similar 
R.O.W.P. - relaxation of working practices agreement, or for 
short, the removal of demarcation, were subsequently bought 
at Fairfield from all other unions in turn for 9d. per hour, 
which was approximately a 6% increase in wages. The means 
of arriving at the flexibility agreements was through method 
study and the costing of benefits which would be derived 
from such agreements but, the implementation of the 
agreement partly failed since, according to Blanford (1969) , 
only about half the forecast savings were obtained. This, 
because management underestimated the degree of difficulty 
associated with overcoming the problems of an ingrained 
culture where workers were unwilling to cooperate fully on 
removing their demarcation barriers and taking up new 
flexibility opportunities.
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Perhaps, therefore, one of the most significant aspects of 
the 'Fairfield Experiment' was the realisation that getting 
value for money after negotiating R.O.W.P. agreements was 
difficult and required the undivided attention of an 
experienced management team who had to be specially trained 
and supervised. This should not have come as a surprise 
considering that this part of the experiment was all about 
trying to change the deeply and emotionally held beliefs.
Beliefs that were held by the managers and supervisors who 
were by products of the craft and trade structures as well 
as the shipyard workers themselves. Consequently, one of 
the lessons of the 'experiment' was that, difficult as the 
negotiations on a flexibility agreement were, it was not as 
difficult as changing the beliefs of each employee and 
creating an attitude in favour of the flexibility agreement.
Several important changes were, however, achieved. The most 
notable was the creation of a boilermaker foreman who
supervised teams consisting of some or all of the many
steelwork trades of shipwrights, platers, caulkers, burners 
and welders etc., instead of simply supervising one trade.
At Fairfield, therefore, flexibility agreements were
concluded between management and the shop stewards that:-
(a) Were aimed at providing cost savings to the 
shipyard.
(b) Relaxed the demarcation boundaries between
the various boilermakers trades and provided 
for a relaxation of work practices between
the various outfit trades.
(c) Created the multi-functional role of 
boilermaker foreman who supervised work teams
consisting of some or all of the steelwork
trades.
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Getting value for money from R.O.W.P. agreements was, 
however, regarded as difficult and required the undivided 
attention of an experienced management team who had to be 
specially trained. Indeed, training was recognised as being 
a vital ingredient of transforming the aims of the 
flexibility agreement into positive flexibility working 
practices.
2. TRAINING
The founding Chairman insisted fervently that the way 
forward, at Fairfield, was to establish a training and 
retraining programme which would bring about that 
flexibility and the mobility of labour, incorporated into 
the industrial relations agreements discussed earlier.
The reality was, however, that the signing of such 
agreements does not, by itself, mean that shipyard workers 
become functionally flexible. Platers had to be trained to 
weld before they could practice welding skills. Shipwrights 
had to be trained to burn before they could practice burning 
skills. Training at Fairfield was regarded as a primary 
means by which the words of the flexibility agreements could 
be transformed into deeds.
The aim of training was, therefore, to retrain the workforce 
in the skills of trades other than their own and, as a 
result, to persuade the trade unions to abolish demarcation 
and enhance flexibility and interchangeability. The 
training programme undertaken at Fairfield aim was extensive 
and perceived by the founding Chairman as being the 
mechanism for the elimination of mistrust and suspicion.
"During 1967 we handled more people in a small 
shipyard than all the Government retraining 
centres in Scotland put together. It is, of 
course, simply a question of education and the 
elimination of mistrust and suspicion by 
communications." (Stewart 1968 page ref.110).
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Part of the Fairfield approach to changing these attitudes 
was to fundamentally change the way in which the 
shipbuilding workers and apprentices were trained.
"As far as apprentices, our new apprentice 
charter, for the first time, eliminated 
differentials between trades, reduced the training 
period from five to four years and trained 
shipbuilding workers during the first of these 
years rather than specific tradesmen." (Stewart 
1968 page ref.110).
The approach was aimed at broadening the apprentices 
training and reducing the training period. Moreover, in 
keeping with the Fairfield philosophy, it was hoped that by 
broadening apprentice training to include the skills of 
trades, other than their specialist trade, the counter 
productive attitudes to demarcation and restricted practices 
would be eliminated. There was a cost involved in this type 
of training. A Training Centre was established and staffed 
by instructors recruited from the shop floor on the basis of 
their particular skills and trained on industrial 
techniques.
Training programmes were established that meant the first 
year of the apprentices training took place in an 
'off-the-job' Training Centre. As such, training fees and 
wage costs had to be met and given that Fairfield recruited 
about 100 apprentices these annual costs were considerable. 
In fact, the annual training fees for the apprentice was 
£400 and wage costs £350 per annum. This, at a time, when 
the annual earnings of a skilled worker was £1,200 per 
annum.
However, the Fairfield move to establish this type of 
training occurred at a time when the Government were 
encouraging industry to have a more active role in 
industrial training.
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Part of their initiative involved the setting up of training 
boards to regulate industrial training on an industry basis. 
To encourage organisations, such as Fairfield's, to set up 
and resource training centres and to train their workers the 
training boards operated what could be loosely termed as 'a 
carrot and stick' technique. They imposed a levy on
organisations, under their control, and rewarded those
carrying out training, with grants. In Fairfield's case 
a levy equivalent to 1% of payroll was paid to their 
Training Board but they could reclaim this and some 
additional grants as a reward for training apprentices and 
workers generally.
Training at Fairfield was not confined to apprentices. It 
was aimed at improving the performance, flexibility and 
mobility of people irrespective of occupation or discipline. 
As such, tradesmen were trained in specially set up 
satellite 'off the job' training centres in skills of trades 
other than their own. Adult training instructors were 
recruited from the trade ranks to carry out the training 
process after which the shipyard workers were able to 
progress work in keeping with the flexibility agreement. 
Specially designed training programmes were arranged for 
managers, foremen, technicians and shop stewards. These 
aimed at ensuring that the Fairfield philosophy and new 
management techniques were fully understood.
In effect, the shipyards approach to training was aimed at 
ensuring that people were equipped with the skills and
knowledge required to carry out their job in a proficient
manner. The training included both the practical and 
theoretical aspects of the job and was conducted in both 
'off the job' and 'on the job' situations. The Fairfield 
management, therefore, recognised training as a major factor 
of shipyard efficiency insofar as it improved the 
performance of the shipyards principal resource - that of 
its employees. As such, they incorporated training into the 
overall business strategy.
140.
This strategy was underpinned by an industrial relations 
agreement and training was the means by which to transform 
the agreement into a practical reality. There was, 
therefore, at Fairfield, a determination to change the 
counter productive attitudes of the workforce and a 
recognition that training had an important role to play in 
this change process. However, it was acknowledged that 
training was not a process to be carried out in isolation 
from all other business activities. It had to be associated 
with business plans and aimed at improving the overall 
performance of the shipyard and its workers.
3. THE FOREMAN'S ROLE
The role of the foreman, as illustrated previously, was 
considered to be a major factor of the shipbuilding 
industry's traditional approach to manpower utilisation and, 
as such, any changes to that role were important. The 
creation of the boilermaker foreman brought about by the 
Fairfield flexibility agreement was only one of many 
important changes that took place in the foreman's role 
during the experiment.
Other changes included the move away from the right of the 
foreman to 'hire and fire' the shipyard workers who worked 
for them. This right was curtailed, due to a changing 
approach to job security, and the advent of a formalised 
personnel function. The introduction of departments devoted 
to the control of quality and planning meant that these
activities moved from production to a more centralised 
support function. The abolition of the traditional piece 
work systems effectively removed from the foreman the
control they had over the earnings of the workers and
perhaps even removed the motivational carrot from the
shipyard workers themselves.
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Not surprisingly, therefore, there was some confusion, 
during the Fairfield experiment, concerning the 
responsibilities associated with the role of the foreman.
"Oliver Blanford reports how wide was the 
variation between what management thought the 
foreman's job should be and what the foremen 
thought their job was. The foreman did not 
regard, as their responsibility, absence and 
lateness on the part of their men, they were not 
concerned about the cost of a job under their 
charge, they did not all consider it their duty to 
inspire leadership or team spirit or in forward 
estimating, yet each foreman had between thirty 
and seventy men under his charge." (Paulden 
1969 page ref.128).
There was also some confusion concerning the overlap of 
responsibilities between the foremen and shop stewards, 
brought about by Fairfield approach to industrial relations. 
A central feature of this confusion was the fact that the 
shop steward organisation had become a powerful institution 
in the shipyard. They had a role in management processes 
including overtime selection and manning. The shop stewards 
were also the shipyard workers principal contact with 
management. It was they, rather than the foremen, who 
provided the shipyard workers with management information. 
The shop stewards were, therefore, the 'Fountains of 
Knowledge' and it was they who had credibility with the 
workforce.
The new management at Fairfield acknowledged that there was 
much confusion surrounding the foreman's role and this 
required clarification and action. As such, they firstly 
added status to the role by putting foremen on salaries, 
instead of paying them a weekly wage. They then reduced the 
size of the workteams to fifteen on a ship and twenty five 
in a workshop.
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They then delegated authority and responsibilities to the 
foreman and ensured that all knew their objectives. 
Training sessions were instituted at weekends and during the 
working week. Moreover, it was made clear that the foremen 
were the main communication line from management to the 
shipyard workers.
Therefore, within the context of the Fairfield experiment, 
the role of the foreman was redefined and training in basic 
supervisory skills, was given to support this new role. 
However, notwithstanding the merits of the Fairfield 
managements determination to redefine the foreman's new 
role, the fact remained that the role of the shop stewards 
was an inhibiting factor and the more powerful the shop 
steward movement became the more it restricted the foreman's 
effectiveness i.e. the formal system was altered but the 
real politics of the situation meant that the foreman's role 
remained confused and low status.
The Fairfield approach to manpower utilisation, therefore, 
as discussed in the previous three sections, addressed 
several key factors
Firstly, it began to tackle the problems of job 
demarcation and overmanning by introducing 
flexibility agreements.
Secondly, it sought to remove the rigid 
demarcation principles which prevented men moving 
from defunct trades into booming trades.
Thirdly, it recognised training as being a vital 
mechanism through which agreements could be 
translated into deeds; as such training was 
regarded as the vital ingredient of organisational 
efficiency.
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Fourthly, it sought to redefine the role of 
foremen and supported them in their new role with 
training relevant to their job.
In addition, the Fairfield approach to manpower utilisation 
involved the introduction of new organisational management 
systems and techniques. These will be discussed in the 
following sections.
4. ORGANISATION
At Fairfield it was recognised that, in order to achieve 
productivity objectives and to utilise manpower more 
effectively, it was necessary to firstly - 'find out what to 
do' and secondly 'to do it'. There was, therefore, a belief 
that information was the lifeline of the Company and 
obtaining and providing information was considered a major 
contributory factor of effective manpower utilisation and 
organisation efficiency.
This belief was not new. The provision of information had 
long been a factor of the shipbuilding industry's approach 
to organisation. Indeed, the builders of iron and steel 
ships had created functions whose sole purpose was to obtain 
and provide information to secure efficiency in design, 
construction and the co-ordination of manpower. However, 
the management at Fairfield considered that a further 
information source was required. According to the 
Production Services Director:-
"If, therefore, it is believed that the obtaining 
and providing of information is a major 
contribution to the operation of management, then 
it is necessary to set up an organisation which is 
capable of producing this information. Such an 
organisation is often called management services, 
but at Fairfield it is called productivity 
services." (Houston 1967 page ref.l).
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The organisation structure associated with the function, is 
illustrated in figure 7.1.
Productivity Services
Oiiidiiilt*
SOUKCF: Productivity (Services 1967)
Figure 7.1
Throughout the 'experiment' this particular function 
introduced management techniques new to shipbuilding. The 
aim was to support more effective manpower utilisation 
policies and to achieve productivity objectives. This was 
one of the major recommendations of the Geddes (1966) 
report, albeit that it had been introduced at Fairfield some 
six weeks before the issue of the report. The new 
Productivity Services Function incorporated five 
departments. Industrial Engineering, Organisation and 
Methods, Personnel Services, Programming and Quality 
Control.
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The Industrial Engineering Department comprised work study, 
process planning, analytical estimating and value 
engineering, while the Organisation and Methods Department 
involved itself in designing and implementation information 
systems required by management. Personnel Services was 
concerned with the effective use and development of human 
resources, while the Programming Department was responsible 
for preparing overall programmes for building each of the 
contracts. Finally, the Quality Control Department was 
established to ensure that faulty work was caught much 
earlier and also to ensure that the final product was 
delivered to contract specification.
At its simplest, the purpose of the new function was, 
therefore, to 'gather the facts' and to 'offer solutions' to 
problems associated with manpower utilisation and 
productivity (including quality).
"About three-quarters of the effort in solving a 
problem has to be put into finding the fact of the 
situation in a quantitative form. The remaining 
effort has to be put into listing possible 
solutions and deciding which to adopt." (Blanford 
1969 page ref.10).
A great deal of time and money was spent in a quantitative 
approach to problems and the introduction of new management 
techniques to support this approach. The main technique 
adopted by the Productivity Services function, and in 
particular the Industrial Engineering Department within that 
function, was 'work study', a technique which had hitherto 
been alien to the traditional culture of shipbuilding, 
though in other branches of industry it had been long 
established and widely used.
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5. SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
Taylor (1911) regarded work study as a scientific approach 
to management and believed that greater efficiency could be 
achieved by adopting work study techniques and dividing work 
into component parts and training workers to a very high 
performance level in the individual parts. Taylor believed 
that observation and measurement, two techniques of work 
study, should be used to discover what constitutes a fair 
day's work and, thereafter, workers should be selected and 
trained for work best suited to them.
In a Fairfield 'context' improving organisational efficiency 
was certainly a principal aim of the experiment and there 
was an acknowledgement by Stewart that training the shipyard 
workers was a vital ingredient of organisational efficiency. 
Furthermore, the approach to industrial relations had 
provided a platform of co-operation between management and 
the trade unions under which new management techniques, such 
as work study, could be introduced. In keeping with 
Taylor's view, the introduction of work study would give 
shipyard workers an opportunity to earn a higher rate of pay 
and the shipyard an opportunity of lowering production 
costs.
The trade union participation in the introduction of the new 
management techniques involved the appointment, of 'workers 
representatives' who, after training, worked alongside 
industrial engineers on work study projects. These 
representatives were nominated by the shipyard workers and 
were the communications link between the shop floor workers, 
the industrial engineering practitioners and management. 
They could talk the new language of industrial engineering 
and, as a result, they could explain work study problems to 
the shipyard workers on the one hand and to the management 
and the industrial engineers on the other.
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The role of the 'workers representative' proved to be a 
success, not only in providing a mechanism for introducing 
work study techniques, but also as a development post for 
future shop stewards, foremen and industrial engineers.
"They proved an indispensable link and enable some 
far-reaching changes to be made. Inevitably a 
problem arose after about two years in keeping 
them in jobs and preventing them either seeking 
promotion or leaving the Company. This must be 
seen as a price which has to be paid, and there 
should be a channel of promotion via shop steward, 
foreman, or industrial engineer at the end of a 
given time. The needs to be negotiated in 
advance." (Blanford 1969 page ref.16).
In total, some 3 0 workers representatives, from a workforce 
of some 3,000, were fully trained in work study and planning 
techniques. Moreover, the extensive training programme saw 
110 shop stewards and full time trade union officials and 
150 foremen and senior technicians attending work study 
appreciation courses.
As with the approach to reducing demarcation, gaining the 
trust and confidence of the trade unions was a prerequisite 
for establishing an Industrial Engineering Department 
comprising of work study, process planning, analytical 
estimating and value engineering. Such trust was to be 
established by the participative approach to industrial 
relations and the involvement of the trade unions along side 
management in the Industrial Engineering Department.
The Industrial Engineering Department was resourced by 2 0 
experienced work study practitioners from outside the 
Company, 72 employees recruited from the tradesmen ranks 
(who had hitherto been part of the craft and trade structure 
and who were known to the shipyard workers) and, of course, 
the 3 0 workers representatives. The objectives were:-
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(a) To introduce work study.
(b) To introduce a measured daywork scheme 
throughout the shipyard.
(c) To build up a library of standard data for 
typical elements and operation.
Blanford's view was that of the three, introducing a 
measured daywork scheme was the most critical to management, 
though the other two objectives were prerequisites for the 
introduction of such a scheme. The measured daywork scheme 
would, in his opinion:-
Firstly, provide production management with 
information for scheduling, manning, programming, 
tendering and costing.
Secondly, provide feedback information to 
production supervisors regarding delays, technical 
problems and information on actual completion to 
production control.
Thirdly, exert an influence on all personnel 
connected with production and other staff 
functions to ensure that the work routines were 
being carried out within the correct time scales.
Fourthly, provide a financial incentive for the 
workers to improve productivity.
There had, of course, been previous systems of measuring 
work in shipbuilding. For example, electricians and 
steelworkers had operated under piecework systems, but the 
previous systems had become obsolete and ceased to have much 
value though, in some cases, they may have ensured that the 
low minimum was exceeded.
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6. PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENTS
The introduction of a measured daywork scheme was, as
indicated previously, critical to management. However, 
according to the Shipbuilding Director, the high content of 
non-productive time, abortive work and the variety of work 
methods observed during time and motion studies, inhibited 
the process of producing standard data for a measured
daywork scheme:-
"As a result of records which were kept and of the 
target times, labour utilisation reports were 
circulated to every foreman and manager each week 
and collated for the main departments and for the
company as a whole. These reports gave the
performance while working, the performance overall 
and the principal amounts of abortive or 
non-productive time and showed that non-productive 
time and abortive work taken together constituted 
between 2 0 and 40 per cent of the labour cost of a 
ship." (Blanford 1969 page ref.20).
Perhaps for the first time, the cost of the traditional 
system of manpower utilisation in shipbuilding had been 
accurately measured! Notwithstand the fact that time and 
motion studies were unable to produce standard data, a
measured daywork scheme was introduced. This was due to the 
fact that the Process Planning and Analytical Estimating 
aspects of the Industrial Engineering Department proved more 
successful. These new techniques broke the job down into 
sequential operations and estimated the standard time to be 
taken for each of the various operations. This provided the 
local manager and his foreman with the means of planning the 
work and estimated the time to be taken and the labour 
requirements in an appropriate and acceptable manner.
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Process Planning and Analytical Estimating provided 
sufficient information to support more effective manpower 
utilisation policies, and the set productivity objectives. 
As a result, it was decided to introduce an estimated 
measured daywork scheme as a means of providing workers with 
a financial incentive to achieve or better the productivity 
objectives which had been set. The measured daywork scheme 
was introduced into the steelwork departments on the 15th 
June 1967 and by August, productivity had increased by 50% 
as illustrated in figure 7.2.
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Figure 7.2
Similar, or higher increases, occurred in the pipeshop, 
machinery installation and outfitting departments. However, 
these figures should be treated with caution according to 
Blanford because:-
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Firstly, there had been a serious decline in 
morale and productivity in the latter days of the 
old company.
Secondly, the figures were built up during the 
run-in period of the scheme so must have been 
subject to a number of errors.
Thirdly, there was an improvement in the recording 
of work actually done.
Fourthly, some target dates were increased and 
non-productive time was more accurately recorded.
The new management at Fairfield originally estimated that in 
1966 the performance level at the shipyard was about 45%. 
They believed that 80% was achievable. Thus they were 
attempting to increase productivity from the offset by 75%.
A productivity increase of 50% meant that the performance 
level, at the shipyard, had increased from its 45% level to 
67.5% which, while short of its 80% target was, nonetheless, 
a considerable achievement. Translating these performance 
levels into manhours and assuming that at 100% effectiveness 
a ship at Fairfield would be built for 1 million manhour, 
while the Fairfield performance would be as indicated in 
figure 7.3
In effect the 1 million manhour ship would have taken 2.22 
million manhours to build on the basis of a 45% performance 
level in 1966 and 1.48 million manhours on the basis of a 
67.5% performance level. Thus, the introduction of a 
Productivity Services function did improve manpower 
utilisation and productivity although the exact magnitude of 
the improvement may be in some doubt.
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PERCEIVED IMPROVEMENTS
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Figure 7.3
Accordingly, the main factors of the 'Fairfield Experiment-' 
approach to organisation were concerned with the 
establishment of a function devoted to the introduction of 
new management techniques. This new function supported more 
effective manpower utilisation policies and the achievement 
of productivity objectives.
The reasons for establishing such an organisation function 
included:-
(a) A belief that obtaining and providing
information is a major contribution to the
operation of management.
(b) A recognition that its purpose was to gather
facts and offer solutions on problems 
associated with manpower utilisation and
productivity.
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(c) A requirement to introduce a measured daywork 
scheme using a quantitative approach through 
the appreciation of new management 
techniques.
The Fairfield approach recognised that the trade unions had 
a major role in aspects of organisation associated with 
manpower and productivity. It also indicated that 
productivity improvements were achieved through the 
establishment of a productivity services function.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The Fairfield approach to manpower utilisation and 
organisation may be judged as a limited success. Limited, 
in that the duration of the 'Experiment' was restricted to 
two years and, therefore, the longer term benefits could not 
be evaluated. A success none-the-less from the point of 
view that productivity did substantially improve albeit from 
a very low point which, arguably, reflected the low level of 
morale, motivation and commitment of the workforce at the 
inception of the 'Experiment'. This limited productivity 
success, although insufficient to achieve shipyard 
competitiveness should not, however, be underestimated.
In terms of the 'Experiment' aims, it would be reasonable to 
conclude that:-
Firstly - the move from the national bargaining 
arrangements to a local shipyard based industrial 
relations forum allowed the protagonists to 
concentrate on the problems of the Govan shipyard 
in isolation from the industry generally. The 
localisation enabled the Fairfield management to 
rewrite the traditional rule book and introduce, 
by agreement with the shop stewards, working 
practices that encouraged manpower mobility and 
flexibility.
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Secondly - the training process, arguably, 
eliminated much of the mistrust and suspicion 
between the shipyard work groups and was 
instrumental in relaxing the demarcation 
boundaries between the specialist trades. It 
should also have improved productivity directly, 
once complete. Training, therefore, helped to 
transform the words of the flexibility agreements 
into positive flexibility working practices, but 
in practice this was incomplete and the full
benefits of the agreements were not forthcoming 
due to a reluctance of the shipyard workers to 
commit themselves fully to the change process that 
would remove the perceived job protection 
afforded by the demarcation boundaries.
Thirdly - the involvement of the trade union 
officials and shop stewards in the management of 
the change process enabled the Fairfield
management to introduce scientific management 
techniques based on work study principles.
Arguably, this resulted in the availability of 
more accurate and effective production related 
information and enabled management to implement a 
measured day work scheme, linked to productivity 
improvement and aimed at providing motivational 
incentive to the shipyard workforce.
The Fairfield Experiment moved the Govan Shipyard from the 
classical model to one which centrally reflected some of the 
key ideas of scientific management. In many ways this was a 
very belated step for shipbuilding since we know that the 
scientific management type of thinking has been present 
since early in the 20th century. But shipbuilding, as it 
was then organised in shipbuilding, was still a traditional 
craft based industry and, as such, work measurement, work 
study and related processes conflicted with the underlying 
production culture.
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However, it would be a misrepresentation of the Fairfield 
Experiment to label it as (belated) scientific management 
and leave it at that. It was much more, in that it sought 
to ally the management approach to work control with a 
participative approach to industrial relations - an approach 
which was far from the original Taylorist principles of 
scientific management.
In terms of our conceptual framework (Chapter 3, Section 4), 
the drive was away from direct supervision towards greater 
standardisation of work processes as a means of achieving 
standards of work and output which the market was now 
demanding. This could not be achieved in a purely technical 
way because management was faced with a long established 
workforce culture based on the crafts in which the industry 
had been built.
In retrospect, it may have been too much to expect that such 
an established culture would be capable of rapid and 
painless change and there were, undoubtedly, stresses and 
strains between these forces as the experiment unfolded. 
Whether, in fact, the culture change would have been 
achieved in time and whether the participative approach 
would have led on to a still more sophisticated form of 
organisation and coordination, had the experiment had longer 
to run, is a matter of speculation. In the end, it was not 
allowed more than two years before the 'experiment' became 
submerged in a further organisation change and this was 
undoubtedly too short a time to achieve the cultural shift 
which would have been necessary for real progress to be 
made.
As it was the management, led by Stewart, had provided a new 
driving force in shipbuilding not so constrained by 
traditional management, supervision and attitudes to labour.
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They offered the shipyard workers an alternative to 
unemployment and yard closures and an opportunity to 
participate in an experiment aimed at transforming the yard 
into a competitive unit. At the end of the experiment, 
however, the unions still exercised great internal power and 
controlled much of the work allocation, how jobs were 
organised and rewarded and they contributed further to the 
erosion of the supervisory management's authority and 
control of manpower supervision. This was still part of the 
inheritance at Govan when British Shipbuilders took over the 
responsibility for running the national shipbuilding 
industry.
CHAPTER 8: THE FLEXIBLE WORKING APPROACH
TO MANPOWER UTILISATION 
MODEL 3 - PART ONE
1. INTRODUCTION
The third model of manpower utilisation to be examined is 
associated with the period when the Govan shipyard was part 
of the nationalised British Shipbuilding industry and covers 
the time frame 1977 to 1988. It is, however, important to 
recognised that a decade had elapsed between the ending of 
the 'Fairfield Experiment' where the approach to manpower 
utilisation was based on Model Two - 'Scientific Management' 
and the creation of British Shipbuilders - Model Three - 
'Flexible Working'. Several significant factors occurred 
during this decade which contributed to a move away from the 
Model Two approach at the Govan yard and these included:-
Firstly - The shipyard lost its individuality and 
right of self determination when it was 
incorporated into the ill-fated Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilding Group. In effect, the Fairfield
shipyard was returned to the fold of the 
shipbuilding traditionalists and this resulted in 
the removal of the scientific management 
techniques and a move away from local shipyard 
based industrial relations and bargaining 
arrangements.
Secondly - A powerful shop stewards' movement 
emerged. They gained a power-base in the 
shipyard, during the troubled days of the U.C.S., 
by taking over the leadership of the yard. It was 
the shop stewards who mobilised the workforce and 
the public at large through a well documented 
'work-in' and, by so doing, mounted a successful 
campaign which resulted in the retention of
shipbuilding on the upper reaches of the Clyde and
saved the Govan yard from closure.
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Consequently the model of manpower utilisation and 
organisation practiced at Govan, at the time of 
nationalisation, was not that adopted by Fairfield and 
discussed earlier as model two. It was more akin to the 
Model One - 'The Classical Approach' and, as such, it was 
similar to that practiced by the other more traditional 
shipyards who were nationalised in the late 1970's.
The key features of the classical approach was, of course, 
the concept of job specialisation and the demarcated trade 
boundaries. In Govan's case the features were, by the late 
1970's, supported by the powerful shop steward movement 
whose influence, in the shipyard, had increased 
substantially as a result of the successful U.C.S. campaign. 
The Govan stewards had, after all, saved the shipyard and 
the jobs of all shipyard workers, including those of the 
management. The Govan shop stewards were, as a result, 
regarded throughout the nationalised industry as the role 
model of trade union power and authority and, as such, were 
a major influence that had to be overcome if changes to the 
manpower utilisation strategy were to be implemented.
It is also important to acknowledge that the nationalised 
industry was created at a time when the world shipbuilding 
market was in decline. From its peak of 40,000,000 gross 
registered tonnes in 1974, it fell to 21,181,000 and 
14,04 0,000 gross registered tonnes of completed and new 
orders respectively by 1977. This market decline had 
resulted in shipyard closures, the detail of which was 
discussed previously in chapter one, and these closures had 
catastrophic consequences within shipbuilding communities 
where the direct employment opportunities nationally dropped 
from 290,000 in 1948 to 87,000 by 1977. Total jobs losses 
were even greater given that the shipbuilding industry also 
supported 3 jobs outwith the shipyard for every direct job.
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The Labour Government of James Callaghan, concerned about 
the effects of the industry's decline, nationalised 
shipbuilding in 1977. Griffin (1978), the first chairman of 
the British Shipbuilding Corporation, gave the Government's 
reasons for nationalising the industry in the Corporation's 
annual report and accounts of 1977/78. He stated:-
"It is the duty of the Corporation, in carrying 
out its activities, to have full regard to the 
requirements of national defence. As a densely 
populated and industrial island, Britain is 
virtually dependent on seaborne trade A 
sufficiently large proportion of this trade must 
be carried in British ships to prevent its control 
passing into the hands of the country's commercial 
competitors. At the same time, an efficient navy 
is a necessity in determining any military threat 
to force us off the sea. While most of the 
special requirements of the Royal Navy need to be 
met by the British Industry, all merchant ships 
could be built abroad. However, should foreign 
merchant yards ever achieve a monopoly, our 
ship owners would eventually be at the mercy of 
their competitors." (Griffin 1978).
It was, therefore, against a background of concern for the 
national defence, and the country's dependence on the 
seaborne trade, that the declining shipbuilding industry was 
nationalised. The prime objective of nationalisation was to 
improve the shipbuilding industry's competitiveness within a 
socially responsible framework, given the industry's 
locations in areas of high unemployment.
To achieve this the industry had to institute changes in its 
approach to building ships. These changes had to include 
the way in which manpower was utilised and organised.
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Model three will, therefore, be concerned with these changes 
and developments. Of particular concern will be the 
policies associated with the introduction of flexible 
working practices, the concept of the flexible firm and the 
associated centralised industrial relations framework under 
which agreements were reached.
2. THE CHALLENGE
Bringing about fundamental but lasting change to the 
Nationalised British Shipbuilding Industry was, according to 
the Corporation's Director responsible for performance 
improvement and productivity, a major challenge. It was, 
however, a challenge that had to be taken up if the industry 
was to survive in the tough international shipbuilding 
market place. The challenge included a reappraisal of 
shipbuilding methods, working practices, equipment and 
technology.
"The industry has for decades neglected to emulate
the steady and continuous improvements in methods
and technology introduced by the competition."
(Vaughan 1983 page ref.127).
The consequences of this neglect was that British 
Shipbuilding costs were high, productivity low and delivery 
dates unreliable when compared to the competition. As a 
result shipbuilding orders were hard to come by, berths lay 
empty, long established and world renowned shipyards closed 
and large numbers of jobs were lost.
Accordingly, the challenge was to transform Britain's 
uncompetitive shipyards, including Govan, into a competitive 
UK shipbuilding industry, by bringing about improvements in 
performance and productivity that would enable the 
nationalised industry to emulate or even surpass those of 
the industry's competitors. By doing so sufficient contracts 
could be secured to enable shipbuilding to become a viable 
industry.
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This would, of course, lead to the maintenance of a 
shipbuilding capacity in the United Kingdom and sustain 
employment in hard pressed shipbuilding communities.
To take up the challenge a strategy, based on a major policy 
initiative, known as the Performance Improvement and 
Productivity programme, hereafter referred to as the P.I.P. 
programme, was established by British Shipbuilders under the 
direction of Dr. Roger Vaughan. Part of the initiative was 
concerned with what was described as 'increasing the output 
potential of those involved in the shipbuilding industry'. 
As the Shipbuilding Operations Director put it:-
"Improving productivity involves ensuring that all 
aspects of a business operation which directly or 
indirectly effect total output potential of its 
employees are organised and conducted 
effectively.” (Craig 1979 page ref.3).
Craig was underlining the important role that shipbuilding 
workers themselves had in the survival of the industry. 
The productivity part of the initiative was aimed at what 
could be termed as the 'people side of the business'. As 
such, it challenged the counter productive attitude of those 
involved in the industry. The restrictive working 
practices, demarcation, overmanning aspects of the business 
where the performance of people was inhibiting productivity. 
Of immediate concern were issues associated with manpower 
utilisation and flexibility, contentious issues, that had 
hitherto been difficult to resolve.
It was, however, recognised that there were many problems 
associated with implementing a programme aimed at removing 
manpower constraints as a means of improving performance 
and productivity. These problems were embedded in long 
established and traditional industrial set up comprising 27 
previously independent companies; each with a uniqueness in 
terms of management style, industrial relationship and 
manpower policies.
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These companies were not grouped together on the banks of 
one river. They were, as illustrated in figure 8.1, some 
distance apart and they were located throughout the length 
and breadth of the United Kingdom.
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Figure 8.1
Given the distance between the companies and their previous 
independence, the establishment of an effective 
communication system to ensure a consistent application of 
policy was an important ingredient of the initiative. This, 
by itself, was of course a major challenge in an industry 
where the normal channels of communication tended to be via 
the grapevine.
Furthermore, it has to be acknowledged that the shipyards, 
comprising British Shipbuilders, were concentrated in areas 
of the country traditionally associated with high 
unemployment. The scale of the problem is reflected in the 
unemployment levels detailed in figure 8.2.
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Unemployment by Region - May 1979
Travel to
Work Area % Male Unemployment
Tyneside 10.2%
Wearside 12.9%
Teeside 9.5%
Birkenhead 11.4%
Glasgow 10.2%
Greenock 10.5%
SOURCE: Parker (1979)
Figure 8.2
In general male unemployment was in the region of 10%. 
Glasgow, the area of the country associated with the Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilding Industry, had a male unemployment level 
of 10.2%. This at a time when the national unemployment 
level was 6%.
Given that part of the initiative challenged the traditional 
working practices and the status of the restrictive craft 
and trade structures, at a time when unemployment levels 
were high, opposition to the initiative was expected from 
the trade unions, particularly at local individual shipyard 
level where the shop stewards traditionally defended trade 
demarcation boundaries to protect the jobs of their 
departmental members. Overcoming, these and the many other 
problems associated with setting up and implementing this 
ambitious, but nevertheless, contentious initiative was 
certainly a major challenge. However, it was, as indicated 
previously, a challenge that had to be taken up if the 
shipbuilding industry in the United Kingdom was to survive.
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A key factor of the challenge would, therefore, appear to be 
gaining the support and commitment of all those involved in 
the industry. Real support and commitment for the 
individual aspects of the P.I.P. programme, as distinct from 
merely paying lip-service to it. A recognition by those 
involved in the industry that this was a way forward - a way 
of halting the decline. An acknowledgement from the 
initiators of the P.I.P. programme that the support and 
commitment was dependent on:-
Firstly - ensuring that the productivity 
inhibitions, including those associated with 
manpower, were identified and that the management, 
at local shipyard level, were firmly committed to 
implementing positive plans aimed at removing the 
inhibitions and thereby increasing productivity 
and shipyard competitiveness.
Secondly - creating a good industrial relations 
mechanism whereby changes and policies associated 
with the removal of the shipyard's inhibiting 
factors could be incorporated into industrial 
relations agreements prior to implementation.
This industrial relation mechanism to have proper 
communications, consultations and negotiations 
procedures.
Thirdly - recognising that improving productivity 
would not be achieved unless all of the people 
employed in the shipyard's business, at all 
levels and in all departments, fully understand 
what the changes mean to them and their role in 
the change process and work together.
In many ways, therefore, the challenge which British 
Shipbuilders had to face up to was similar to that which 
faced the architects of the Fairfield Experiment - the 
counter productive attitudes of the shipyard workers, 
demarcation, inefficient working practices and, of course, 
poor industrial relations.
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The principal difference was the scale of the National 
operation as compared to the single shipyard Fairfield
operation.
3. THE STRATEGY
Transforming long established and uncompetitive British 
shipyards into a vibrant, modern and competitive United
Kingdom shipbuilding industry was, as previously indicated, 
the major challenge of the British Shipbuilders strategy, as 
reflected by the P.I.P. programme. A challenge made all the 
more complex by the fact that the shipyards had their own 
distinctive traditional values and attitudes. Some were 
operating with outmoded equipment and antique belt driven 
machinery and most were constrained by a restrictive
approach to manpower utilisation and flexibility.
The aim of the strategy was to fundamentally change the 
nature and character of British shipyards sweeping away the 
cobwebs of neglect, inefficiency and inactivity and by doing 
so reduce the costs of building ships. In terms of cost
competitiveness, the P. I.P. Director had the view that the 
strategy had to bring about a reduction of between 10-15% in 
shipbuilding costs immediately and a further 20% in the 
medium term, to enable British Shipbuilder's to compete 
effectively in the international market place:-
"It is vital to mount a prolonged aggressive and 
successful attack on costs in order to minimise 
the impact of lower prices and generate reserves 
during times of higher prices." (Vaughan 1983 
page ref.114).
To mount such a strategical attack it was necessary, 
according to the P.I.P. Director, to understand that 
traditionally shipbuilding costs are broken into three main 
elements - materials, labour and overheads - as illustrated 
in figure 8.3.
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SHIPBUILDING COST DISTRIBUTION
TYPICAL MERCHANT SHIP
INDIRECT 
LABOUR, STAFF 
AND EMPLOYMENT 
ON COSTS
(60% OF OVERHEADS)
MAIN ENGINE 
(23% O F  MATERIALS)
OVERHEADS
19%
DIRECT MATERIALS  
• 57% .
INDIRECT MATERIALS 
(20%OF OVERHEADS)
S O UR CE: Craig (1979)
Figure 8.3
The individual cost elements are not independent and a
saving in one of the elements could quite easily create 
additional costs elsewhere. For example, if by negotiating 
a significant reduction is achieved in the price of material 
and, as a result, the supplier decides to sacrifice the 
quality of the product, additional labour costs could be 
incurred, due perhaps to rectification work.
The P.I.P. Director stressed that the focus of the strategy 
would be determined by a thorough examination of 
shipbuilding costs. This was introduced against a
background of what was described as a 'structural approach 
to cost reduction'. By introducing it against such a
background the Director was not suggesting that traditional 
business management methods of cost reduction were
inappropriate or unimportant to shipbuilding.
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On the contrary, he pointed out that they were important, 
but in the past the traditional methods had been 
unintelligently applied.
"Unless a coherent and comprehensive approach to 
the problem is adopted cost reductions will not be 
achieved." (Vaughan 1983 page ref.114).
The strategies were, therefore, aimed at reducing 
shipbuilding costs and consisted of:-
a) A Preparatory Stage during which prime areas of
potential economies, including those associated with 
manpower resourcing and utilisation throughout the 
nationalised shipbuilding industry, were scrutinised by 
the centralised P.I.P. department.
b) An Examination Stage, a detailed examination of all
areas of shipbuilding costs and the establishment of
project groups. Consideration was given to costs 
associated with marketing, design, facilities methods, 
industrial relations, manpower utilisation flexibility 
and management.
c) An Industrial Relations Stage whereby industrial 
relations agreements were concluded that embodied
initiatives that were identified from the examination
and were aimed at improving productivity.
d) An Implementation Stage that included detailed training 
programmes aimed at ensuring that the shipyard workers 
had the skills and knowledge required to support the 
initiatives.
The seven areas of review identified during the preparatory 
stage for examination are illustrated overleaf in figure 
8.4.
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Figure 8.4
Significantly, several review areas were associated with 
manpower. Areas of the business where the potential of the 
industry's people was being constrained. As such, part of 
the strategy was concerned with removing these manpower 
constraints, as a means of realising this potential. 
Accordingly, the adoption of effective manpower utilisation 
and flexibility policies, free of manpower constraints was, 
therefore, certainly an aim of the strategy with the 
survival of an economically viable United Kingdom
shipbuilding industry the principal goal.
4. MANPOWER EXAMINATION
One of the prime aims of the strategy was to improve 
productivity as a means of reducing shipbuilding costs by 
realising the full potential of the industry's people.
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As such the establishment of an effective process to 
identify the industry's manpower constraints was a priority.
The P.I.P's coherent and comprehensive approach of sub­
dividing what was termed as 'production weaknesses' into 
review areas was just such a process. Certainly, the 
'production weaknesses' were the industry's problem areas, 
and many were associated with constraints that inhibited 
manpower utilisation. Consequently they were exactly the 
areas where the removal of constraints could lead to 
productivity improvements and cost reductions.
The approach, therefore, appeared to offer a convenient 
means of breaking these problems into manageable parts or 
projects. Groups made up of the centralised P.I.P. function 
and selected senior managers, drawn from the industry, were 
established for each project. They were supported by 
production engineering and industrial engineering 
techniques, that were not completely alien to the industry 
and were, as indicated previously, used during the 
'Fairfield Experiment'. The P.I.P. approach also encouraged 
a careful and analytical examination of the industry's 
problems and afforded an opportunity of proposing solutions 
which could lead to improved efficiency. The Shipbuilding 
Operations Director was quoted as having said:-
"The objective of all must be the same. The 
efficient organisation of all resources within 
British Shipbuilders for the economic building of 
ships to satisfy the customer; on time; at a 
competitive price; to the required quality." 
(Craig 1979 page ref.17).
Perhaps the problems associated with, what was termed as the 
'use of the working day', serves to demonstrate the 
Shipbuilding Operations Director's point that efficient 
organisation was a major constituent of economic 
shipbuilding.
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Inefficiency was evident in the organisation of British 
Shipbuilders human resources and this restricted the number 
of hours available for productive use. This was due to the 
high levels of non-productive time, the typical causes of 
which are illustrated in figure 8.5.
N O N -PR O D U C T IV E  T IM E
Average T im e lost  p e r  Yard (Mins)
Morning and A f te rn o o n  b r e a k s ............................................................................................................  23
Late s t a r t - E a r l y  f i n i s h .............................................................................................................................. 47
Idle t im e w ith in  em p lo y ees  c o n t r o l ..................................................................................................... 31
Normal base to  w ork  s ta t io n ...................................................................................................................  26
Waiting t i m e ...................................................................................................................................................  21
Adverse w e a th e r  c o n d i t i o n s ...................................................................................................................  17
C orrec t ion  o f  e rro rs .....................................................................................................................................  12
O t h e r s ..............................................................................................................................................................  8
T o t a l .....................................................................................................................................................................135
T h ree  h o u r s  five m inu tes
SOURCE: Craig (1979)
Figure 8. 5
In many ways shipbuilding had become an industry of lost and 
waiting time. People lost time due to late starts and early 
finishes at the beginning and end of their shifts. They 
lost time travelling to and from their work place and they 
waited on the services of others before they could progress 
their job. In total 1 hour 26 minutes were lost daily, 
simply getting shipyard workers to and from their jobs. 52 
minutes lost waiting on the services of others and some 47 
minutes per day lost due to the weather and quality 
problems.
All of this time was lost during the normal working day. In 
fact, 3 of the 8 hours per day was regarded as 
non-productive. This, of course, had major implications on 
the number of manhours taken to build a ship. Unproductive 
manhours were an added cost of shipbuilding. As such, they 
were a major influence on the high shipbuilding costs, and 
low productive rates which were placing the future of the 
United Kingdom shipbuilding industry in doubt.
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In addition to the non-productive time lost during the 
working day, the shipbuilding production process was, as 
previously discussed, disrupted by poor time keeping, late 
arrival and early departure from the workplace and by 
absenteeism. Unpunctuality and absenteeism had long been a 
problem in British shipbuilding. Indeed, Woodcock (1971) 
cited earlier, indicated that 42% of shipbuilding employees 
were being paid less than their normal basic hours i.e., 
they worked less than their full basic hours. The figure 
was far in excess of any other industry and almost double 
the rate of manufacturing generally.
This problem was not confined simply to the employees who 
were not punctual or absent. It had a' knock-on effect on 
others. Platers could not carry on their work until they 
were reallocated a welder to service them. People could not 
get material out of the store until such times as the 
storeman arrived or alternative arrangements were made for 
the release of stores material. Erectors could not lift the 
steel units without the craneman. All of these contributed 
to a reduced output and poor productivity and there seemed 
little doubt that productivity improvements could be found 
in these areas. The Shipbuilding Operations Director's view 
was that the improvement would be at least one hour per day.
Further, it was recognised that two other factors were 
contributing to the industry's poor productivity, they 
were: -
Firstly, the difficulties in maintaining a steady 
flow of information to employees at their place of 
work.
Secondly, time lost, due to inclement weather, 
particularly on the uncovered berths, during ship 
construction.
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According to the Shipbuilding Operations Director, a further 
half hour per day was being lost due to these constraints. 
He pointed out that, taken together, one and a half hours 
per day was lost due to these factors. As such, the removal 
of the constraints associated with these manpower 
utilisation problems could bring about a 3 0% productivity 
improvement and a saving in shipbuilding costs of 10%. This 
was, of course, based on the perception that only five 
production hours were available during a normal eight hour 
day as illustrated in figure 8.6.
WORKING DAY IMPROVEMENT IN PRODUCTIVITY
8
6,5
= (OUTPUT + 30%)
+ 90 MINS = + 30% OUTPUT
5
PRODUCTIVE
HOURS
OF
WORKING
DAY WORK DAY  
OUTPUT
0 1.0
EFFICIENCY OF WORKING HOURS
SOURCE: Craig (1979)
Figure 8.6
The Shipbuilding Operations Director was, therefore, 
indicating that by increasing the number of hours available 
to production from 5 to 6.5 hours per day this would 
increase the output of the workforce by 30%. The efficiency 
of the working day would, therefore, be increased and the 
result of this increased efficiency would be a reduction in 
the number of hours required to build ships. Quite apart 
from this, 1.5 hours out of 8 per day were still being lost 
from the processes associated with building ships.
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A number of other constraints to manpower utilisation were 
identified. These included working practices, flexibility, 
manning levels, retraining, accidents and overtime controls. 
The shipbuilding Operations Director wrote:-
"Traditional working practices in an industry as 
old as shipbuilding are deeply entrenched and 
though custom and practice have achieved the force 
of precedent, whereas, many of our efficient 
competitors overseas have not been in shipbuilding 
for so long and consequently have a more flexible 
attitude." (Craig 1979 page ref.40)
U.K. Shipbuilding working practices and customs had been 
painstakingly built up over decades. They were an integral 
part of the industry's craft and trade structures, created 
when labour was divided and demarcation lines set over a 
century ago. Ironically, as indicated previously, by
Mortimer (1973) they were created as a means of improving
productivity. However, they were now regarded as a 
constraint to effective manpower utilisation and flexible 
working. Breaking down these traditional working practices 
and the trade demarcation lines was, of course, . a 
fundamental prerequisite of flexible working.
This was not altogether a new approach to shipbuilding 
indeed, much progress had been made during the 'Fairfield 
Experiment' where the move to more open forms of functional 
flexibility was supported by an industrial relations
agreement and underpinned by an extensive retraining
programme.
However, Fairfield was the exception within the nationalised 
industrial framework and throughout the United Kingdom 
shipyard workers and shop stewards vigorously defended their 
traditional working practices and trade demarcation lines as 
a means of protecting jobs. Any encroachment on these was 
normally met with resistance and in many cases industrial 
disputes.
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Shipbuilding was renowned for demarcation or "who does what" 
disputes the principal reason for disputes and strikes in 
shipbuilding.
Another of the industry's manpower problem areas, identified 
as a result of the P.I.P's coherent and comprehensive 
approach, was the high number of accidents which occurred in 
the shipyards. Indeed, Goldie (1983) indicated that, in a 
Govan context, 30,091 people visited the shipyard's 
ambulance rooms during 1983, for treatment, as a result of 
injuries sustained at the workplace. Most were treated "on 
site" and the average time lost was 3 0 minutes per visit. 
Others sustained more serious injuries and required external 
treatments where the time lost was measured in days and 
weeks rather than minutes.
The manpower examination, therefore, revealed that the 
British Shipbuilding Industry had many constraints that were 
inhibiting manpower utilisation and, thereby, adversely 
affecting productivity and competitiveness. These 
included:-
(a) The organisation of the working day and the 
restrictions this placed on the number of 
hours available for productive use. Three 
out of eight hours were used unproductively.
(b) Statistics indicated that 42% of shipbuilding 
workers worked less than a full week. The 
problems related to unpunctuality and 
absenteeisms were not simply confined to the 
workers engaged in absenteeism but also had a 
knock on effect on others whose work was 
disrupted.
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(c) Difficulties in maintaining a steady flow of 
information to employees at their workplace 
and time lost due to inclement weather and 
particularly on uncovered berths during ship 
construction.
(d) Deeply entrenched customs and practices which 
encouraged demarcation and restrictive 
working practices and discouraged flexible 
working and attitudes.
(e) A poor safety performance which resulted in 
high numbers of accidents and consequential 
manhour losses which, in the Govan shipyard, 
was reflected by the 30,091 people who 
visited the shipyard's medical centre during 
1983 .
In some instances to remove these inhibiting or constraining 
factors involved a challenge to the traditional working 
practices and this was recognised as contentious. However, 
given that a more open approach to flexible working was 
regarded as essential, the challenge had to be taken up.
5. ATTITUDES AND RESISTANCE
Arguably, one of the biggest challenges of the P. I.P. 
programme was overcoming the resistance shipbuilding workers 
had towards changing their highly valued traditional working 
practices and customs. They may well have recognised that 
they were partly responsible for the industry's poor 
productivity but changes, particularly those which 
challenged the specialist craft and trade structures, were 
resisted rather than welcomed.
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In reality company viability was set aside when Joiners and 
Sheet Iron Workers disputed who was responsible for hanging 
ceilings. Cost competitiveness was stood down when shop 
stewards argued that newly installed machines be manned on 
the basis of manning levels set over half a century ago when 
machines were belt driven.
The root cause of this resistance and what has previously 
been described as the 'shipbuilding workers counter 
productive attitudes' was, as indicated earlier, suspicion 
and fear, suspicion that the changes will lead to job losses 
and a fear that the job losses will lead to unemployment. 
Indeed, Paulden (1969) cited earlier, suggested that strict 
demarcation was a means of jealously guarding jobs. Not 
only between unions but also between trades. Inside the 
same union 'one man one job' had been the slogan for 150 
years - shipwrights could not drill a hole, blacksmiths were 
not allowed to weld. In fact, all trades had strict 
limitations on what they were permitted to do.
Consequently, it was acknowledged that any move to remove 
the manpower constraints associated with the industry's 
restrictive craft and trade structures, as a means of 
bringing about a more open approach to flexible working, 
would be resisted nationally by shipbuilding workers and 
their shop stewards. This notwithstanding the fact that 
such a move was made at the Govan shipyard during the 
'Fairfield Experiment'.
To overcome the perceived resistance from the shop stewards, 
at shipyard level, British Shipbuilders preferred option was 
to conclude an industrial relations agreement which 
integrated the productivity improvement plan, by means of 
centralised collective bargaining, Kelly (1988) wrote:-
"A new corporate strategy aimed, inter alia, to 
overcome shop steward resistance by centralising 
industrial relations policy which replaced 168 
bargaining units with one central unit." (Kelly 
1988 page ref.298).
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This was seen as a way of increasing the influence of 
national union officials relative to the shop stewards and 
was intended to bring about a more disciplined approach to 
resolving problems during the difficult times which the 
industry had to face.
In centralising collective bargaining British Shipbuilders 
recognised that their subsidiary companies had distinctive 
management styles, different industrial relations 
agreements, terms and conditions of employment, customs and 
practices and interpretations of national agreements. As 
such the move to centralise collective bargaining could be 
regarded as part of an overall policy of centralising the 
industrys organisation and decision making processes. This 
strategy aimed at what Mintzberg (1988) would describe as 
achieving standardisation and uniformity of policy 
implementation and application throughout the industry.
One of the principal advocates of this type of strategy, was 
Robert Aikinson, Chairman of British Shipbuilders in 1980. 
He wrote:-
"It was clear that there would be advantages in 
such an organisation supported by a central 
departmental structure." (Aikinson 1980 page 
ref.8).
Basically this took the form of moving the industry's major 
departments, including those associated with finance, 
industrial relations and productivity improvement, to the 
central headquarters. In total seven major departments, 
illustrated in figure 8.7, moved to centralised control.
CENTRALISED ORGANISATION STRUCTURE
C O R P O R A T I O N
B O A R D
C H A I R M A N
P E R F O R M A N C E  
I M P  & P R O D
B U S I N E S S
D E V E L O P M E N T
P U B L I C
R E L A T I O N S
S E C R E T A R I A T T E C H N O L O G Y
F I N A N C E P E R S O N N E L
SOURCE: Atkinson (1980)
Figure 8.7
In reality, centralisation of organisation ensured that 
authority for the industry's major decisions, including 
those associated with productivity improvements, lay with 
British Shipbuilders executive. This was, of course, a 
major power shift away from the individual shipyards to the 
centralised executive. It reduced the autonomy of the 
shipyards insofar as the centralised departments were vital 
to the viability and operational success of the shipyards. 
Centralisation aimed at standardisation of approach was, 
therefore, part of a strategy aimed at overcoming resistance 
at the individual shipyards to policy implication and 
application. (Such resistance could well come from the 
shipyards' senior management.)
It ensured that British Shipbuilders executive had the 
authority to determine industry policy and the power to 
ensure that policy was implemented with a degree of 
commitment and consistency in all shipyards. This authority 
extended to the appointment of the senior managers, at 
individual shipyard level, to carry out policy 
implementation and application.
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The centralised collective bargaining part of the strategy 
was aimed at overcoming shop stewards resistance to changes, 
and to bring about a more consistent approach to industrial 
relations, and the implementation and application of policy. 
Such a strategy, therefore, removed the 'ownership' of 
industrial relations agreements and policies from the local 
shop stewards and placed ownership with the national trade 
union officials.
6. AGREEMENTS AND INITIATIVES
The major initiatives, in terms of manpower utilisation and 
flexibility, taken during nationalisation, were aimed at 
removing many of the industry's manpower constraints that 
were prohibiting people from realising their full potential 
and, as such, were contributory factors of the industry's 
poor productivity.
To the shipyard worker restructuring was simply another way 
of saying that more shipyards were to close and more jobs 
were being lost. In such circumstances, changes to working 
practices and customs were more liable to be resisted rather 
than welcomed. However, given that the removal of manpower 
constraints was regarded as vital to the future viability of 
the shipbuilding industry the restrictive working practices 
and customs were challenged.
According to a British Shipbuilding Corporate Director:-
"I talk about changes in working practices. By 
this I really mean a fundamental relaxation which 
will allow flexibility and interchangeablility 
particularly between boilermaker and outfit 
trades. I know that such trades will never be 
completely flexible but provided a man is capable 
of doing a job and has had the training to do it 
we would expect to get an agreement on that 
point." (Rice 1983).
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An electrician could weld his own hangers, and drill his own 
holes, rather than wait for other tradesmen to do these 
tasks for him. Provided a man was capable of doing the job 
and he has had the necessary training, he should not be 
restricted by traditional working practices and customs from 
doing the complete job himself. The type of fundamental 
relaxation Rice was proposing required the support of the 
trade unions and had to be incorporated into an industrial 
relations agreement.
In many ways Rice was proposing a strategy similar to that 
adopted at Fairfield during the "experiment" and described 
previously. Both challenged the traditional specialised 
craft and trade structures by introducing a more open 
approach to flexible working. The business plan aimed at 
improving manpower effectiveness and shipyard
competitiveness, as expressed in the P.I.P. programme was 
integrated with industrial relations policy and underpinned 
by an extensive retraining programme.
An important factor at Fairfield, however, was the company's 
approach to industrial relations. Within the setting of 
the Fairfield industrial relations environment the trade 
unions supported the business plan and their role was a 
central feature of the change process. As such, the 
Fairfield approach had a local identity it was supported by 
the shop stewards and through them by the shipyard workers.
British Shipbuilders had, of course, established their own 
forum to discuss contentious industrial relations problems 
and initiatives. It differed from Fairfield insofar as it 
lacked local identity and the mechanism set up by the 
nationalised industry was aimed at by passing the local shop 
stewards as a means of avoiding resistance. The British 
Shipbuilding Executive and the national trade union leaders, 
however, believed that they had established a meaningful 
forum where the national trade union leaders, as distinct 
from the local shop stewards, had a major role in the 
industry's change process. The Shipbuilding Negotiating 
Committee Chairman declared in 1983:-
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"This will be the fifth year that we endeavour to 
continue the philosophy. Events will prove 
whether we can or not but it is our view that our 
contribution to facing the problems of the 
industry has never been properly acknowledged and, 
in some cases, never understood. However, it is 
still the view of the S.N.C. that centralised
collective bargaining is still the major crutch of 
a sick industry." (Hepplewhite 1983).
The plan was resisted by shipyard workers who prompted the 
shop stewards to mandate their national trade union leaders 
to take industrial action unless British Shipbuilders
substantially changed their attitude. A motion passed at a
Delegate Conference in 1983 stated
"The membership throughout the industry pledge
full support to the S.N.C. for any action called 
for up to and including total occupation or all 
out strike action. Finally, in view of the 
decisiveness of our members decision, there is no 
need for any further Delegate Conferences to be 
convened on this issue unless there is a 
substantial change in the attitude of British 
Shipbuilders." (Ferry 1983).
Negotiations associated with the Productivity Improvement 
Plan were protracted in that they lasted seven months. 
However, they were concluded without recourse to industrial 
action and the Plan was integrated with industrial relations 
policy. This, after some alteration, and by means of the 
nationalised industry's industrial relations forum 
centralised collective bargaining. Kelly (1988) wrote:-
"The Productivity Improvement Plan was integrated 
with industrial relations policy. Changes took 
the form of greater functional and numerical 
flexibility as well as retraining.
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Stemming from the March 1979 corporate agreement 
(Phase 1) in wage restructuring, harmonisation and 
productivity, these industrial relations changes 
were incorporated into the phase 5 agreement of 
January 1984." (Kelly 1988 page ref.298).
In his opinion, the phase 5 agreement constituted a 
determined attempt, by British Shipbuilders, to 'grasp the 
nettle' by radically altering their work practices and 
methods of organisation. It also secured a recognition from 
the trade unions that management had the right to determine 
more flexible working arrangements.
Accordingly, the Productivity Improvement Plan was 
incorporated into an industrial relations agreement and 
major initiatives, related to numerical and functional 
flexibility, were introduced. These initiatives were 
prominent features of Atkinson's (1986) model of the 
flexible firm discussed earlier.
In terms of numerical flexibility, a shipyard would operate 
with what was called a "core group" of employees supported 
by a 'peripheral group' who may or may not be employees. The 
peripheral group would be generally temporary, short term 
employees or sub-contractors engaged on appropriate 
contracts and conditions of services for periods required to 
meet production demands or peaks. They provided numerical 
flexibility insofar as they were hired when needed and fired 
when the job was finished.
The 'core group', on the other hand, were the permanent 
employees, supported with appropriate rewards, including 
implicit guarantee of job security, training, pensions, 
holiday entitlements. These employees were valued by the 
company because of their skills and by virtue of training, 
were functionally flexible; tradesmen who carried out the 
skills of trades other than their own. In addition, they 
would carry out tasks normally associated with semi skilled 
employees.
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Semi skilled employees themselves would be interchangeable 
throughout the shipyard. As such they could, for example, 
be transferred from their traditional helping functions to 
tasks associated with crane driving, forklifting - tasks 
that were performed by other semi-skilled workers.
Consequently, the Productivity Improvement Plan sought to 
tackle many of the industry's manpower constraints and, in 
particular, the areas where productive time was lost, as a 
result of one tradesman waiting for the services of others. 
It also tackled the industry's cyclic problems by 
introducing numerical flexibility. In addition to temporary 
employees and sub-contractors, this part of the initiative 
included a provision to lay-off core workers during 
difficult times. It also included provisions to transfer 
core workers between shipyards, introduce shift working and 
balance the labour force during times of production peaks.
Balancing the labour force was a particularly interesting 
provision, in terms of the cyclic nature of shipbuilding, 
insofar as it meant that when there was insufficient work 
for a tradesman, in his own department, he could be 
transferred to any other department in the shipyard. As 
such, it partly addressed the problems highlighted 
previously, the laying off of steelworkers when the ships 
were launched and recruiting outfit workers to complete the 
vessel.
Concluding the phase 5 agreeement did not, however, by 
itself, contribute to improving productivity or reducing 
costs. The words of the agreement had to be transformed 
into deeds in the individual shipyards and this was 
dependent upon:-
Firstly - the commitment of managers, supervisors
and shipyard workers to the Productivity
Improvement Plan.
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Secondly - the establishment of effective 
industrial relations, communication and
consultation processes to clarify any contentious 
issues and enable the implementation of the 
changes covered by the agreement.
Thirdly - the establishment of effective training 
programmes to underpin the agreement and to ensure 
that all employees fully understood the 
implications of the Productivity Improvement Plan 
and their part in it. This including a programme 
aimed at transforming specialist craftsmen into 
functionally flexible craftsmen.
The major manpower initiatives taken by British Shipbuilders 
did, of course, involve more than eliminating waiting and 
'lost time'. They also involved supporting the industry's 
people with modern plant and equipment, new technology and 
systems. A common feature of all initiatives was the role 
and contribution of training, itself a determining factor of 
industrial efficiency and international competitiveness.
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CHAPTER 9: THE FLEXIBLE WORKING APPROACHES
IMPLEMENTATION PLANS 
MODEL 3 - PART 2
1. FLEXIBILITY TRAINING
Two important principles characterised British Shipbuilders 
move to implement more open forms of flexible working 
incorporated in their industrial relations agreement. They, 
were firstly, the role of training in the change process and 
secondly, the importance of maintaining safe working
practices. Indeed, the agreement stated:-
"To ensure the full implementation of the terms of 
the agreement the necessary training or retraining 
shall be given. Training needs must be identified 
and the relevant training programmes devised. 
Employees shall be provided with training
sufficient to enable them to carry out the
particular task or tasks required. Any work 
performed by the individual shall be subject to 
his/her competence to do the job. Both parties 
recognise the importance of covering all aspects 
of safe working practices and health protection in 
the implementation of this agreement." (Phase 
Five 1984) .
The individual shipyards were, therefore, committed to the 
concept that a tradesman could carry out the tasks of trades 
other than his own only when he had been adequately trained 
and was familiar with the safety implications of his 
extended skills. As such, training programmes aimed at 
increasing the skills and knowledge of the individual craft, 
non-craft workers and, indeed, their supervisors and 
managers were established. These following detailed training 
analysis conducted in the individual shipyards.
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At Govan Shipbuilders, the former Fairfield Shipyard, this 
type of training approach was familiar, given that a similar 
approach was adopted during the 'Fairfield Experiment'. The 
training analysis there was, according to the Personnel 
Director at Govan, conducted by senior managers and agreed 
with the departmental managers and supervisors:-
"We could not implement such a profound change in 
working practices unless the will to make it work 
was present both in the managers and in the men 
and women of the workforce. It is one thing to 
get the agreement signed but it was another to put 
it into practice. What we did, was to have the 
senior management agree with managers and 
supervisors the calibre and duration of training 
necessary to extend the capacity of tradesmen. We 
did not seek miracles, but if you have an 
efficient tradesman and you extend his horizon say 
by 2 0 per cent, 3 0 per cent, then the Company is 
going to benefit and certainly his job 
satisfaction is going to increase." (McCann 
1985 page ref.11).
At Govan Shipbuilders, the involvement and commitment of the 
shipyard management was recognised as a critical aspect of 
the change process. We tend to support that which we 
create. As such, the departmental managers and the 
supervisors participated in the training analysis. They 
identified the additional skills that their workers required 
to improve efficiency. For example, the analysis indicated 
that Platers required training in welding and burning skills 
to improve their performance, to enable the platers to 
progress their own work rather than wait for the service of 
other tradesmen.
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The training programme was not aimed at producing 
"shipbuilding jack of all trades". It was a process aimed 
at extending the skills of tradesmen by about 2 0 per cent, 
enabling tradesmen to service or support themselves. The 
programme was, therefore, not intended to train the
tradesman to be fully competent in all four specialist 
trades. Platers were simply trained to tack weld and to 
remove obstructions in way of fairing. They were not
trained to weld butts to X-Ray standards, nor were they 
trained in the full range of burning and gouging skills of 
the caulker/burners.
The process of involvement and commitment practiced at Govan 
extended to include the local trade union representatives 
and shop stewards. The Personnel Director said:-
"Once this analysing of training needs was 
completed, Trade Union reaction was sought. The 
response was encouraging. There was genuine 
interest shown by their members in extending
existing skills and learning new skills and, of
course, if you have a skilled man with, perhaps, 
ten years of shipbuilding experience, his ability 
to graft on new skills is quick and impressive.
So the shop stewards were able to reflect this 
interest and agree the major training programme 
implicit in such an undertaking." (McCann 1985 
page ref.11).
In fact, the training programmes identified, as a result of 
the analysis, were extensive. In some instances, the shop 
stewards suggested that their departmental members receive 
more training than originally identified by management. 
More than 50% of the tradesman in the shipyard required to 
have their skills extended, even the younger tradesmen, 
including those who had been trained under S.I.T.B. 
policies. Yet these policies had aimed at, what Fielding 
(1969) described earlier as, 'training the industry's 
craftsmen of the future to be more versatile and adaptable'.
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Accordingly, after long and protracted discussions and 
negotiations, the phase 5 Industrial Relations Agreement was 
underpinned by an extensive training programme.
As an example of what was involved, the training established 
for the boilermakers or steelwork tradesmen is illustrated 
in figure 9.1.
INTERCHANGEABILITY AND ACROSS GROUP TRAINING
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SOURCE: Gordon (1985)
Figure 9.1
As indicated previously, not all of the 657 steelworkers 
employed in the shipyard received training. Some had latent 
skills that they had acquired during the Fairfield 
Experiment, others received skills in addition to their 
specialist trade skills during apprentice training. The 
detailed training analysis revealed that 54% of the 
steelworers had training needs and the programme addressed 
the shipyard worker's individual needs. Figure 9.1 is a 
'snap shot' of the training covered for the individual 
trades and indicated that platers, for example, required to 
acquire skills in burning, welding, buffing and shipwrights 
work. Not all platers required the same additional skills.
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The instructors appointed to carryout the training were 
selected from the craft ranks. They were chosen on the 
basis of their individual skills by the managers and their 
appointment was agreed with the shop stewards. Welders were 
selected, trained in instructional techniques and, 
thereafter, trained platers, caulkers and shipwrights to 
tack weld. Caulker/burners trained welders, platers and 
shipwrights in burning skills and so on.
In this way ownership of the training programme lay with the 
Govan shipyard, as distinct from the centralised British 
Shipbuilder organisation function and the training was an 
attempt to remove demarcation lines at the yard. This was 
achieved with the assistance, support and commitment of the 
shipyard managers, foremen, shop stewards and the shipyard 
workers themselves.
One measure of the effectiveness of the training was, 
perhaps, illustrated by the number of employees practicing 
their extended skills. A one off activity sampling, taken 
one month after completion of the training programme, 
revealed that, on that particular day, as illustrated in 
figure 9.1, the number of those who participated in the 
training programme, practicing their newly acquired skills 
was, generally, in excess of 30%.
Functional flexibility and interchangeability was, of 
course, not confined to the steelwork trades. It was aimed 
at outfit tradesmen and ancillary workers and, as such, 
extensive training programmes were mounted for these 
workers. The activity sample, once again revealed that, in 
general, the number of employees practicing their newly 
acquired skills was well above the 30% mark.
The programme, for the outfit trades, is illustrated in 
figure 9.2.
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Enqineers 59 58 . 13 46 29 42
Boilermakers 13 8 7
Pipeworkers • 10 17 7 14 12
Electricians 19 16 5 25 57
Total 88 104 13 8 58 68 111 7
2. Total number of employees 
now using their new skills
Enqineers 6 6 4 13 6
Boilermakers 13 8 7
Pipeworkers 10 17 1 9
Electricians 5 25 57
Total 16 36 4 8 19 40 57 7
3. Total percentage of employees now 
using their new skills 1818% 34-6295 30-7756 100% 32-7656 58-82% 51-35% 100%
SOURCE: Gordon (1985)
Figure 9.2
The flexibility training programme, at Govan shipbuilders, 
had, therefore, realised the ambitions cited earlier by 
the Personnel Director, insofar as the horizons of shipyard 
workers who participate in training had been extended by 
over 20%.
2. SAFETY EDUCATION
A prerequisite of a tradesman being able to carry out the 
tasks of trades, other than his own, was that he had been 
adequately trained in the safety aspects of his extended 
skills. The Shipbuilding Operations Director stressed the 
desirability of this type of training, both in terms of 
economic and humanitarian grounds. Efficiency in safety 
performance was just as important as efficiency in 
productivity:-
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"It is vital that everyone concerned with 
improving productivity and performance is aware of 
safety and recognises that accidents do not happen 
but are caused. Accident prevention is desirable 
on economic grounds but absolutely essential on 
humanitarian grounds. Efficiency in safety and 
health is as important as efficiency in 
productivity and performance." (Craig 1979 page 
ref.55).
Accidents, particularly the high level of accidents cited 
earlier by Goldie (J. 1983) were an integral part of the
industry's poor productivity. Vast numbers of people lost 
productive time travelling to and from the ambulance rooms. 
They lost time travelling to hospitals and they lost days, 
weeks and, in some cases, months due to serious injuries 
sustained in the shipyard.
At Govan Shipbuilders the link between safety performance 
and productivity improvement was recognised. Indeed, an 
ambitious Health and Safety educational approach was 
established in 1984 to support the company's extensive 
flexibility training, insofar as it ensured that shipyard 
workers were adequately trained in the safety aspects of 
their extended skills. However, the educational approach 
was aimed at more than this. Its aim was to reduce 
accidents by influencing the complacent attitude that 
shipyard workers had to health and safety. The Personnel 
Services and Safety Manager said:-
"We were attempting to raise the level of safety 
awareness in the shipyard and change the attitudes 
of workers who appeared to believe that a 
consequence of building ships was that, people 
would be injured, maimed and killed." (Yuill C.
1985).
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The Govan shipyard's safety performance was poor. Accidents 
were a result of firstly, unsafe ways of working on 
hazardous activities and secondly, working with substances, 
equipment and materials that were threats to health. 
Consequently, prior to establishing the educational 
programme the accident creators were identified. Safety 
arrangements aimed at eliminating them were devised. These 
were the corner-stone of the educational programme.
For example, accidents occurred as a result of unsafe 
working practices associated with burning on board the 
vessels. The most common cause was the failure of the 
burners to remove their burning torches and hoses from tanks 
and confined spaces at the end of working shifts. The 
result of the omission was that oxygen and fuel gas escaped 
from the torch or hoses. This created an oxygen enriched 
atmosphere and was normally fatal for the returning burner, 
or any other employee, using a naked light in the confined 
space.
Accordingly, the use of fuel gases and oxygen was identified 
as a hazardous activity. A safety arrangement setting out a 
safe system for the use of fuel gas and oxygen was devised. 
The education ensured shipyard workers engaged on this 
activity were trained to work in accordance with the safety 
arrangements. The arrangements were also issued to the 
workers as information and instruction documents. This 
ensured a common standard of work conduct and, in effect, 
was 'standardisation'.
The safety educational programme recognised that as a result 
of the flexibility training tradesmen, other than 
caulker/burners, would carry out the skills of burning. 
These tradesmen were unfamiliar with the dangers. The 
education ensured that they were trained to fully understand 
the safety implications of using fuel gases and oxygen, this 
before they practiced their newly acquired skills.
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Indeed, safety education was extended to include employees 
who already had the skills but had never been trained in the 
safety aspects of their job. The caulker burners, the 
pipework burners, shipyard workers had been, in some 
instances, practising these skills for 25 years and were 
attending their first safety education course.
SAFETY MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
FOR CRAFT & NON CRAFT EMPLOYEES
BASIC MODULE 
GENERAL SAFETY COURSE No. of
Participants
Safety in Shipbuilding 
Health & Safety Legislation 
Role of the Supervisor 
Hazard Spotting
2nd Stage Safety 
Training Modules
No. MODULE TITLES
No. of
Participants
S1 Fuel Gases and Oxygen
S2 Fire Fighting and Rescue
S3 Entry into Confined Spaces
SU Lifting and Handling
S5 Electrical Safety
S6 Woodworking Machines
S7 Cranemen Safety
S8 Abrasive Wheels
S9 Competent Persons
SOURCE: Yuill (1985)
Figure 9.3
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Almost every tradesman and semi-skilled worker, in the 
shipyard, participated in safety education which, as 
indicated previously, supported the flexibility training and 
was also aimed at influencing the shipyard workers poor 
attitude to safety. Again by way of illustration an extract 
from the safety educational programme is shown in figure 
9.3. As indicated, a number of safety modules were 
developed. These were aimed at ensuring that employees were 
familiar with the safety arrangements associated with their 
'core' and extended skills.
The shipyard workers took part in firstly, the basic module 
aimed at influencing their poor attitude to safety and 
secondly, the stage 2 module appropriate to their core or 
extended skill. For example, the plater attended the basic
module and the S.l. stage 2 module, associated with fuel
gases and oxygen, prior to practising his extended skill in 
burning. The impact of this approach was stunning in that 
there was a major reduction in the number of accidents and 
there were no accidents directly related to employees
practising their extended skills unsafely.
The annual medical report for 1984 confirmed this, by 
indicating that the number of employees visiting the 
ambulance rooms had been reduced from 3 0,091 in 1983 to 
8,404 in 1984. As such, less time was being lost from
production, as a result of accidents, and the link between 
efficiency in safety performance and efficiency in 
productivity and performance were established.
3. SUPERVISORY/MANAGEMENT TRAINING
A major feature of Govan's move to implement the British 
Shipbuilders Productivity Improvement Plan, as incorporated 
in the Phase 5 Industrial Relations Agreement, was the 
participation and involvement of the industry's supervisors 
and managers in the training process.
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This was, of course, a departure from the industry's 
traditional approach to supervisory/management training. 
However, given that the supervisors and managers did not 
participate in the creation of the Productivity Improvement 
Plan and were not involved in the process of incorporating 
the Plan into an industrial relations agreement, it was 
considered important that they fully understood the Plan and 
their role in any change process.
Shipbuilding, as indicated previously, traditionally had a 
complacent attitude to this type of training. Indeed, the 
vast majority of supervisors received little, by way of 
formal training, either on or after appointment. They were 
products of the craft ranks, who had hitherto been part of 
the restrictive craft and trade structures and whose 
appointment was usually followed by what has previously been 
described as a "weekend miracle". Yet supervisors were 
regarded as the vital link in the organisation and 
management process. This was a view he shared with the 
Chairman, of the Robens Commission on Health and Safety, who 
said:-
"The supervisor is the direct link between 
management and men. He, therefore, has the most 
important role to play. One of the ills of 
industry is the lack of information given to 
people who most require it. This induces 
frustration which, in turn, destroys interest, 
effectiveness and relationships." (Robens 1972).
In shipbuilding the supervisor, as indicated earlier, 
provided the vital link in the organisational chain, the 
link between the designers and the makers, the managers and 
the managed, to keep the production process moving 
effectively. The link provided by the supervisor was like 
any other in a chain. It required to be oiled and 
maintained, by effective information and by the training 
process.
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At the Govan Shipyard the supervisors involvement in the 
training process included:-
Firstly, their participation in information, 
giving training sessions on the phase 5 agreement.
Secondly, the identification of the training 
required to transform their specialist workers 
into multi-skilled and functionally flexible 
craftsmen.
Thirdly, their participation in training courses 
aimed at increasing their skills and knowledge.
The supervisors initial involvement in the training process 
was their participation in information giving training 
sessions, aimed at ensuring that they fully understood the 
implications of the phase 5 industrial relations agreement 
and their role in its implementation and application. These
training sessions were supported by specially prepared
training material, slides, handouts and videos, materials 
that were prepared centrally by the headquarters staff and 
distributed to the individual shipyards. The aim was to 
ensure a consistent application of policy.
Fuelled with this information the supervisors then
identified the training required to transform their 
specialist workers into multi-skilled and functionally 
flexible craftsmen. Transforming the specialist workers
into multi-skilled craftsmen had major training implications 
for the supervisors themselves, particularly those whose 
working knowledge was restricted to their specialist trade 
background. To supervise groups of multi-skilled craftsmen 
the supervisors required to extend their working knowledge. 
As such, they required training.
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The training programme established for the steelwork 
supervisors is illustrated in figure 9.4.
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Figure 9.4
The aim of the training programme was to transform the 
specialist trade supervisors into area supervisors, 
responsible for multi-skilled work groups in pre-determined 
work areas. As such, a supervisor whose specialist trade 
background was a plater, could be responsible for a work 
group practicing the skills of the welder, plater, 
caulker/burner and the shipwright.
As illustrated in figure 9.4 the training programme ensured 
that steelwork supervisors had a working knowledge of all 
steelwork trades and, in addition, had an understanding of 
planning and accuracy control techniques. Area supervision 
was a concept that was not confined to steelwork. It was 
also aimed at outfit and ancillary departments. Therefore, 
training programmes were organised for the supervisors in 
these departments.
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By way of example, the training programme established for 
the engineering supervisors is illustrated in figure 9.5.
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Figure 9.5
An important feature of the supervisory training programmes 
was the fact that the instructors were appointed from the 
supervisory ranks. They were selected on the basis of their 
individual working knowledge and trained in instructional 
techniques. For example, the pipework supervisor delivered 
a pipework training programme. This ensured that 
engineering and electrical supervisors had a sufficient 
working knowledge to supervise a multi skilled work group 
who practiced pipework skills amongst others.
In this way, the ownership of the supervisory training 
programmes lay with the supervisors themselves. They 
created the programmes and supported them to such an extent 
that trade rivalry gave way to competition. Pride in their 
individual trade ensured that the instructors presented 
their trade skills to best effect. The result was that the 
content of the programme and the standard of delivery was 
regarded, by those who participated in the training, as 
being of the highest order.
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One measure of the effectiveness of the training programme 
was, perhaps, illustrated in figures 9.4 and 9.5. These 
figures reveal that 100% of steelwork supervisors were 
practicing the concept of area supervision, while the number 
of engineering supervisors operating on an area basis was 
37%.
Accordingly, the supervisory training programme at Govan 
Shipbuilders realised the ambitions cited earlier by the 
Personnel Director, insofar as the horizons of the 
supervisors were extended by over 2 0%.
4. SAFETY MANAGEMENT EDUCATION
At Govan Shipbuilders, the supervisors involvement in 
training processes extended beyond that discussed earlier. 
Their involvement included participation in a safety 
management education programme established in 1984.
Govan was, of course, an integral part of the nationalised 
British Shipbuilding industry, an industry the Chairman 
of the Shipbuilding Negotiations Committee described as 
sick. Many of its ailments or ills were self inflicted. 
Indeed, according to Robens (1972), one had a direct link 
with the industry's poor safety performance. He suggested 
that one of the ills of industry is a lack of information 
given to the people who require it most, such as supervisors 
who were regarded as vital links in the organisation and 
management process and who became frustrated due to the lack 
of information. Robens had the view that this frustration 
led to apathy which was dangerous in terms of Health and 
Safety.
"The most dangerous result of frustration is 
apathy followed by a counldn't care less attitude.
Would we not agree that this is dangerous 
particularly in the area of safety?" (Robens 
1972) .
200.
The supervisors were the vital link in the organisation and 
management process. Their complacent attitudes to health 
and safety was directly related to the lack of information 
they had hitherto received on the health and safety aspects 
of their job, adversely affecting their safety performance 
and those of the workers they supervised. Consequently, the 
safety management education programme was established as an 
information giving training process and had three principal 
aims. They were:-
Firstly - to identify the role of supervisors in 
the management of health and safety.
Secondly - to reduce accidents in the shipyard by 
influencing the complacent attitudes that 
supervisors had to health and safety.
Thirdly - to support the supervisory/management 
training programme by ensuring that the 
supervisors were adequately trained in the safety 
aspects of extended skills.
The extensive educational programme was structured in 
two stages. The initial stage was aimed at 'role 
identification' and influencing attitudes. Stage two 
was aimed at increasing safety knowledge.
'Role identification' was considered by the creators of 
the programme as being significant. The Personnel 
Services and Safety Manager indicated that this was a 
central feature of the drive to improve safety 
performance:-
"We recognised that the initial stage of 
influencing the company's safety performance was 
to establish a far more dynamic health and safety 
policy.
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This laying down arrangements, duties and 
responsibilities allocated to all levels of 
management to ensure the healthy and safer working 
on all activities within the company." (Yuill 
1985) .
An extract from the safety management educational programme 
is illustrated in figure 9.6.
SAFETY MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
FOR CRAFT & NON CRAFT EMPLOYEES
BASIC MODULE 
GENERAL SAFETY COURSE No. of
Participants
Safety in Shipbuilding 
Health & Safety Legislation 
Role of the Supervisor 
Hazard Spotting . .j --- ]---
2nd Stage Safety 
Training Modules
No. MODULE TITLES
No. of
Participants
S1 Fuel Gases and Oxygen
S2 Fire Fighting and Rescue
SB Entry into Confined Spaces
S4 Lifting and Handling
S5 Electrical Safety
S6 Woodworking Machines
S7 Cranemen Safety
S8 Abrasive Wheels
S9 Competent Persons
SOURCE: Yuill (1985)
Figure 9.6
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By allocating responsibilities and accountability to each 
and every member of management from the Managing Director to 
the first line supervisors, it was possible to assess the 
real chain of responsibility for every safety failure. As 
such, individuals could be held accountable for accidents, 
injuries and even fatalities sustained at the workplace.
The supervisors, in particular, had a vital role to play in 
ensuring the health and safety of employees in that, they 
were regarded as accountable for whatever happens within 
their sphere of control. They had to ensure that the jobs 
allocated to the workers were safe to do, that the 
environment in which the work was to be carried out was 
healthy and that the employee was protected with appropriate 
safety equipment and the methods adopted to do the job was 
free from risk.
The words of the policy had to be transformed into deeds. A 
key factor of this transformation was the safety management 
education programme. The initial stage of this programme, 
as illustrated earlier in figure 9.6, was the supervisors 
participation on 'information giving' in training workshops. 
Safety mangement workshops constructed in such a way that 
the supervisors were able to:~
Firstly - identify their role in the management of 
health and safety. A role which was defined in 
the company health and safety policy and was vital 
to the company's safety performance.
Secondly - identify the hazardous activities under 
their control. Activities which were accident 
creators when carried out unsafely.
Thirdly - identify the safety arrangements 
required to ensure that the hazardous activities 
could be carried out safely. The safe system of 
work required for their work areas.
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Fourthly - identify the safety training needs for 
themselves and the employees in their work areas.
The training required to give a working knowledge 
and understanding of the safety systems.
The workshop therefore provided the supervisors with an 
effective 'information giving' forum, in the sense that the 
supervisors were firstly provided with information on their 
role, duties and responsibilities and secondly, they 
participated in a process whereby the hazardous activities, 
safety arrangements and training requirements associated 
with their work areas were identified.
5. COMPETITIVE REALITIES
Arguably, the prime object of the British Shipbuilders 
strategy was to improve the industry's competitiveness 
within a socially responsible framework given the industry's 
location in areas of high unemployment. The expectation was 
that, by so doing, sufficient contracts would be secured to 
ensure that the shipbuilding industry would become viable.
To achieve shipyard competitiveness, British Shipbuilders 
introduced a centralised P.I.P. programme with the principal 
aims of reviewing areas of shipbuilding costs, including 
those associated with manpower and implementing, within the 
setting of an industrial relations agreements, initiatives 
that would bring about economies. The reality was, however, 
that the architects of the P.I.P. initiative had an uphill 
task. The shipbuilding industry was severely hit by 
recession in terms of world demand for merchant ships. This 
recession affected shipbuilding well into the 1980's and 
exacerbated an underlying decline in the United Kingdom 
shipbuilding capacity. Indeed, the British Shipbuilding 
share of a declining world market, as indicated by Lloyds, 
slumped from 3.49% in 1979 to 1.8% in 1982.
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British Shipbuilders, therefore, failed to secure sufficient 
contracts to ensure that their shipyard and workers were 
fully employed. In fact, ship completions declined 
significantly as illustrated in figure 9.7
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This decline was reflected in both shipyard closures, and 
very large measures of job losses and this dramatically 
affected the morale, motivation and commitment of the 
workers and management in the remaining shipyards. The 
labour force of the nationalised British Shipbuilding 
Corporation, fell from 87,000 in 1977 to 33,000 at the 
beginning of 1986.
How long can we keep our jobs, was regarded a more 
appropriate theme than 'how can we improve competitiveness'. 
As a result, at shipyard level in Govan, both the management 
and the workforce paid lip service to the P.I.P. programme. 
They did not openly reject it but their efforts to comply 
with its aims were reflected more by way of the local 
actions associated with the training and safety initiatives 
than by the removal of restrictive working practices and 
overmanning.
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By April 1986, Govan Shipbuilders Limited was one of only 5 
remaining merchant shipyards left within British 
Shipbuilders and, although, generally considered to be one 
of the United Kingdom's most efficient yards, they too, had
suffered major and increasing financial losses and losses in
both capacity and jobs, throughout the period of 
nationalisation.
The loss of capacity included the closure of the shipyards 
formerly known as Alexander Stephen and Charles Connell, and 
a consequential reduction in the workforce from 5,300 in 
1978 to 2,300 in 1986. Accordingly, the P.I.P. programme 
did not achieve its competitive objectives insofar as:-
(a) British Shipbuilders share of a declining 
market slumped by almost half - from 3.49% in
1979 to 1.8% in 1982, due to the high costs
of British built ships and the 
uncompetitiveness of the shipyards.
(b) Insufficient contracts were secured to 
maintain the shipbuilding capacity. 
Shipyards closed and by 1980 only 5 
uncompetitive and loss making merchant 
shipyards remained in British Shipbuilders 
and the management morale motivation and 
commitment of the workers at these yards was 
at a low ebb. 1986.
(c) Massive job losses incurred during 
nationalisation devastated the industry. The 
number of employees dropping from 87,000 in 
1977 to 33,000 at the beginning of 1986, and 
still further to below 10,000 when the 
warships returned to the private sector. All 
this was in spite of the 'socially 
responsible' framework under which the 
corporation operated.
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The simple reality was that the P. I.P. programme did not 
transform the uncompetitive British Shipyards into a 
competitive shipbuilding units. The individual shipyards, 
even Govan, the most efficient of the surviving yards, 
continued to operate as unprofitable loss making units.
6. CONCLUSIONS
It could be concluded that British Shipbuilders' plan to 
transform the nationalised shipyards into viable 
shipbuilding units recognised the competitive importance of 
the industry's people and, in particular, the policies and 
practices adopted to utilise them. This is demonstrated by 
the fact that one of the principal aims of the plan was to 
realise the full potential of the industry's employees' as a 
means of improving productivity. By implication this 
suggests that the strategists at British Shipbuilders 
acknowledged that the industry's manpower potential was 
being inhibited and constrained and, as a result, shipyard 
viability and competitiveness was being adversely affected. 
The adoption of a strategy that linked manpower utilisation 
with shipyard competitiveness, therefore, had considerable 
logic given that shipbuilding was a highly labour intensive 
and uncompetitive industry with a history of manpower 
problems. The strategy takes, as its start point, the view 
that in the highly competitive shipbuilding market place, 
the division of shipbuilding manpower and the concept of job 
specialisation, protected by strictly demarcated trade 
boundaries, was a flawed approach to effective manpower 
utilisation and organisation.
Supporters of the British Shipbuilders approach would argue 
that it was focused and structured; focused in the sense 
that the centralised P.I.P. department focused in on seven 
areas of shipbuilding costs, including several where 
manpower utilisation was being inhibited by the strictly 
demarcated trade boundaries and structured from the point of 
view that the coherent and comprehensive approach:-
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Firstly - subdivided these seven areas into 
manageable parts that were examined by groups of 
specialists whose aim was to identify economic 
improvements that would remove uncompetitive 
inhibitions and constraints.
Secondly - concluded industrial relations 
agreements that incorporated moves to more open 
forms of trade and numerical flexibility. The, 
context for this was a centralised industrial 
relations mechanism that avoided local resistance 
by by-passing the shop steward movement in the 
individual shipyards.
Advocates of the approach would argue that in terms of 
manpower utilisation the examination of manpower policies 
and practices did reveal several areas where manpower was 
being inhibited and constrained. They could also point out 
that the industrial relations agreements concluded between 
British Shipbuilders and the national trade union leaders 
were progressive and provided opportunities to introduce 
more open forms of flexible working into shipyards that were 
uncompetitive and constrained by demarcation, overmanning 
and restrictive working practices.
The manpower utilisation model developed by British 
Shipbuilders could, therefore, be described as a Flexible 
Working Model. It takes its start point as the specialist 
craft and trade structure and seeks to improve the 
coordination of work by adding additional skills to the job 
specialists, to provide the specialist with greater mobility 
and introduce functional flexibility of the type described 
by Aitkinson (1985).
Arguably the functional flexibility enabled the specialist 
platers to progress their own work by welding and burning 
rather than waiting on specialists from these trades to 
service them and thus elimination of this waiting time 
increased manpower efficiency.
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However, it could be argued that the more open forms of 
flexibility introduced under British Shipbuilders extended 
to include those described as numerical and it could be 
reasonably assumed that the concept of model three was based 
on Aitkinsons (1985) Model of Flexible Firm.
The more cynical, however, would argue that the approach had 
all the hallmarks of the 'ivory tower' syndrome. It was 
high centralised with little involvement from the local 
shipyard management or the workers. Indeed, the whole 
purpose of the centralised industrial relations forum was to 
avoid local involvement or resistance from the trade union 
representatives and management at shipyard level. As a 
result the proposals for change embodied in the agreements, 
could be regarded at local level as alien and imposed from 
on high.
It could also be argued that the aim of realising the full 
potential of the industry's employees was little more than a 
pipe-dream given that the period of nationalisation was 
synonymous with shipyard closures and job losses. In fact, 
as illustrated earlier, the number of people employed by 
British Shipbuilding shipyard fell from 89,000 to 10,000 
during a decade of state ownership. This could only have a 
damaging effect on the morale, motivation and commitment of 
the industry's employees and, as if to make matters more 
difficult, the agreements to close shipyards and shed jobs 
were incorporated into the same agreements that were aimed 
at realising the full potential of the industry's employees.
PART FOUR
Developing and Implementing Manpower Utilisation 
Policies at Kvaerner Govan Limited
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PREFACE
Part Four provides an analytical account of the industrial 
relations processes and action programmes adopted by Kvaerner 
Govan Limited, to develop and implement manpower utilisation 
policies and facilities initiatives aimed at transforming an 
uncompetitive shipyard into a viable shipbuilding operation.
Initially, the aim of the work is to put into a 'descriptive 
format', the thoughts and theories related to Kvaerner's 
acquisition of the shipyard and the strategy adopted by them to 
achieve viability. In particular, we will be concerned with 
the thinking related to 'manhours' and their importance to the 
overall strategy of achieving shipyard competitiveness. This 
comprises Chapter 10,
Secondly, in Chapter 11 the aim will be to put into an analytical 
framework the context in which the shipyard's traditional working 
practices constrained manpower utilisation and created situations 
where manhours and manpower were lost. The purpose is to 
describe and quantify the restrictive nature of the working 
practices and manpower inhibitions in the Govan yard.
Thirdly, in Chapter 12, the aim is to demonstrate the uniqueness 
of the shipyard's traditional and prevailing industrial relations 
process and practices and to provide some explanation for the 
shipyard workers' attitudes and behaviour with regard to changes 
in working practices and values. The merits of the alternative 
industrial relations framework introduced by Kvaerner, will also 
be considered. The purpose here is to analyse the strengths and 
weaknesses of the industrial relations process, in terms of its 
ability to improve manpower utilisation, efficiency and shipyard
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Fourthly, Chapters 13 and 14 will aim at putting into a 
descriptive and measurable framework the context in which the 
Kvaerner Govan action programmes improved manpower utilisation 
effectiveness and shipyard competitiveness. Emphasis is placed 
on the shipyard's improved productivity and increased efficiency 
as reflected by the reduced manhour content of Govan built ships. 
This will be detailed in section six of Chapter 14. In 
particular, this evaluation will concentrate on the four ships 
L.P.G. construction programme.
In effect, the improved manhour efficiency and the ability to 
secure orders, based on that efficiency, are the 'two acid tests' 
of effectiveness of the Kvaerner Govan strategy and, indeed, the 
'range of actions' incorporated in their contentious and far 
reaching action programme.
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CHAPTER 10: THE KVAERNER STRATEGY
1. INTRODUCTION
August 1988 is an important date in the history of Upper 
Clyde shipbuilding. The Kvaerner Group, Norway's largest 
privately-owned commercial enterprise, bought all the assets 
of Govan Shipbuilders, the largest merchant shipbuilder in 
Great Britain, and the last remaining merchant shipbuilder 
on the upper reaches of the River Clyde.
The Group, whose enterprise embraces production, sales and 
engineering companies in more than 50 countries world wide, 
are active in the fields of mechanical engineering, offshore 
deliveries, pulp and paper technology and shipping. They 
had also a long and profitable association, lasting for more 
than a century, with the Norwegian shipbuilding sector which 
ended in the early 1980's. Their decision to purchase 
Govan, therefore, marked a return to an industrial sector 
familiar to them and in which they had extensive knowledge.
However, when Kvaerner took over the Govan shipyard, they 
did not acquire a smooth running, well organised and 
profitable shipbuilding operation. Quite the contrary; 
they, in fact, took over a shipyard that, although 
considered to be 'the jewel in the crown' of the state owned 
British Shipbuilders had nonetheless contributed mightily to 
their high losses. Indeed, in the previous nine years Govan 
had more than its share of the state industry's £1.8 billion 
of subsidy. Yet even this large influx of funds had not 
turned what was an unprofitable shipyard into a viable 
operation. Kvaerner were aware of this, but were taking a 
strategic decision in the light of market forecasts - 
perhaps a risky venture, but small in comparison with 
Kvaerner's assets (£270 million), especially given the 
asking price.
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Govan Shipbuilders, in fact, incurred losses throughout its 
period of nationalisation and these losses steadily 
increased. So much so, that by 1988 the shipyard losses, as 
illustrated in figure 10.1, were in excess of £40 million. 
This loss was based on an annual trading figure of 
approximately the same amount.
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Figure 10.1
On the positive side the Clyde based yard had an excellent 
reputation for building some of the world's best ships. The 
workforce were highly skilled and malleable, demonstrating 
this by their ability to continually produce a product mix 
of vessels ranging from passenger vessels to product 
tankers. This range of ships required different balances of 
skills and resources to be deployed and, therefore, tested 
both the skills and malleability of the workforce.
The problem, insofar as Kvaerner was concerned was, 
therefore, not one of producing quality ships at Govan, it 
was simply that the shipyard could not build quality ships 
at profit and had not done so for the past three decades. 
Kvaerner clearly believed they could turn the shipyard 
around and back to profitability but this would not be 
achieved overnight.
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A time horizon of 2 to 3 years was more appropriate given 
that the yard needed re-investment and a re-organisation of 
work process. The good quality workforce were inflexible 
and badly organised by a poor and highly bureaucratic 
management. Bruce (1990), Industrial Correspondent of the 
Glasgow Herald, perhaps helps to identify the source of the 
problem and the legacy which Kvaerner inherited when they 
aquired Govan.
"When Norwegian Industrial Group Kvaerner took 
over Govan Shipbuilders, Scotland's largest 
merchant yard in 1988, it inherited 50 years of 
restrictive practice, demarcation between trades
which just stopped short of civil war and a
management which was top heavy with bureaucracy."
(Bruce 1990).
The perception left by Bruce's comments was that
shipbuilding workers, be they managers or craftsmen, still 
appeared to place their traditional values and restrictive 
working practices high on their agenda. They might well 
recognise that these practices have been partly responsible 
for the industry's decline and unprofitable position but 
changes were more liable to be fought rather than welcomed. 
This was in spite of the many flexibility agreements 
concluded during the past three decades during the
'Fairfield Experiment' and the British Shipbuilders 
Productivity Improvement programme.
Negotiated agreements on demarcation and restrictive
practices had not led to real improvements in manpower 
utilisation due, perhaps, to the industry's inability or
reluctance to implement the industrial relations agreements 
for a sustained period. Herein was one of the British
Shipbuilding Industry's major problems, that of 'attitude', 
a trait that could be regarded as the shipbuilding workers 
"Achilles heel". Their 'self destruct button' generally 
triggered when someone was asked to do a job which 
traditionally had been carried out by someone of another 
trade.
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Company viability was set aside when platers and caulkers 
disputed who was to operate a particular burning machine. 
Competitiveness was stood down in the interest of 
overmanning newly installed machinery on the basis of 
manning levels set three decades previously. This workforce 
culture had been bred into the current generation of Govan 
Shipyard Workers. It ultimately derived from the 
insecurities of employment which had plagued the industry on 
Clydeside for half a century - excluding the 1940's. 
Destructive though the attitudes and work practices may have 
been, the reaction was, nevertheless, understandable. The 
strong community identity of the Clydeside workforce and the 
strong craft traditions had led to the belief that 
employment in shipbuilding, and in the Govan yard in 
particular, was a kind of right. That belief giving rise to 
the view that if ships could not be built profitably, so be 
it: Government support and subsidy would provide the
protection to keep the loss making shipyard afloat.
Kvaerner's acquisition of the yard meant that this type of 
thinking and the culture associated with it had to change if 
Govan was to achieve the profitability objectives. The 
culture could not be changed overnight. Kvaerner first had 
to demonstrate to the workforce that they meant business and 
were here to stay. They had to build confidence in the yard 
and give a clear signal that they could provide the 
employment security which had been so lacking. Only these 
conditions could lead to a change in culture and a 
willingness to go along with - or even to accept reluctantly 
- the changes in work organisation and traditional values 
that would be required.
As it was profit had become a pipe-dream in shipyards where 
ineffectiveness accounted for as much as 50% of productive 
time and absenteeism levels reached 22%.
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There have, of course, been many other reasons put forward 
to explain the ineffectiveness of the shipbuilding industry. 
Some were associated with, what could be loosely termed as, 
the 'people side' of this highly labour intensive industry 
and could, therefore, be within the internal control of the 
individual shipyards and their employees. Figure 10.2 
illustrates some of these reasons.
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Figure 10.2
The root cause of these problems could be summed up in two 
words - excessive manhours. The simple fact was that Govan 
and the United Kingdom shipbuilding industry at large took 
somewhere in the region of two to three times the number of 
manhours as did their European or Far East competitors to 
build a ship.
216.
This situation not only added to the direct cost of the 
ships but limited the utilisation of the fixed assets and 
increased overhead costs per unit of output. Delivery times 
also became unreliable. Consequently, the Govan shipyard 
and the industry generally was uncompetitive in the 
international market place and had been so for decades.
2. LOGIC
This section sets out to explain why Kvaerner took the 
plunge in acquiring the Govan yard and how it believed it 
could overcome the problems of long standing 
non-profitability, so as to convert the yard into a 
profit-making unit in the wider Kvaerner organisation. 
Govan's legacy of uncompetitiveness prompted a view that 
logically the only way that the profit conscious Norwegian 
International group could make money out of their new 
acquisition was to close the yard and sell off the assets. 
Some of the Govan employees no doubt saw the acquisition 
this way and this may have strengthened their resolve to 
preserve their traditional ways of working, their acquired 
work culture.
Kvaerner's logic, however, was somewhat different. They 
regarded the acquisition of the Govan shipyard as a unique 
opportunity to re-enter, in a positive and profitable 
manner, the shipbuilding market place, which the Norwegians 
long regarded as being a core industrial sector of their 
business operation. They had a long and profitable 
association with shipbuilding for over a century. That 
association ended in the early 1980's when they closed their 
Norwegian based shipyards, a policy decision based on the 
fact that in the depressed shipbuilding market, the 
shipyards were no longer generating profits.
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However, by 1988 market research findings, based on the 
status of Kvaerner's own shipping fleet and the status of 
the world shipping fleet in general, indicated that by the 
mid 1990's the shipbuilding market would be on the upturn. 
Ship owners would, according to the Kvaerner research, have 
to replace their aging fleets with more technology based and 
safety conscious and high added value vessels. Ships that 
would be required to transport ever more sophisticated 
cargos and serve a rapidly changing shipping market.
Kvaerner recognised the business opportunity that this 
perceived shipbuilding upturn presented, particularly given 
the potential shortage of shipbuilding facilities available 
world wide due to the closure of so many shipyards over the 
past two decades. This capacity shortage, coupled with the 
increased demand for new vessels could, in Kvaerners view, 
create a builders market forcing ship prices up and thus 
provide profitable opportunities.
To the Norwegian group, the choice of Govan as the shipyard 
from which to launch the re-entry was considered logical in 
the sense that:-
(a) It was a shipyard of the correct size and
type with work in progress and, importantly,
was available for purchase at the reasonable 
price of £6.3 million. Financial
arrangements were also available to complete 
the work in progress on a cost plus basis and 
to meet restructuring, redundancy and
retraining costs, thus providing a protective 
'lead in' period for the new owners.
(b) It was a British based merchant shipyard with 
access to European community subsidy funding 
equivalent at the time of the acquisition to 
27% of ship costs and favourable shipbuilding 
mortgage facilities.
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This would give the Govan yard a positive 
advantage over the Norwegian shipyards and 
yards in other non E.C. countries who did not 
have such funding.
(c) It had a highly skilled workforce and access 
to a large labour market of former shipyard 
workers who had the skills and ability to 
produce high technology based vessels with 
high added value.
(d) The wage rates at Govan were equivalent to 
only 60% of those prevailing in Norway. This 
even though productivity levels might be low, 
the wage cost advantage was one that could be
harnessed if more efficient working could be
achieved.
Govan, therefore, was a modest acquisition for Kvaerner, 
with protective financial guarantees which were important to 
the future well being of the yard. These included a 
cost-plus workload guarantee that ensured the workforce had 
a sufficient workload for at least one year and meant that 
all losses incurred on this workload would be picked up by 
the nationalised British Shipbuilders. This one year 
workload also gave Kvaerner a lead-in period that could be
used to assess and restructure the shipyard.
Among other factors that encouraged Kvaerner to make the 
commitment was the fact that British Shipbuilders had agreed 
to meet the costs of the restructuring programme. These 
included the costs associated with redundancies as the yard 
adjusted its labour requirements to meet the demands of the 
competitive commercial environment, and the retraining costs 
associated with increasing the skill base of the workforce 
to meet the requirements of the market place in terms of 
high technology vessels.
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Again the availability of a 27% E.C. subsidy provided
another form of guarantee. Kvaerners aim was to build ships 
competitively and profitably at the Govan shipyard. The 
reality was that Govan had a legacy of unprofitability, was 
uncompetitive at the time of the take over and could not 
attract profitable orders. To assist shipyards such as 
Govan secure vitally needed contracts during transition 
periods, the European Community provided considerable
subsidy funding.
In Govan's case this funding was equivalent to £13.5 million 
on a £50 million vessel and was aimed at enabling them to 
bridge the competitive gap between themselves and their 
profitable competitors. This type of financial assistance 
would, of course, be vital to the new owners, particularly 
in securing initial orders and during the difficult
transition stage.
There was, therefore, a clear set of reasons for the 
Kvaerner Board's decision to acquire the Govan yard: market, 
wage costs, EC subsidy, a basically sound yard (though 
needing investment) and a labour force capable of quality 
output. Nevertheless, it has to be said that if the 
decision had been taken only 2-3 years later, an 'East
European' yard might well have proved equally attractive. 
But- the timing was right for Govan.
The Norwegian based executives of Kvaerner had, therefore, 
provided the local management of their new acquisition with 
a framework of financial guarantees that would assist in the 
process of transforming the uncompetitive Govan shipyard 
into a competitive Kvaerner Govan Ltd. Responsibility for 
this transformation, at local level, rested with the local 
Board of Directors at Govan, who were in place at the time 
of the take-over.
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Their composition is illustrated in figure 10.3.
Local Board of Directors
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Figure 10.3
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This Board remained in place for the duration of the 
'lead-in' stage and were responsible for the completion of 
the workload which Kvaerner inherited from British 
Shipbuilders. Twelve months after the take-over, however, 
the Managing Director, Mackie (1989), indicated that the 
local board had major difficulties with the processes 
associated with transforming the shipyard from its 
uncompetitive state. Indeed, he suggested that little 
progress had been made and the yard's performance had 
deteriorated during the lead-in period.
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The lack of progress in tackling the problems which had to 
be overcome, prompted the Kvaerner main board to change 
radically the compensation of the Local Baord of Directors 
at Govan. The composit of the new board is illustrated in 
Figure 10.4
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Figure 10.4
Five of the directors in post at the time of the take-over, 
including the Managing Director, had left the company. Only 
the Contracts and Financial Directors remained. Four new 
directors, the Managing Director, Technical Director, 
Personnel and Employee Relations Director and the Production 
Director were appointed.
The new Managing Director, a Norwegian by birth, was brought 
from America. He had extensive international shipbuilding 
experience, having previously worked in Europe, the Far East 
and American shipyards.
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He also had experience of the shipbuilding support industry 
having worked for an organisation whose prime responsibility 
was to introduce modern plant and equipment into shipyards. 
The new Managing Director appointed the other three new 
directors and specified their individual and collective 
responsibilities for the processes associated with 
transforming the shipyard. Initially, he seconded, from 
Kvaerner, a Norwegian Technical Director, who had an 
extensive knowledge of high technology based ships and whose 
prime responsibility was to restructure the technical 
function of the organisation to ensure that Govan had the 
ability to produce technical information for the high 
technology ships on a cost effective basis.
Thereafter, he appointed from within the company, a 
Personnel and Employee Relations Director, who had extensive 
knowledge of the company, the trade union movement 
agreements, working practices, and U.K. employment 
legislation. This was considered as a key appointment by 
the Norwegians, since extensive changes in manpower 
practices were considered essential and resistance from the 
powerful trade union movement was expected to be strong. 
The new directors' prime responsibility was to develop and 
implement manpower utilisation policies and initiatives, 
which would improve performance by reducing lost productive 
manhours and eliminating manpower constraints.
Finally, the Managing Director appointed a Production 
Director who was, by birth, Finnish and who had previous 
shipbuilding experience at the high technology end of the 
market in both Western and Eastern European shipyards. His 
prime responsibility was to restructure the production 
organisation to ensure that the shipyard could produce the 
high technology ships competitively. At the end of this 
board replacement and restructuring there was a new team 
selected for its expertise and experience, specifically 
relevant to the problems known to exist in the Govan 
shipyard.
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An integral part of the strategy process was the involvement 
role of the shipyard managers and supervisors, the first 
opportunity many had to expressed their views. This was an 
important characteristic of the Kvaerner approach insofar as 
it enabled the managers and supervisors to identify and 
quantify the factors which were, in their opinion, 
contributing to the high numbers of unproductive manhours. 
Many of the managers quantifying these inhibiting factors 
using latent industrial engineering skills gained over two 
decades previously during the 'Fairfield Experiment'.
The strategy adopted was, therefore, essentially a Govan 
creation and recognised that a solution to Govan culture and 
inbred manpower problems could not be imposed by the 
Norwegian company. The solution had to be found by those 
employed in the shipyard under the direction of the local 
board of directors.
Kvaerner corporate management in Norway did, however, have 
some involvement in the strategy process in the areas of 
product direction and the provision of the necessary finance 
to support the investment and restructuring programmes. 
They also had a critical role in monitoring the shipyards 
performance and for this purpose an alternative reporting 
arrangement was established by the local board. These 
reports were linked to the strategies implementation and, in 
particular, the action programmes aimed at improving 
productivity and competitiveness. They were intended to 
offset criticism associated with losses during the years 
1990 to 1992.
The reports gave corporate management an indication of the 
effectiveness of the actions in terms of their ability to 
recover hitherto lost productive manhours. They set out in 
measurable terms the improvements in action areas such as 
working practices, Health and Safety performance and 
absenteeism and relating these improvements to the reduced 
number of manhours taken to build ships at Govan.
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3. THE STRATEGY
The strategy adopted by Kvaerner Govan and supported by the 
main board of Kvaerner acknowledged that 'excessive
manhours' was a major feature of the shipyards uncompetitive 
situation. It also acknowledged that the manhour content of 
Govan ships were influenced by the plant, equipment and
facilities available in the shipyard and the manpower 
policies practiced by the Govan workers. The simple logic 
behind the strategy was based on the fact that approximately 
65% of the ships costs were expended outwith the shipyard.
These costs were associated with the purchase of the main
engine, pumps, valves, steel etc. Costs that all 
shipbuilders had to incur and, given the potential
purchasing power of the international Norwegian group, they 
were purchases that could be made at no financial
disadvantage to Govan.
Only about 3 5% of the ship costs were actually spent in the 
shipyard and these were largely associated with manpower 
costs. It could be suggested that it is, in fact, the 
number of manhours taken to assemble the 'bought in' parts 
that the shipbuilder sells to the customer.
At Govan the number of manhours taken to assemble the 
'bought in' material was twice that of the shipyards
competitive international competitors. These competitive 
shipyards utilised their manhours more effectively, most of 
their paid manhours were devoted to the building of the 
vessel, with very few, if any, devoted to unproductive 
activities. This contrasted with the Govan situation where 
50% of the manhours were lost due to unproductive work. 
These additional hours had to be paid for.
The Kvaerner strategy aimed at developing manpower policies 
and initiatives would reduce by 50% the number of manhours 
taken to build a ship: in broad terms from 2 million to 1
million manhours per ship.
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The strategy illustrated in figure 10.5 had three 
interlinking component parts a workload, investment plan and 
manpower policies (including the training and development of 
the human resources) all of which were related to achieving 
competitiveness by reducing the manhour content of Govan 
ships.
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Figure 10.5
The first part of the strategy was product based and had a 
strong parent company involvement. It was concerned with 
providing the shipyard with a workload that would provide 
the workforce with stability of product and job security. 
This part of the strategy was particularly important since 
the shipyard hitherto did not provide security of employment 
and appeared to have no sense of product strategy in an 
increasingly competitive market.
The yard had not had a steady product to build over the 
previous decade. The workload range continually changed - 
from coal carrier to passenger ship - back to container 
vessels; all ships with quite different mixes of skills and 
levels of sophistication.
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The result was that Govan Shipbuilders was constantly on a 
new learning curve. No sooner had they ironed out the 
problems of building one new type of ship than they were 
changing direction and building an entirely different type 
of vessel. This contributed to the shipyard's 
uncompetitiveness, depriving the shipyard of the benefits 
which could be derived from a single product range, the 
'sister ship effect' whereby learning gained from the first 
ship could be passed on to future ships of a similar type.
By placing an initial workload of four similar ships at 
Govan, Kvaerner demonstrated an acute sense of product 
strategy knowledge. They selected a product they were 
familiar with and had previously built profitably in their 
Norwegian operation: a product which was the mainstay of the 
Kvaerner shipping fleet and was in an expanding market 
segment.
The principal overall aim of the four similar ship order 
was, of course, to achieve the sister ship benefits but 
Kvaerner were looking for much more than this. Their view 
was that a four ship order and a three year work programme 
would demonstrate to the workers at Govan that the Norwegian 
owners were not asset strippers and they had, in fact, a 
long term commitment to the yard, providing the workforce 
with a sizeable workload and secure employment.
At Govan as job losses had become a regular occurrence. 
Indeed, the shipyard appeared to have been in a constant 
state of redundancy since nationalisation with the 
workforce, at Govan, cut back from 5,300 to 1,350 during 
state ownership. This created a lack of job security which 
clearly had an adverse effect on the workers' morale, 
commitment and attitudes. The planned 3 year workload 
provided the time frame required to implement the two other 
parts of the strategy.
227.
Responsibility for parts two and three of the strategy were 
allocated to the local directors on the basis of their 
individual expertise with the Managing Director devoting his 
energies to part of the strategy associated with plant, 
equipment and facilities and the Personnel and Employee 
Relations Director spearheading the part associated with 
manpower policies.
Part two was aimed at ensuring that the Govan workers, 
in the knowledge that their jobs were safe, were supported 
by facilities and equipment at least the equal of those of 
the competition. This was a recognition that manpower 
utilisation at Govan was being inhibited and manhours were 
being lost because of a lack of modern quality equipment and 
a poor working environment.
An investment programme, funded to the tune of £31 million 
underpinned this part of the strategy. A major feature of 
this was the construction of a large assembly hall where 
steel units, approximately five times larger than those 
normally built in the fabrication sheds, could be 
constructed.
The establishment of this new facility ensured that much 
more of the ship could be constructed under cover, thus 
reducing the number of manhours lost due to inclement 
weather conditions. The benefits of constructing much 
larger units indoors included easier supervision of labour, 
more accurate planning, production control and quality 
performance and the ability to support the production 
process more readily with modern techniques and equipment. 
Without doubt, the most difficult part of the strategy to 
implement was part three, the various aspects of which are 
illustrated in figure 10.6.
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Figure 10.6
It dealt with the people side of the business; the work 
ethic and human resource disciplines; the way people worked 
and how they were organised and managed; the relationships 
between the workers and the union representatives and 
between the representatives and the company; the competence 
of the people; all areas of the business where manhours were 
being lost and manpower utilisation was being restricted. 
The details of this part of the strategy will be subject to 
future discussions and analysis.
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Accordingly, the Kvaerner strategy was in three parts and 
designed to transform an uncompetitive shipyard into a 
viable operation by:-
(a) Providing a workload that offered the 
shipyard workers a stable product and job 
security.
(b) Demonstrating to the workforce that the 
Norwegian owners, Kvaerner, had a long term 
commitment to the Govan shipyard.
(c) Providing the workforce with facilities and 
equipment at least the equal of the 
competition.
(d) Implementing manpower policies and 
disciplines that maximised manpower 
utilisation.
The central theme, running through all the component parts 
of the strategy, was to restore competitiveness and 
profitability by reducing the number of manhours taken at 
Govan to build ships.
4. CONCLUSIONS
It could be argued that similar initiatives aimed at 
improving the facilities and manpower aspects of the 
business had previously failed to resolve the problem of 
Govan's uncompetitiveness when they figured prominently in 
the British Shipbuilder Productivity Improvement Programme. 
However, there were fundamental differences between the 
British Shipbuilders and the Kvaerner Govan approaches.
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The British Shipbuilders approach took place within a 
framework of a depressed shipbuilding market place and a 
perception that there was an over capacity of shipbuilding 
facilities in the United Kingdom. The approach was strongly 
centralised. Decisions on products, facilities and manpower 
strategies were made at headquarters and, thereafter, 
imposed on the individual subsidiaries with little or no 
involvement at local shipyard level. This produced strategy 
problems which gave rise to a distinct lack of commitment 
when it came to implementation at shipyard level. Arguably 
the result was that at Govan little changed in terms of 
shipyard competitiveness, as demonstrated by the legacies of 
shipyard losses and inefficiencies inherited by Kvaerner.
The Kvaerner approach was different. It took place within 
the framework of a projected upturn in the shipbuilding 
market and a conviction that there were profitable 
opportunities for competitive shipyards. This approach had 
a strong degree of decentralisation with decisions on 
facilities and manpower strategies, in particular, being 
made locally in the shipyard. Ownership, commitment and 
economic reality were three important characteristics of the 
Kvaerner approach. They sought to create ownership and gain 
commitment by involving those employed at Govan in the 
strategy development and implementation processes. This 
involvement brought with it a responsibility for the 
shipyards future and a knowledge that if competitiveness and 
profitability could not be achieved then Govan would suffer 
the same fate as the unprofitable Norwegian shipyards.
It could, therefore, be argued that the strategies of 
British Shipbuilders and Kvaerner Govan had little in common 
other than the fact that both regarded facilities and 
manpower practices as being two of the shipyard's principal 
inhibiting factors. They differed insofar as they were set 
within contrasting frameworks and the approaches adopted 
were at variance in terms of their views on ownership, 
commitment and economic reality.
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CHAPTER 11: KVAERNER GOVAN'S ANALYSIS
OF UNPRODUCTIVE MANHOURS
1. THE SOURCES
The reality of the Govan shipyards uncompetitive situation 
was, perhaps, summed up in Clydesider (Issue No.17 1990)
where it was stated
"We currently take 2 to 3 times as many manhours 
than, say the Danes, to build a ship. It is 
essential to recognise that, if we are to compete 
in the international market place we must, at 
least, regain these lost manhours."
Lost manhours, in a Govan context, were not manhours that 
had simply gone missing and could not be accounted for. 
They were manhours that were not being used productively - 
manhours paid for by the company but were not contributing 
directly to the building of the ship.
The task of identifying the sources of lost manhours was 
delegated to the employees who were responsible for managing 
the shipyard, the managers and supervisors at Govan who had 
'inside knowledge' of what was actually happening in the 
yard. This team of managers (the Lost Time Action Group) 
were reflective of all functions within the shipyard 
production, technical, personnel, financial, planning and 
quality functions, was established. In general, the sources 
identified by the team, in their initial analytical stage, 
could be structured under four broad headings:-
(a) Concessions - manhours that the shipyard 
management saw fit to 'give away'.
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(b) Performance - manhours that were lost due to 
an inability or lack of commitment to perform 
well in certain areas of the business.
(c) Organisation - manhours lost due to 
constraints that were inhibiting the 
shipyard's ability to organise its manpower 
effectively to suit the product or the 
competitive market place.
(d) Lost Manpower - manhours that were lost from 
the production process due to the high levels 
of absenteeism and non attendance.
The second stage of the process, which will be discussed in 
detail in the proceeding sections, was concerned with 
quantifying these unproductive manhours. This, however, was 
not an entirely new experience at Govan. The shipyard did 
quantify the unproductive manhours associated with trade 
union activities, inclement weather, waiting time on their 
manhour recording system. This system operated on manpower 
returns submitted daily by the foremen, and recorded the 
productive and unproductive hours of each shipyard worker. 
Although limited, this information at least provided a start 
point. In circumstances where no prior information existed 
quantitive research was carried out using observation 
techniques such as 'activity sampling'.
2. LOST MANHOURS - CONCESSIONS
Ironically, many of the shipyards manhour losses were 
concessions, by-products of industrial relations agreements 
adopted during nationalisation and as part of the Fairfield 
Experiment. These included major manhour losses in the 
normal working day, many due to negotiated concessions 
associated with late starting and early stopping times and 
breaks for tea.
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The extent of the manhour losses associated with these 
concessions was illustrated in Clydesider (Issue No.17 
1990).
"One of the most common reasons for loss of time 
is the break-up of continuous work pattern - up to 
as much as one and a half to two hours per day are 
now lost around starting and stopping time and for 
tea."
Shipyard workers did not commence productive work at the 
proper starting time nor, indeed, did productive work end at 
what was termed as the stopping time. The perceived 
starting and stopping times for dayshift was 7.50 a.m. to 
12.15 p.m. and 1.00 p.m. to 4.35 p.m. However, 5 minute 
time concessions, at the beginning and end of each shift, 
had been negotiated between British Shipbuilders and the
S.N.C. during nationalisation, to enable the shipyard 
workers to clock in and to clock out. Moreover, a tea break 
had been established in the morning with the time set at 
9.30 a.m. to 9.45 a.m. and, once again, the 5 minutes time 
concessions prevailed on either side of the break.
The actual situation, reflecting 'custom and practice', 
accepted by the management and the trade unions in the 
shipyard was much worse. Further concessions were 
associated with travel time to amenities areas, time 
allocated to enable shipyard workers to put on working 
equipment, time to travel from the amenity areas to the 
workplace. These further concessions meant that some 20 
minutes were lost at the start of the working day.
The tea break was not a 15 minute stoppage but a mid morning 
breakfast which stretched to 3 5 minutes and, in some cases 
even longer. Workers left their places of work and queued 
at canteens for some considerable time for their hot filled 
rolls. They returned to their work places late, after the 
extended break.
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The level of these concessions are illustrated in figure 
11 . 1 .
START AND STOP TIMES
PERCEIVED NEGOTIATED ACTUAL
Times Hours Times Hours Times Hours
Shift Start 
Tea Start
7.50am 
9.30am 1.40
7.55am 
9.25am 1.30
8.10am 
9 .20am 1. 10
Tea Ends 
Lunch
9.45am 
12.15pm 2. 30
9.50am 
12.10pm 2.20
9.55am 
12.05pm 2.10
Shift .Start 
Shift Ends
1.00pm 
4.35pm 3.35
1.05pm 
4.3 0pm 3.25
1.10pm 
4.20pm 3 . 10
TOTAL PRODUCTIVE 
TOTAL LOST TIME
7.45 
0.15
7.15 
0.45
6.30 
1. 30
OVERALL TOTAL 8.00 8.00 8.00
SOURCE: Briggs (1989)
Figure 11.1
Furthermore, significant time losses occurred before the 
lunch break as a result of concessions granted to ensure 
that no matter where the worker was located in the shipyard, 
he had sufficient time to leave his place of work, wash up 
and travel to the main exit gate before the official 
stopping time. Even after lunch there were time concessions 
to clock in and prepare for work.
Well before the end of the working day productive work had 
wound down. Concessions had been granted to enable tools to 
be returned to stores, protective and working clothing to be 
removed, washing up and clocking off.
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Moreover, in order to avoid crushing at the clocking 
stations, some of which were located at the exit gate, the 
stations were open 8 minutes before the official stopping 
time so that the workforce could clock out. Most of the 
workforce, therefore, left the yard, on pay, at least 5 
minutes before the official end of their working day.
The official 8 hour working day was, therefore, a myth. 
Negotiated time concessions had reduced this to 7 hours 15 
minutes with 45 minutes devoted to other activities. The 
actual situation in the shipyard was, however, much worse. 
Custom and practice had ensured that only 6 hours 30 minutes 
were utilised for building and no less than 1 hour 30 
minutes every day was taken up by other activities. All of 
this was significant, in terms of lost manhours, as 
illustrated in figure 11.2.
THE WORKING DAY
HOURS
NEGOTIATEDPERCEIVED
S O URCE: Briggs (1989)
Figure 11.2
236.
Given, therefore that the shipyard workers worked an 8 hour 
day, Monday to Thursday, and a shorter 7 hour day of which 2 
hours were lost on Friday. The best estimate of management 
was that only 31 hours out of the normal 39 were available 
for productive use. However, there were managers who 
believed that the manhours lost were underestimated. They 
indicated that further losses occurred, particularly during 
ship construction when the shipyard workers had to make 
their way to and from their workplaces on the ship, via 
gangways. They estimated that the number of manhours lost 
was around 11 hours per week.
The shipyard workers at Govan had handicapped themselves. 
By utilising working hours for activities other than 
building ships, they had handed the shipyard's international 
competitors a tremendous advantage. The number of manhours 
lost was illustrated in Clydesider (Issue No.17 1990):-
"Last year 190,000 production hours, or 20% of the 
working day, was lost as a result of ineffective 
time. The magnitude of the problem is, perhaps, 
best illustrated by pointing out that 190,000 
production hours is equivalent to closing the yard 
for 4 weeks."
This was not the only activity where concessions had 
resulted in the loss of large numbers of manhours. In 
addition to the negotiated holiday entitlement of 25 annual 
days and 8 public days, the shipyard workers at Govan had, 
what was termed, concession days. These concession days 
were negotiated, as an 'extra', in the late 1970's, at the 
time of the Heath Government when wage increases were 
constrained. In reality, they were, three further days 
holiday taken at a time suitable to the worker and paid for 
by the company. Some 40,000 production manhours were lost 
as a direct result of workers simply taking their 3 days off 
work and an untold number of additional manhours were lost 
as a result of delays which occurred when the workers were 
of f.
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Furthermore, arising from the Fairfield Experiment, the shop 
stewards, in the Govan Yard, were paid for the manhours 
devoted to trade union activities and duties. A noble 
concept, given the industry's industrial relations problems 
of the mid I960's. However, over two decades on, the shop 
stewards had become a powerful institution in the shipyard. 
Their numerical strength had grown to 70, a large number of 
whom were devoting the full working day to trade union 
activities. At times they were an immovable force and 
changes to traditional working practices would only happen 
with their approval notwithstanding the progressive 
flexibility agreements negotiated by the national officials.
Their power and strength was established as part of the 
Fairfield Experiment, when, in order to improve industrial 
relationships, the shop stewards participated in management 
processes and were paid wages in full for the time spent on 
trade union duties. Their power base was enhanced during 
the U.C.S. work-in and during nationalisation. Indeed, the 
shop steward movement were the major 'attitude' formers in 
the yard. It was they who were the vital and, in some 
cases, the only communications link with the shipyard 
workforce. They arranged regular meetings during normal 
working hours, paid for by the Company and providing the 
shop stewards with an opportunity to express their views and 
opinions on issues such as working practices, manning levels 
and overtime working, in many instances, contrary to those 
of management.
The shop stewards' power was such that management were 
discouraged from having similar meetings with the workforce 
to put over their point of view. The shop stewards 
regarded this form of communication as being their exclusive 
domain. This was, of course, fairly standard practice in 
British industry in the 1970's but began to break down in 
the 1980's as management began to make more direct 
approaches.
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Even attempts to take those more direct approaches through 
the introduction of 'team briefing' during nationalisation 
were ineffective at Govan and petered out through a lack of 
shop floor response and a lack of management commitment to 
what was perceived as a British Shipbuilders imposed 
concept, i.e. a centralised policy which had no local sense 
of commitment or ownership.
A major factor of Govan's industrial relations communication 
was the fact that it was the shop stewards' opinion that the 
workforce were first and foremost trade union members, not 
employees of the Company. They, as trade union
representatives, considered themselves to be the major 
influence in determining the pace and nature of change that 
would take place in the shipyard. They were engaged in 
joint regulation, in an extended sense, with involvement in 
the management process. This was where management had to 
make a major impact and win back their role of pace setters, 
if it was to succeed in making the yard profitable.
The number of manhours lost due to trade union related 
activities had grown alarmingly. Clydesider (Issue No. 17 
1990) reported:-
"With just under 2,000 employees, including 
temporary workers, on the payroll, there is a 
strong feeling that the number of trade union 
representatives and the time spent on trade union 
activities is excessive. The magnitude of this 
problem is that last year over 50,000 production 
manhours were taken up by trade union related 
activities."
This was equivalent to one working week.
In summary, the number of manhours lost due to concessions 
and identified through 'activity sampling' and actual 
manhour recordings included:-
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(a) 190,000 manhours or 20% of the working day 
lost simply getting the shipyard workers to 
and from their workplace.
(b) 40,000 lost manhours associated with 
concession days granted in addition to 
holidays.
(c) 50,000 lost manhours taken up by trade union 
related activities.
In total, therefore, over a quarter of a million manhours or 
12.5% of the manhour content of Govan built ships were 
accrued through concessions.
3. LOST MANHOURS - PERFORMANCE
Lost manhours at the Govan shipyard were not simply confined
to those associated with concessions emanating from 
industrial relations agreements. Manhours were also lost 
due to poor performance, and in particular, poor performance 
in areas of the business associated with health and safety, 
quality and the application of flexibility agreements. 
Health and Safety performance had long been a major cause 
for concern in the Govan shipyard. Building ships was a 
hazardous activity; many of the substances used during
construction were health threats and shipyard workers often 
adopted systems of work that were regarded as unsafe.
Performance at the Kvaerner Govan yard , as measured by the 
number of manhours lost due to minor 'first aid type' 
incidents and man days lost due to the more serious 
accidents, was considered poor and an inhibiting factor in 
terms of competitiveness; despite what appeared to be a
successful improvement initiative launched by the shipyards' 
management of 1984, and discussed earlier in chapter 9.
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However, the improvements emanating from the initiative were 
not sustained, as illustrated in figure 11.3.
FIRST AID INCIDENTS
Monthly Comparison Jan 89 -  May 89
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Incidence Ratio
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SOURCE: Goldie (1989)
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Figure 11.3
Indeed, during the early part of 1989, the number of 'first 
aid type' incidents increased on a month by month basis. 
For the period January to May 1989, the 'incident ratio' 
revealed that there was one first aid incident per month for 
every shipyard worker. The estimated average time loss per 
incident was 1/2 hour, the time taken to travel from the 
workplace to the Medical Centre, treatment, and the travel 
time back to the workplace.
Given a labour force of 2,000 employees, approximately,
1,000 manhours per month were lost due to minor first aid 
type incidents. Moreover, over the same period of time, the 
number of man days lost due to the more serious type of 
accidents was also on the increase. The monthly incident 
ratio for what was termed as lost time accidents was 
established as 0.3 man days per shipyard worker.
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With a labour force of 2000 employees, approximately 4,800 
manhours were lost monthly as a direct result of serious 
accidents. Overall the consequences of Govan's poor health 
and safety performance was that 12,000 manhours were being 
lost annually as a result of first aid incidents and a 
further 57,600 manhours were being lost due to serious 
accidents.
Other reasons were put forward at Govan for lost manhours 
due to poor performance. The most obvious were those 
associated with major quality problems. An example of this 
is cited by the Production Director and relates to the 
welding of special steel during the construction of ship 
number 3 01.
"The construction of the first L.P.G. carrier has 
meant that everyone involved in production has had 
to adopt higher standards of workmanship. This 
inevitable learning curve has not been without 
problems. At the start of construction we wtere 
having problems with welding and had to take tank 
sections onboard even though X-Rays were not 
complete. We had to carry out a lot of repairs 
which held us back." (Kytola 1990)
The Production Director was pointing out that the 
workmanship was not being carried out to the highest 
standards - standards that, in the past, were synonymous 
with Clyde built products. The workmanship of the welding 
was substandard. It had avoidable faults - slag inclusions, 
spatter, undercut and porosity, the type of faults that were 
easily detected by X-rays and which a competent and 
committed welder was capable of avoiding when depositing the 
weld metal. As a result of this substandard workmanship, 
large numbers of weld repairs were carried out. Poor 
quality welds had to be removed prior to weld repair. This 
time consuming process took at least 2 to 3 times more 
manhours to complete than the original weld. It not only 
held back the completion progress of the vessel but added 
substantially to its costs.
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The Managing Director stated
"Tremendous difficulties were suffered with 
defects of up to 60% on the hull of 301." 
Draegebo 1991).
The reality of this level of rework was that some
300,000 manhours were added to the cost of building the 
ship, due to poor performance associated with welding.
Poor performance was also evident in the application of 
flexibility agreements. Indeed, Bruce (1990) quoted earlier 
wrote:-
"When Norwegian Industrial Group Kvaerner took 
over Govan Shipbuilders, Scotlands largest 
merchant yard in 1988, it inherited 50 years of 
restrictive practices and demarcation between 
trades which just stopped short of civil war." 
(Bruce 1990)
Despite over a decade of national and local agreements aimed 
at introducing flexible working, manhours were still being 
lost due to shipyard workers waiting on the services of 
others to carry out tasks they were capable of performing 
but- were restricted by demarcation or departmental rules 
from doing. Platers and shipwrights waited while burning 
and welding equipment was drawn from the store, connected up 
and taken to them at their workplace. Caulkers left their 
place of work, queued up at stores to have their grinding 
wheels changed. Welders waited while their exhaust and 
ventilation trunks were moved and, stagers had to be in 
attendance every time a hydraulic lift was in operation. 
These were tasks that were within the scope of the national 
and local flexibility agreements, tasks that the individual 
craftsman could carry out themselves and thus avoid waiting 
time and the consequential manhour losses.
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There was no good reason why the caulkers, for example, had 
to leave their workplace twice per day to have another 
shipyard worker remove and replace a grinding stone. It was 
a task the caulkers were perfectly capable of performing 
themselves at their workplace.
However, the caulking department, at a union meeting 
controlled by their shop steward, had 'ruled' that this was 
not their job. The result of this, according to Briggs 
(1990) , Chairman of the Lost Time Action Group, was that 
every caulker in the shipyard lost approximately 2 hours per 
day in changing the grinding stone. 120 caulkers between 
them lost approximately 240 manhours every day on 4,800 
manhours every month, due to a "departmental rule" which 
restricted caulkers from changing their own grinding stone.
In summary, manhours lost due to poor performance included:-
(a) Approximately 69,600 manhours lost per year 
due to the shipyards poor health and safety 
performance.
(b) Almost 300,000 manhours lost on ship 301, due 
to poor performance associated with welding 
quality.
(c) An anticipated manhour loss of almost 57,600 
on just one example of poor performance 
related to the application of flexibility 
agreements.
These losses, at the very least, were equivalent to over
400,000 manhours or 20% of the manhour content of Govan 
built ships. Importantly, however, they were recoverable 
manhours, since the level of performance could be positively 
influenced by training and changes of attitude and 
commitment.
244.
4. LOST MANHOURS - ORGANISATION
As indicated previously, in Chapter 10, when Kvaerner took 
control over the Govan shipyard they did not acquire a 
profitable well organised shipbuilding operation. Among the 
problematic issues were shift working patterns, the overtime 
working arrangements and even the bureaucratic 
organisational structure.
These problematic areas were perceived as being areas where 
manpower constraints could be identified and where manhours 
were being lost. They were, however, difficult areas to 
quantify, in terms of manhour losses but, nonetheless, 
effectiveness in these areas was regarded as a vital 
ingredient of organisational efficiency and viability. One 
such problem, that of shift working, is explained by the 
Production Director:
"If we are seriously in the business of building 
ships we have to deliver to cost and on time.
Lost delivery time costs enormous amounts of time 
and money and today's contracts are won and lost 
on timely delivery. Therefore, to keep this yard 
thriving the introduction of a back shift should 
not be regarded as an alien concept. Indeed, a 
three shift working system is very well known in 
industry throughout Britain and Europe." 
(Kytola 1990).
Shift working at Govan was not organised to suit the demands 
of the production programme or the sophisticated 
construction requirements of an L.P.G. vessel:
"To build and delivery L.P.G. carriers to cost and 
in time on the current programme, requires an 
output weekly of 660 tonnes of steel. Currently, 
this target figure is still to be achieved and 
there has, therefore, been slippage in the 
programme." (Kytola 1990).
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The situation described above related to the 3 year work 
programme associated with the building of the four L.P.G. 
Carriers and largely came about because there were 
bottle-necks in the preparation - that is the burning 
process associated with cutting steel and the manufacturing 
of panels and webs.
The immediate answer, according to the Production Director, 
was to organise the shift working patterns in a manner more 
suited to the demands of the production programme thereby 
increase production through-put. His view was that a double 
dayshift or a three shift working arrangement with an equal 
number of workers on each shift, would solve the problem and 
enable Govan to meet its programme and delivery dates. This 
would enable manpower, plant and equipment to be utilised 
more effectively, with the shipyards facilities fully manned 
5 days a week for 16 or 24 hours a day.
However, this at Govan was an alien concept and meant 
breaking from the traditional shift working arrangements of 
a numerically strong dayshift supported by a much smaller 
night shift. This traditional arrangement had been 
developed to suit the shipyard workers and put in place more 
than two decades ago. It operated on a voluntary basis. 
Dayshift was worked over 5 days while nightshift, manned by 
volunteers, operated on a 4 night basis. Nightshift had the 
advantage of affording the shipyard workers a long weekend, 
which began on a Friday morning and ended on a Monday. 
Nightshift workers also had an additional payment. 
Production Director.
There was a gap of 4 hours 5 minutes between the end of 
dayshift at 4.35 p.m. and the commencement of the nightshift 
at 8.4 0 p.m. This gap was perceived to create two further 
organisation problems:-
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"It is important to remember that this type of 
ship has a high requirement in terms of welding 
standards. Continuous monitoring and prompt 
feedback on the quality status of welds and other
problems is essential." (Kytola 1990)
To ensure that these high welding standards were achieved, a 
monitoring and feed-back system involving the X-Ray process 
had to conform to stringent health and safety legislation 
which prohibited shipyard workers from entering the work 
areas where X-Rays were being taken.
As such, this process had to take place at "quiet times",
when the work areas were free from shipyard workers. Under
the traditional shift working arrangements, illustrated in 
figure 11.4, the only time available for X-Ray was the gap 
between the current shifts.
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However, the gap between dayshift and nightshift constrained 
this monitoring and feedback process. Firstly, there was 
insufficient time between the shifts to enable the welds 
deposited by the dayshift to be X-Rayed and the results fed 
back to nightshift. This meant that the monitoring and 
feed-back process fell behind at the welding continued for
days and, in some cases, weeks before the quality status of
the welding was known. Defective weld metal, however,
continued to be deposited by welders who were unaware that
their techniques or equipment were faulty.
The 60% weld repair rate on ship 301, as previously 
discussed, was partly due to the unsatisfactory shift 
arrangements. Furthermore, the delay in feeding back the 
results of X-Rays meant that work progressed to another 
workplace. As a result the welding equipment, staging and 
ventilation systems removed from the workplace, after the 
initial welding, had to be returned in order that weld 
repairs could be carried out. This additional task added 
manhours to the building of the ship. '
Moreover, the traditional shift working arrangements 
presented further organisation problems:
"Since most of the planning and work preparation 
is done during the dayshift it would be difficult 
to communicate plans and targets to the 
nightshift. Currently they communicate through a 
means of messages which do not clearly convey the 
urgency or complexity of particular problems 
between shifts." Kytola (1990).
His view was that the traditional shift working system did 
not allow the supervisors on each of the separate shifts to 
communicate effectively. They could not discuss, on a 
'one-to-one' basis, targets and work schedules and, 
according to the Production Director,, this created 
confusion and, as a result, manhours were lost.
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Some problems were also evident in the organisation of 
overtime working. For some time overtime, in some areas of 
the shipyard, was organised on a rota basis by the Trade 
Unions. The practice was most evident in the steelwork 
areas where, for instance, one particular department 
operated four separate rotas. As such an operator, coming 
from one rota, could refuse to carry out the tasks
associated with another rota.
"A burner could not, during overtime, carry out
the tasks of a caulker or buffer, all of which was
contrary to the flexibility agreements."
Clydesider (Issue No.17 1990).
Moreover, the operators who controlled the rota, on behalf 
of the trade unions, refused to supply production managers 
with the name of the employees who were due to turn out on 
overtime. Consequently, the management at the shipyard were
unable to prepare work in advance, due to the fact that
those turning up for overtime could well be from' another 
part of the shipyard. The skills and competence of the 
workers were unknown factors to their overtime supervisors 
and the workers themselves were, in some cases, unfamiliar 
with the complexities of the work to be undertaken.
As a result, time was lost sorting out and allocating the 
workers to suitable jobs. Workers travelled from one end of 
the shipyard to another for midweek overtime, while at 
weekends they reported to unfamiliar supervisors and to an 
unfamiliar work area. They searched for equipment to carry 
out their overtime work. Furthermore, managers and 
supervisors were unsure how many workers to expect, given 
that they did not have the names of the employees. 
Accordingly, the organisation of overtime at the shipyard, 
was problematic and an unquantified number of manhours were 
being lost.
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Problems of organisation were not confined to those 
connected with shift working and overtime. Inefficiency and 
manpower constraints were also attributed to the 
bureaucratic organisational structure, which was perceived 
as having an inhibiting effect on the performance of the 
shipyard managers and foremen and in their relationships 
with the shop stewards and the shipyard workers. This was 
partly due to the move throughout nationalisation to a 
centralised form of organisation and decision making and 
partly due to the bureaucratic management structure in the 
shipyard where four tiers of managers operated between the 
Production Director and the foremen. This structure 
is illustrated in figure 11.5.
BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE
AREA MANAGERS
FOREMEN
GENERAL MANAGERS
DEPARTMENT MANAGERS
SENIOR MANAGERS
DIRECTOR
SOURCE: Bisset (1992)
Figure 11.5
A consequence of this bureaucratic structure was that 
communications from the top downwards were restricted and 
ineffective.
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Confusion existed in managerial job roles and the decision 
making process resulting in managers and foremen being 
unsure of their job responsibilities and levels of decision 
making, particularly those associated with industrial 
relations and budgetary control. All of this contributed to 
a lack of authoritative management.
Furthermore, the managers and foremen were often bypassed by 
the powerful shop stewards movement who dealt with directors 
and senior management on industrial relations rather than 
through the recognised procedures. As a result, managers 
and foremen were ill at ease when dealing with shop 
stewards. They were never quite sure when they were being 
bypassed or when their decisions would be overturned by 
their seniors and they did not perceive themselves to be 
accountable for the financial implications of their work 
areas.
The bureaucratic organisational structure was, therefore, 
problematic and ineffective. It inhibited the performance 
of the shipyard managers and foremen and adversely affected 
communication. There were, therefore, at least three key 
aspects of organisation which were problematic, shift 
working patterns, overtime working arrangements and the 
bureaucratic organisation structure.
In summary, management analysis had identified several 
aspects of organisation in the shipyard which were 
problematic and contributing to lost manhours and 
constraining manpower utilisation. These problematic areas 
inhibited the shipyard efficiency and were major factors of 
Govan's uncompetitiveness:
i) Outmoded shift working patterns.
ii) Unions control of overtime working 
allocations by rota.
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iii) A bureaucratic management structure, leading 
to inefficient decision taking.
iv) Underlying these, a power base in the hands 
of the shop stewards who controlled 
communications and were capable of by-passing 
supervisory and middle management by dealing 
directly with senior management.
5. LOST MANPOWER
The Govan shipyard had a further factor which was 
dramatically affecting its competitiveness, a factor that 
could be summed up in two words 'lost manpower'. Every 
working day large numbers of workers, at Govan, did not turn 
up at their workplace. The level of absenteeism or 
non-attendance of employees, for scheduled work, reached a 
peak of 22.6% in 1989.
1
"As recently as 1989 absenteeism was rife in the 
shipyard running at an alarming 22% which based on 
a labour force of 2 000 meant around 440 employees 
were not at their work every day - thus creating 
havoc with production schedules." Clydesider 
(Issue No.25 - 1991).
Ironically, much of the additional cost was again incurred 
as a result of industrial relations agreements concluded 
during nationalisation. These included agreements aimed at 
what was termed as "harmonising the conditions of employment 
between staff and hourly paid employees". A major feature 
of the harmonisation process was the introduction of company 
sickness payment schemes for hourly paid employees. 
Negotiated sick pay was provided for in the national 
agreement. This operated along side the SSP Scheme and 
National Insurance Sickness Benefit Scheme.
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The theory behind the schemes, introduced in 1982, was that 
the manual hourly paid employees should have the same
privileges as staff employees. As such, they too should 
receive company sick pay during periods of illness and 
sickness, in addition to that provided under the terms of 
the state sickness payment scheme.
The financial support from the company scheme was related to
the employee's length of service. For example, employees
with service levels of between 6 weeks and 1 year, received 
company sick pay for 8 weeks. Employees with service of 
between 1 year and 5 years were supported for 18 weeks, 
while those with over 5 years service had a 2 6 week support 
period.
Under the terms of the 1982 scheme, according to the General 
Secretary of the S.N.C., Ferry (1986), financial support to 
sick employees was equivalent to 1/3 of normal earnings. In 
addition to company sick pay, employees also had benefits 
available under the state scheme which, according' to the 
Chairman of the Shipbuilding Negotiating Committee, 
accounted for a further 42.3% of normal weekly pay.
"The worker gets £42.25 less national insurance 
contributions plus £13.70 child benefit (i.e. 
£52.15.) That is 42.3% of normal weekly income. 
However, family expenditure does not drop, indeed, 
it might rise - as rent, rates, food fuel and 
light have still to be paid for". (Hepplewhite 
1985).
In effect, hourly paid employees received 75.3% of normal 
basic earnings during periods of absence due to sickness and 
3 3% of these costs were met by the shipyard. These were, of 
course, additional costs which had to be incurred by the 
uncompetitive and loss making shipyard, associated with 
activities other than those related to the actual building 
of the ship.
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Notwithstanding this, Hepplewhite argued that even this 
level of financial support was insufficient to relieve the 
hardship and insecurity encountered by shipyard workers 
absent due to sickness. He proposed to British 
Shipbuilders, during the 1985 negotiations, that 
improvements to current sick pay arrangements should 
include:-
Removal of qualification period.
Payment of sick pay from the first day of absence.
Extension of entitlement periods towards the 
T.U.C. objectives of 26 weeks at full pay and 26 
weeks at half pay.
Change in the basis of calculation of negotiated 
sick pay to ensure that workers are no worse off 
when sick. That will mean including in the 
formula not only basic pay but also shift pay, 
bonus, overtime and other payments.
These proposals, while unacceptable in the format suggested 
by Hepplewhite, formed the basis of changes made to the sick 
pay scheme as part of the 1986 Phase 8 national agreement 
which stated
"With effect from 1st April 1986, all manual 
workers with 2 0 years continuous service and 
above, shall be included in the staff sick pay 
scheme and receive full pay, less S.S.P. for 
benefit periods prescribed locally."
At Govan some 15% of the manual workforce moved to staff 
sick pay scheme which offered full pay for 26 weeks and half 
pay plus S.S.P. benefits for a further 2 6 weeks.
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This move heralded a marked increase in absenteeism, as 
illustrated in figure 11.6.
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The absenteeism level of hourly paid employees, with 20 
years or more service, was 3.8% at the inception of the 
scheme in April 1986. The level steadily increased and, by 
December 1988, absenteeism within this group of employees 
had reached 17%. This was at a time when the general level 
of absenteeism throughout the Govan shipyard, as discussed 
previously, had reached 22.6%.
The introduction of sick pay schemes for hourly paid 
employees in 1982, and the subsequent improvements of 1986, 
relieved the hardship and insecurity encountered by these 
shipyard workers, but it brought with it a marked increase 
in absenteeism levels and added considerably to costs.
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By the end of 1988, the weekly cost of supporting sick pay, 
according to the Clydesider (Issue number 21 1990), was
equivalent to 1.2 6 hours pay per employee. Based on the
current manpower hourly rate of £5.81, this would indicate 
that the then weekly costs for a labour force of 2000 
employees was £14,643.24 and the annual costs a remarkable 
£761,448.
It would, of course, be unwise to suggest that all of
Govan's absenteeism problems were by products of the 
attractive sick pay schemes - of course they were not. 
However, the fact remains that the shipyard was severely 
handicapped by high levels of absenteeism which meant that, 
in terms of 'lost manpower' 440 employees were not at their 
work every day.
Production schedules were, of course, affected and 
replacement labour had to be recruited, to progress work in 
the absence of the 440 employees, at additional costs. The 
competitive situation in the yard was clearly adversely 
affected by this growing burden and another area of manpower 
utilisation spotlighted as in need of urgent reform.
6. CONCLUSION
Arguably, the analytical review conducted by the Managers 
and supervisors was critical and meaningful. Critical, in
the sense that it provided the foundation on which future
actions on industrial relations processes, manpower 
practices and policies would be structured. Meaningful from 
the point of view that it identified and, in many cases, for 
the first time quantified, in terms that could be easily 
understood by the shipyard management, the manpower factors 
which were inhibiting the shipyard's competitiveness.
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The analysis, therefore, served to bring home, to those
responsible for managing the shipyard, the critical reality 
that Govan was operating in a tough international market 
place under a self imposed handicap. The situation was 
akin to a boxer entering the boxing ring with the handicap 
of one hand tied behind his back. In Govan's case the
handicap was the high number of unproductive or lost 
manhours highlighted by the analysis. In effect, this meant 
that the Govan shipyard, like the boxer, was only operating 
at 50% efficiency level and given this degree of handicap, 
the chances of success were literally zero.
The analysis could also be described as demonstrative 
insofar as it revealed what was really going on in the 
shipyard. For the first time the manpower factors 
inhibiting Govan's competitiveness, were broken down and
analytically appraised by those responsible for managing the 
shipyard. What emerged was a complex of factors involving 
technical deficiencies in the shape of weld quality, trade 
union regulations of what should have been managerial
duties, failures of communication and communication systems, 
work patterns ill organised for the prevailing technology 
and competitive market requirements, a poorly organised, top 
heavy management structure and crippling absenteeism.
Cynics could, of course, argue that the shipbuilding 
industry had long known the manpower factors which were 
inhibiting competitiveness and had really done little to 
change the situation. They could support the argument by 
pointing out that British Shipbuilders, as part of their 
'Productivity Improvement Programme', were only one of many 
organisations who, over the past three decades, had produced 
such information. The result of these efforts and the Govan 
shipyard's management commitment to do something about these 
inhibiting factors is amply demonstrated by the financial 
losses incurred regularly by Govan and the legacies of 
uncompetitiveness and inefficiency inherited by Kvaerner.
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The process of identifying the sources of unproductive and 
lost manhours would not, by itself, transform the 
uncompetitive Govan shipyard into a viable and competitive 
shipbuilding unit. It was merely the start point. But it 
was on this very point that the Kvaerner analytical analysis 
differed from those previously carried out in shipbuilding. 
Their analysis was carried out by the shipyard managers - 
the managers who had 'inside knowledge' of what was actually 
happening in the Govan yard and whose whole purpose in 
carrying out the analysis was to to 'do something about' the 
inhibiting manpower factors. Thus the management analysis 
of local yard practice was the foundation of the process
which helped isolate a set of action areas.
There was certainly plenty of scope for such an efficiency 
increase insofar as:-
(a) An increase in productivity efficiency of up
to 12.5% could, in theory, be achieved by
ending the concessions granted by those who 
previously managed the shipyard. On the 
basis of the descriptive analysis of section 
two, new manpower policies could be
introduced that would impact on the manhour 
losses associated with concessions and also 
re-balance the distribution of authority 
between the shipyard management and the shop 
stewards.
(b) Efficiency could be increased by levels up to 
2 0% by improving performance in Health and 
Safety, weld quality and the application of 
flexibility agreements. Performance could be 
improved and attitude and commitment 
positively influenced by training and 
management actions.
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(c) The levels of shipyard productivity could be 
significantly increased by altering the
organisation of working patterns, overtime 
arrangements and management structures. The 
introduction of new shift and overtime
working arrangements and management 
structures could positively influence the
shipyard's efficiency level by taking account 
of the demands of the production programme 
and the technology requirements of the 
product.
(d) Shipbuilding costs could be reduced and 
productivity efficiency increased by 
management actions to reduce absenteeism and 
non attendance: actions that included 
stringent disciplinary measures on the one 
hand and health programmes on the other.
Kvaerner Govan's analysis of unproductive manhours provided 
a critical foundation on which future actions on industrial 
relations processes, manpower policies and practices could 
be structured and, providing the actions were far reaching 
in their implication, could transform the uncompetitive 
Govan shipyard into a viable shipbuilding unit.
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CHAPTER 12: KVAERNER GOVAN'S APPROACH
TO INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
1. THE FRAMEWORK
An important feature of the Kvaerner manpower strategy was 
their intention and willingness to work with the recognised 
trade unions, within an industrial relations framework 
provided that the accountability of the unions and their 
representatives was properly defined by procedures 
acceptable to management. This, from a Kvaerner point of 
view, reflected the traditional Norwegian culture of union 
recognition with accountability.
Although on the surface, this did not appear to be a 
complete break from the past, the approach had fundamental 
differences from that pursued previously at Govan. These 
differences were far reaching and it could be suggested that 
they 'redressed the authority and control between management 
and the shop steward movement'.
The Kvaerner approach was based on the proposition that 
management, and not the shop stewards, were responsible for 
managing the pace of change taking place in the shipyard. 
They did not believe that managers should be inhibited by 
shop stewards from making decisions and taking actions that 
would increase shipyard competitiveness. The preferred 
option for Kvaerner was to work with the unions to ensure 
that such 'actions', and their consequences, were understood 
and agreed with the shop stewards prior to implementation. 
This was in line with the Norwegian tradition where strong 
unions were accepted. What was not acceptedable was the 
negative influence that the Govan unions had grown 
accustomed to exerting, and that required to be changed. 
This was a vital ingredient in the total strategy for 
change.
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The Kvaerner approach to industrial relations contrasted 
starkly with that pursued previously in the shipyard. This
contrast was most evident in what could be termed as 'trade
union', or in a Govan context, 'shop steward
accountability' . At Govan the traditional approach afforded 
the shop stewards joint regulation, in an extended sense,
with involvement in management processes, but it did not 
imply any degree of shop steward accountability.
The shop stewards had power and authority without 
accountability and many of the inhibiting factors to 
competitivenesss were by-products of Govan's traditional 
industrial relations framework. Agreements were concluded 
that gave away manhours and added considerably to the cost 
of building ships. The shop stewards did not always 
encourage the application of flexibility agreements. 
Agreements were flouted in the interest of job demarcation 
and overmanning.
The traditional approach also impinged on management 
authority and control with the shop stewards carrying out 
managerial duties and providing the shipyard workers with 
their only communications link on industrial relations 
issues. The shop stewards, and not management, were the 
principal attitude formers and they, therefore, set the pace 
of change in the shipyard.
Kvaerner's initial 'analysis' had indicated that, to achieve 
competitiveness, it needed to take a range of 'actions' that 
would bring about changes to manpower policies and working 
practices: actions that, in some instances, could be
considered as contentious, and ending practices which were 
enforced by the shop stewards.
The prevailing industrial relations system had been unable 
to cope with this type of contentious change in the past, 
and stood accused of lacking in economic reality, 
accountability and credibility.
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It left management helpless in certain respects and so it, 
and the attitudes and values within it, had to be changed. 
This was the key to unlocking the door to lost productivity. 
However, to unlock the door, Kvaerner first had to overcome 
four major hurdles which could be summarised as:-
(a) The attitudes that resulted from a lack of 
economic realism and which were a product of 
an industry where job protection was more 
important than shipyard efficiency and where 
competitiveness was considered as an 
impossiblity.
(b) Industrial relations agreements that lacked 
local shipyard ownership and were flouted in 
the interest of job demarcation and 
overmanning.
(c) A communications process that ensured the 
shop stewards and not management were the 
link with the shipyard workers on industrial 
relations issues.
(d) Shop stewards who had power and authority 
without accountability and had the freedom to 
carry out trade union duties at will.
Introducing an industrial relations framework acceptable to 
management and where 'actions' that would build on the 
foundation of the analysis could be agreed with the shop 
stewards was considered critical to the Kvaerner strategy. 
As such the processes adopted to overcome the four hurdles 
summarised earlier, were considered as vital to the 
strategies overall success. These processes will be 
discussed and analysed in the following sections.
262.
2. ATTITUDES AND ECONOMIC REALITY
As a preamble to this section, it may be helpful to 
understand the perspective from which it was written. The 
author is the Personnel Director who was responsible for 
devising a strategy to achieve a change in workforce and 
union culture and practice - a culture which was familiar to 
him as he had grown up within it and had experienced it at 
first hand and at various stages in a career that started on 
the shop floor. The rationale behind the workforce and 
union attitudes, and the way in which work practices and 
union stances had adapted to form a thick protective coating 
against change were, therefore, well understood.
To appreciate what this new challenge meant and how it was 
perceived by the workforce and unions would be a fascinating 
exercise in its own right. But it cannot be the perspective 
from which the present analysis is developed. The 
perspective here is that of management, having analysed the 
problems, seeking ways to rectify the problems and convert 
the yard back to viability - which was necessary if security 
of employment and the continuation of the yard into the 
future were to be realised. This is, therefore, one part of 
a story which has two sides. While recognition is given to 
the stand point of the workers and unions, and how they had 
got- themselves to this point, it is the other side which is 
the prime focus here - the problems for management of 
achieving a set of changes which would be seen by the 
workers, initially at least, as threatening to traditional 
or acquired values, but which had to be challenged 
nevertheless. Former Managing Director, Mackie, adds 
support to the view that 'attitudes and economic realities' 
were major hurdles that had to be overcome if shipyard 
competitiveness was to be achieved. He pointed out that the 
Govan yard had, during nationalisation, been cushioned 
against the harsh economic realities of the international 
market place.
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Indeed, it had been cushioned from these economic realities 
for much longer than the decade of nationalisation. Govan, 
in fact, had survived for over two decades as a loss making 
shipyard. During this period it had changed ownership four 
times, moving firstly from Fairfield Shipbuilders to 
Fairfield Glasgow to Upper Clyde Shipbuilders and then to 
Govan Shipbuilders prior to nationalisation.
In commercial terms each change of ownership followed a 
financial failure with the Government picking up the costs. 
The result was that the shipyard workers and their managers 
had become used to working in a loss-making shipyard where 
the target was simply to build the ship and let someone 
else, usually the Government, worry about the costs. There 
was a deep held belief that the shipyard was in business as 
a social non-profit making institution and its purpose was 
to provide employment and support the economy of the local 
community. There was a presumption that shipbuilding in the 
U.K. was an industry that could not generate profit and had 
to survive on the basis of state handouts and subsidy.
This presumption was deep rooted within the shipbuilding 
industry and, in particular, within the trade union 
movement. On several occasions during the past two decades, 
they had advanced the proposition that the only way to 
maintain a shipbuilding capacity was for Government to 
introduce a 'scrap and build' policy, financed by the 
Treasury (and the tax payer).
This view was particularly strong at Govan where the 
prevailing attitude of the management, shop stewards and the 
workforce towards costs, efficiency and productivity, as 
demonstrated by the large number of unproductive manhours 
and high levels of absenteeism could, at best, be described 
as ambivalent. These prevailing attitudes were totally 
inconsistent with the operation of a privatised shipyard 
whose principal aim was to make money and generate profit by 
building ships. As such, they were a major hurdle that had 
to be overcome. A point made by the former Managing 
Director when he stated:-
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"Privatisation has certainly meant that the goal 
posts have moved and so attitudes have to change.
There has to be a much greater awareness of costs, 
efficiency and productivity. The ability to stand 
on our own two feet is vitally important. Gone 
are the days of the feather-bed image which was 
too often associated with nationalised industries 
and this change of attitude means change not 
simply for the workforce but everyone." (Mackie 
1988) .
The entire workforce had to accept the reality that there 
was no longer a "chest full" of money in the Treasury Office 
available to offset Govan's high losses. The shipyards
survival was squarely in the hands of the management and the 
workers and this survival was based on their ability to 
change their attitudes and commit themselves to 'actions' 
that would transform the shipbuilding operation into a 
viable unit. Kvaerner, therefore, had to positively 
influence the counter productive attitudes that were an
inherent part of the shipyard's approach to industrial
relations and which were a major influence on the manhour
losses.
It had to replace the existing system and attitudes with 
their own framework which would bring economic realism, 
accountability and credibility to the industrial relations 
process, by:-
(a) Establishing meaningful industrial relations 
agreements which would integrate the needs 
and values of the workforce with the 
company's competitive goals: such agreements 
to incorporate the 'action' highlighted by 
the 'initial analysis' and be aimed at 
tackling the contentious issues hitherto 
avoided by the traditional system.
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(b) Introducing communication systems that would 
ensure that management had a direct link to 
the workforce which would enable them to 
brief the workforce on industrial relations 
issues. Such systems were needed to ensure 
that the workforce understood what actions 
were required by management, the reason for 
the actions and, importantly, what the 
actions meant to them.
(c) Reducing the influence, power and authority 
of the shop stewards movement and introducing 
a degree of accountability into their role.
This, meant defining procedures acceptable to 
management, a much reduced number of shop 
stewards and a restriction on the number of 
manhours available to carry out trade union 
duties. Such procedures would ensure that 
the shop stewards ability to inhibit 
management and shipyard workers from taking 
initiatives and adopting progressive working 
practices, was reduced.
To transform the uncompetitive Govan yard into a viable 
shipbuilding operation Kvaerner had to take the shipyard 
workforce with them. This meant changing the 
counter-productive attitudes of the shipyard workforce and 
gaining their agreement, support and commitment to the 
strategy, (the detail of which was discussed in Chapter 10) 
and the associated actions, some of which would be 
contentious, that would assist the transformation process. 
Difficulties and tensions associated with the change process 
were anticipated and with the benefit of hindsight we now 
know were encountered. The tensions created workforce 
resistance to change and resulted in a 'strike', the detail 
of which is discussed in Section 2 of Chapter 14. At the 
heart of the tensions was the question of job security and 
the age old problems of working practices, overmanning and 
redundancies.
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3. AGREEMENTS AND OWNERSHIP
There seemed little sense, in view of Govan's uncompetitive 
situation, in continuing to arrive at 'nicely worded' 
industrial relations agreements. There was no place for 
documents which, on the surface, appeared to be aimed at 
resolving contentious issues when, in reality, both parties 
- management and trade union representatives - acknowledged 
that the agreements were, in some cases, an "accommodation 
of words" that changed little.
The shipyard had, after all, concluded industrial relations 
agreements annually for the past two or more decades. Most 
were aimed at contentious issues associated with demarcation 
and restrictive working practices. These agreements did 
not, by themselves, eliminate the problems - "who does what" 
disputes still existed. Platers and caulkers disputed 
'ownership' of burning machines, joiners and sheet 
ironworkers took to the streets in a strike over "who would 
hang metal ceilings" and caulkers would not change their own 
grinding wheels. This was in a shipyard where the first 
flexibility agreement, based on the relaxation of working 
practices, was signed in 1966 during the Fairfield 
Experiment.
The industrial relations process and its protagonists had to 
have accountability and credibility. The process required 
meaning and had to be associated with economic realism and 
actions, clearly defined manpower initiatives and plans 
which had the measurable aim of elimination of manpower 
utilisation constraints and reducing by 50%, the number of 
manhours associated with building ships at Govan.
Given the magnitude of lost manhours and lost manpower, 
cited earlier in Chapter 11, it was an aim that was 
achievable but only with the commitment and motivation of 
the Govan workers and, in particular, those involved in the 
creation, development and implementation of manpower 
initiatives and associated industrial relations agreements.
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Herein lay one of the problems for the privatised Kvaerner 
Govan: the ownership of initiatives and agreements - a
problem which was one of the legacies of nationalisation 
with its roots in the centralised collective bargaining
process. Centralised collective bargaining was, as
indicated previously by Kelly (Dr. J. 1988), a mechanism
introduced by British Shipbuilding to overcome local shop 
stewards resistance to changes to working practices.
The reality was that, as a result of this move, the powerful 
shop stewards movement, at Govan, had no real involvement in 
the national industrial relations process. Agreements were 
concluded nationally on the basis of a national vote. 
Inevitably the Govan shop stewards and the shipyard workers 
were in the minority. They voted against proposed changes 
but their views were often set aside and agreements
implemented on the majority of votes cast by shipyard 
workers throughout the length and breadth of the country.
This meant the shop stewards could declare that the 
agreements were imposed on Govan workers, against their 
wishes, giving rise to their constant challenges to the 
manpower initiatives associated with the agreements. The 
powerful shop steward movement at Govan were recognised as 
an immovable force who resisted, rather than welcomed 
change, regarding themselves as the custodians of the craft 
and trade structures and working practices.
Given this lack of ownership, or indeed lack of involvement 
in the central bargaining process, the shop stewards 
response to national agreements could best be described as 
"luke warm". They did not actively reject them but, in most 
instances, lessened their impact by paying lip service to 
them. The shop stewards, the management and the shipyard 
workers had all grown accustomed to industrial relations 
agreements which were never fully implemented.
The manpower policies and initiatives, associated with the 
British Shipbuilders agreements, were developed by a 
centralised function with limited involvement from the 
executives of the shipyards and negotiated by the 
centralised personnel function. Therefore, many excellent 
and far sighted manpower initiatives were incorporated into 
agreements which lacked ownership at the local shipyard 
level by managers and shop stewards.
The historical problem was that agreements e.g., on 
flexibility were not being enforced or complied with, even 
when they were developed within the local (Fairfield) 
framework of collective bargaining. The problem got worse 
when negotiation was centralised under British Shipbuilders, 
since the sense of ownership was absent and agreements were 
again difficult to enforce.
Kvaerner, on taking over, were committed to dealing with 
unions in a responsible way but demanding accountability 
from the unions meant that agreements made had to be 
honoured on both sides. Collective bargaining would still 
be the recognised process by which rules were made and union 
and workers rights would be regulated by management. But 
the scope of union control had to be reduced and managements 
right to manage restored in important areas affecting 
manpower utilisation. This meant a culture change, both 
from management and union/workers, involving an unfreezing - 
reshaping -refreezing process. In this sense the key to 
implementing the manpower utilisation changes lay as much in 
the collective bargaining process as in the direct solutions 
themselves and this could be true so long as Kvaerner were 
committed to union negotiations and negotiating change by 
agreement.
The particular solution was to ensure that:
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(a) Management and supervision involved in the 
primary analysis, were responsible for 
developing the objectives and carrying the 
plans through in detail.
(b) Unions/workers would be party to the changes 
and accountable for them.
(c) Former areas of control in the yard would be 
returned to management control.
To achieve these objectives and to build a sense of local 
ownership meant the definition of a strategy not just 
setting the objectives. This had been tried before and 
failed. What was different this time was that the primary 
analysis had local ownership.
Based on the theory 'we tend to support that which we 
create', Kvaerner, created an active role for managers and 
supervisors in identifying and quantifying the factors which 
were inhibiting competitiveness and constraining manpower 
utilisation. Moreover, the managers proposed 'actions' 
which they believed would be the basis of a solution to 
problems.
Managers and supervisors were to be identified with the 
proposed 'actions'. They, in fact, were the owners. The 
actions were their ideas and, for many, this was the first 
time in over a decade that they were given an opportunity to 
influence the change processes of their departments. 
Furthermore, the managers and supervisors proposed actions 
were incorporated into industrial relations agreements 
negotiated between the shipyard management and the shop 
stewards. Shop stewards whose accountability was properly 
defined by procedures acceptable to management and 
agreements which were put to the workforce by the shop 
stewards and accepted on a majority vote. Thereafter, 
action programmes were established, progress was monitored 
and the results fed back to management, unions/workers who 
were party to and accountable for the change process.
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Kvaerner, therefore, based on the Personnel & Employee 
Relations Director's, author of the thesis philosphy, set in 
place a mechanism to overcome the dual problems of 
industrial relations agreements and ownership. As such the 
author was firstly a key member of the management team at 
Govan and secondly a participator/observer in terms of the 
organisational change process taking place in the yard.
The Director's philosphy required a total shift in the 
balance of power in the shipyard, management regaining 
control against the prevailing culture but much was 
dependent on management's ability to replace the prevailing 
communications system with one that would enable them to 
deal directly and thereby influence the attitudes of the 
workforce.
Management, therefore, required a willingness to confrpnt 
these issues and, if necessary, take on the unions. New 
methods of communication were essential and the role of the 
shop stewards had to be changed. Management by concession 
or trade union resistance to change, was no longer a 
tolerable option. Shipyard workers jobs were on the line 
and there was a lack of alternative employment in
shipbuilding or elsewhere in the local economy.
4. COMMUNICATIONS
Significantly, Kvaerner's approach to industrial relations 
included changes to the ways in which the aims of the
agreements were communicated to the shipyard workers. The 
Managing Director referred to 1990 as:
"A year when our approach to industrial relations
changed. Initiated by the signing of the 1990 
wages agreement, we started to tackle the 
inefficiencies in the use of the working day." 
(Draegebo 1990).
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An important part of the approach to was to recognise the 
importance of effective communications in terms of 
transforming the aims of the agreement into positive action, 
which would reduce inefficiency and improve performance. 
The new approach to industrial relations had to move away 
from the shipyards traditional approach to communications 
whereby, the shop stewards and trade union representatives 
communicated with, and advised the shipyard workers on 
agreements.
The shop stewards and trade union representatives regarded 
communications as their exclusive domain. The trade unions 
were the principal 'attitude formers' in the shipyard, 
insofar as they were the only 'voice' in the industrial 
relations process, as far as the workforce was concerned. 
They, therefore, influenced the outcome and the eventual 
fate of agreements and initiatives.
Influencing in a positive way, the hitherto counter 
productive attitudes of the Govan workforce was essential 
ingredient of the Kvaerner approach to industrial relations. 
Many a manpower initiative and industrial relations 
agreement had floundered due to a lack of commitment and 
negative attitudes. The new approach to industrial 
relations adopted by Kvaerner had to ensure that the 
shipyards workforce fully understood the agreements, their 
aims, the reasons for any proposed 'actions' and the role of 
the workforce in the change process.
This new approach placed particular emphasis on effective 
communications. It involved regular briefing meetings for 
managers and supervisors, who had been involved in the 
'primary analysis', identification and development of 
'actions' which included new manpower policies and 
initiatives. They were briefed throughout the negotiation 
process and they were encouraged to discuss the proposed 
'actions' with the shipyard workers in their work areas thus 
gaining an understanding and building scope for commitment.
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In addition, direct communications, on industrial relations 
issues, were established between the shipyard workforce and 
the management. These took the form of letters to the 
workers homes and a changing role and method of distribution 
for the company newspaper "Clydesider".
Traditionally bundles of newspapers were left in amenity 
areas to be picked up by employees. The Clydesider's 
content was normally associated with non-controversial 
issues such as - charity and social events. Kvaerner 
changed this. They altered the editorial content to include 
industrial relations issues. Indeed, much time and effort 
was put into articles associated with the proposed changes 
to working practices and the reasoning behind them.
The newspaper was sent to the homes of all employees to 
ensure that all of the people, employees and their families, 
who relied on the shipyard for their job security, 
understood the agreements and the reasons for the changes 
and their role in the change process.
Moreover, in order that some managerial control and 
discipline could be exerted over industrial relations 
agreements, manpower practices and employment conditions all 
employees were issued with what was termed as a 'Rule Book'. 
Thig handbook, whose contents were agreed with the trade 
unions, clarified previously contentious issues and sought 
to take much of the mystique out of the industrial relations 
process.
In simple terms the 'Rule Book' let the employees know what 
was expected of them and what they could expect in return 
from the company. The handbook would form the basis of any 
discussions between the shipyard worker and his supervisor 
about what could and could not be done. Furthermore, the 
'Rule Book' is issued to new employees at a 'first day' 
induction session introduced to ensure that they too fully 
understand the rules of the company.
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In this way, therefore, the Kvaerner Govan set out to lay a 
solid and more disciplined foundation for the future. The 
Managing Director said:-
"1990, therefore, has been a year when we have 
started to eliminate inefficiencies and laid a 
solid, more disciplined foundation for the future.
We plan, in 1991, to build on this foundation and 
to secure a competitive shipyard which will 
provide security of employment to our existing 
employees and opportunities for young people in 
our community. Gone are the days when the Company 
was dominated by the old fashioned divisive 
attitudes of 'them and us'. 1991 must be a year 
when we create a team in this shipyard, a team who 
are dedicated to securing a prosperous future." 
(Draegebo 1990).
He further pointed out that:-
"Improving productivity to levels where we, in 
effect, will produce twice as much with the same 
number of employees is a major challenge but it is 
one we must be capable of facing up to and 
meeting. Moreover, it is not a challenge that can 
be taken up alone by management." (Draegebo 
1990).
He was emphasising that the shipyard workforce did not 
operate as a team, it was divided. The management were in 
one camp, and the workers in the other. The principal aim 
of management had been to take up the challenge of improving 
productivity and the aim of the shipyard workers was to look 
for ways of defeating management and securing a victory over 
them and vice versa.
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Each prepared their team accordingly. They talked to their 
people, they psyched them up, motivated them and committed 
them to victory. As such they influenced the attitudes and 
a victory for one side was always regarded as a defeat for 
the other. The eventual loser in the contest was, of 
course, the shipyard.
The challenge facing Govan was not one that involved a 
contest between management and the workforce although it may 
have appeared so to the workforce and unions. It was, in 
fact, one of the Govan Shipyard against its competitors and 
this was a challenge of such magnitude that it required the 
combined effort of both camps. This required a well 
prepared plan that had to be communicated effectively and 
understood and supported by all of the team members.
The overall aim was, of course, to positively influence the 
workforce's attitudes to industrial relations agreements and 
manpower initiatives and by so doing gain their commitment 
to actions aimed at reducing manhours and manpower losses.
5. THE SHOP STEWARDS ROLE
The Kvaerner approach to industrial relations also tackled 
the somewhat thorny and difficult problems of the shop 
stewards. Huge numbers of manhours were devoted at Govan to 
trade union activities and duties. The numerical strength 
of the shop steward movement had grown to 70 and a large 
number of the stewards were devoting the full working week 
to trade union duties.
The magnitude of the manhour losses was cited in Clydesider 
(Issue No.17 1990):-
"The magnitude of this problem is that last year 
over 50,000 production manhours were taken up by 
trade union activities."
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However, these direct manhour losses were, perhaps, only the 
tip of the iceberg. The powerful shop stewards had the time 
to roam the shipyard, 'policing the working practices' and 
challenging management who introduced changes, and advising 
shipyard workers on what they could and could not do.
In this way 'initiative' was stifled. Shipyard workers were 
discouraged from having "good ideas"; they did not suggest 
more productive ways of approaching their work. Supervisors 
and managers found it easier to adopt the 'status quo', 
rather than endure the consequence of a challenge from the 
shop stewards. As such, the vast reservoir of shipbuilding 
knowledge, which existed on the shop floor, was not being 
channelled into improving productivity and improving the 
shipyards competitive situation.
Rather the reverse was happening. Practices adopted by the 
competition to increase their competitive edge were alien 
and frowned upon at Govan. The caulking department, for 15 
years, resisted the introduction of metal removing processes 
such as arc air gouging and burring, in the interest of 
preserving buffing, an operation which took up to five times 
longer and was less effective. The problem was so acute 
that even temporary employees were restricted from carrying 
out tasks in Govan that were common place in their previous 
company. The prime example was the caulkers who, although 
capable of doing so, were prohibited by the shop stewards 
from changing their own grinding stones.
The role of the shop stewards had become confused. They did 
not regard themselves as employees of the company, who were 
accountable to production supervision, nor did they 
recognise that their prime responsibility was to produce 
manhours. Rather, they saw the role of the shop stewards as 
that of a full time trade unionist, whose job it was to 
preserve the 'status quo', albeit they were paid their wages 
by the company.
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The Kvaerner approach was to reduce the number of manhours 
the shop stewards devoted to trade union activities. 
However, there was a second aim which was not quite so 
evident. This was to provide an industrial relations 
climate in which managers could manage the business and 
shipyard workers could utilise their skills and initiatives 
without the constant challenges from the shop stewards.
This was not to say that Kvaerner Govan were adopting an 
anti-shop steward or trade union stance - quite the 
contrary. They, in fact, perceived the shop stewards role 
at Govan to be a vital ingredient of the change process, but 
the accountability of the shop stewards had to be properly 
defined by procedures acceptable to management.
The Kvaerner view was that the shop stewards were, first and 
foremost, employees of the company and their prime role was 
to produce manhours which could be sold to the customer. 
They were part of work teams and, while they may well have 
been regarded by their fellow workers as the 'captain' of 
the team, they were still nonetheless 'accountable' to the 
production supervision for their time, performance and 
discipline. The shop stewards were team workers who 
happened also to be the trade union representatives 
reporting to the supervisor and, like any other shipyard 
workers, being allocated meaningful work.
In a sense this view was the start point for the 
re-definition of the shop stewards role within an industrial 
relations framework acceptable to Kvaerner. Their approach, 
as indicated previously, was based on the proposition that 
management was responsible for managing the pace of change 
in the shipyard. As such, the factors inhibiting them 
moving the shipyard towards competitiveness, including the 
unaccountable power and authority of the shop stewards, had 
to be removed, particularly, the inhibiting factors 
emanating from the perception of the shop stewards as a 
rival management structure.
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In theory, they had no managerial authority to direct and 
control the work of shipyard workers - however, in practice 
it seemed they had. This perceived authority had, at times, 
rendered the shipyard management helpless to introduce 
changes that would increase competitiveness.
The role of the Govan shop stewards was, therefore, 
unacceptable to Kvaerner. They were, however, willing to 
work with the shop stewards but it had to be on the basis of 
properly defined procedures acceptable to management. These 
procedures set out in the 1990 industrial relations 
agreement were it was stated:-
"The company recognised the rights of its 
employees to appoint Trade Union representatives 
(i.e. shop stewards and staff reps) to represent 
them...............
The number of Trade Union representatives will be 
reasonable in relation to the number of employees 
in the company. The number, however, will not 
exceed a total of twenty, plus three full time 
conveners and one part-time convener."
Initially these procedures were rejected by the local union 
representatives and given their implication in terms of 
numerical reductions this was not suprising. Management 
however were committed to shifting the balance of power in 
the shipyard in favour of managers and supervisors and were, 
therefore, determined to take on the unions on this 
particular issue. After five months of negotiations the 
procedure was adopted and incorported into the industrial 
relations agreement of 1990.
The number of shop stewards was thus reduced from 70 to 20 
and, in addition, the number of hours available to the 20 
remaining shop stewards was restricted to 5 hours in any 
week.
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The agreement, therefore, addressed both the numerical 
strength of the shop stewards movement and also the number 
of hours the individual shop stewards could devote to trade 
union activities.
Under the terms of their agreement, the company reduced the 
number of manhours devoted to trade union duties from 50,000 
to just over 10,000 manhours per year. The 10,000 manhours 
per year recognised the fact that 20 shop stewards would 
have 5 hours per week available for 45 working weeks per 
year. Moreover, the 3 conveners would be allocated 37 hours 
per week and 1 part-time convener 16 hours per week.
In addition to reducing the number of manhours associated 
with trade union activities the Kvaerner approach to 
industrial relations also addressed the problems of the shop 
stewards role insofar as it:-
(a) removed their ability to roam the shipyard 
'policing' working practices.
(b) clarified their role in the industrial 
relations procedures of the company and 
defined the limits of their authority.
(c) clarified their principal job function and 
their responsibility to produce manhours.
(d) clarified their relationship with the 
production supervisor.
(e) reduced their ability to stifle the shipyard 
workers initiatives and ensured that new 
employees could adopt the more productive 
practices of their previous companies.
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(f) ensured that managers and supervisors could 
adopt more productive ways of approaching 
their work without the constant challenge of 
the shop stewards.
The overall aim of the Kvaerner approach was to provide an 
industrial relations climate in which the shipyard workers, 
their supervisors and managers, could utilise their skills 
and initiative without the constant challenge of the shop 
stewards. It is important though to recognise that a 
cornerstone of the Kvaerner approach was their intentions 
and willingness to work with the recognised trade union 
within an industrial relations framework subject to proper 
definition of the accountability of the unions, and their 
officers.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The Kvaerner industrial relations framework was, 
essentially, the 'nerve centre' of the ambitious manpower 
strategy, the vital link between the strategies analytical 
analysis and the implementation stage. It was the linking 
stage where the 'actions' from the analysis were 
incorporated into industrial relations agreements prior to 
implementation. As such, from a management perspective, the 
framework was the key to unlocking the door to the lost 
productivity identified previously in chapter 11.
Critics could suggest that the Kvaerner approach was anti 
trade union and the principal aim was to reduce the power 
and influence of the shop steward movement. They could 
support that view by pointing out that Kvaerner would only 
work with the trade unions providing the union officials and 
the shop stewards had accountability for agreements and 
actions and providing the degree of accountability was 
defined by procedures acceptable to management.
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To the critics this was rather like Kvaerner saying to the 
shop stewards that they could participate in the industrial 
relations framework but only providing they conform to the 
role and the rules set by the company.
Realists, however, would argue that Kvaerner were simply 
replacing a 'flawed' industrial relations system, unable to 
cope with the type of contentious actions required to 
improve manpower utilisation and, thereby, address the 
problems of uncompetitiveness, with an industrial relations 
framework that could. They could support the argument by 
pointing out that the lost manhours and manpower cited 
earlier in chapter 11, were by-products of the shop steward 
'lead' system, which afforded the stewards control over the 
pace of change taking place in the shipyard and ensured them 
the only communications platform to influence the attitudes 
of the workforce. Management had to replace this flawed 
system with one which:
(a) was capable of producing agreements 
incorporating the 'actions' emanating from 
the 'primary analysis' prior to 
implementation and having the support and 
commitment from the owners of the industrial 
relations process, the shipyard management 
and the shop stewards.
(b) would complement the hitherto exclusive shop 
steward 'voice'by providing a clearer system 
of management communications. In theory, the 
counter productive attitudes resulted from 
'fear' and insecurity. Improved management 
communications could remove this fear and 
insecurity. The supervisory briefings, the 
'Clydesider' newspaper, and the Company Rule 
Book were seen as means to give the workforce 
an understanding of what actions were 
required by management, the reasons for the 
actions, and what the actions meant to the 
workers.
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This was designed to positively influence 
their attitudes by removing the fear and 
insecurity.
(c) reduced the power and authority of shop 
stewards and increased their accountability 
for agreements and shipyard efficiency. This 
redefinition took place through a reduction 
in the number of shop stewards from 70 to 20 
and in the time each was allocated for trade 
union duties. This reduced the shop stewards 
ability to 'police working practices' and 
reduced their ability to inhibit management 
and the workforce from taking initiatives and 
actions that would increase efficiency.
The fundamental philosophy behind the Kvaerner approach 
was that management and not the shop stewards were 
responsible for the pace of change taking place in the 
shipyard and in the demanding commercial market place this 
proposition had credibility. Arguably, the proposition 
'redressed the authority and control between management and 
shop steward'. It recognised that the shop stewards were, 
first and foremost, shipyard workers who were under the 
direct control of supervisors and, in such a role, they had 
no authority to control the workforce.
282.
CHAPTER 13: KVAERNER GOVAN'S ACTION PROGRAMME
PHASE ONE
1. THE ACTIONS
The Kvaerner Govan 'action programme' was, essentially, the 
stage of the manpower strategy where thoughts and 
discussions were translated into actions. It was, in 
effect, the third stage of a strategy following on from the 
initial analysis of manpower utilisation and the definition 
of a participative and communicative industrial relations 
process designed to incorporate the actions into meaningful 
industrial relations agreements.
The 'action programme' was in two phases and the initial 
phase was incorporated into the negotiated industrial 
relations agreement of 1990, while phase two, to be 
discussed in Chapter 14, was incorporated into the 1991 
agreement. The initial phase of the programme was concerned 
with maximising the manhours available for productive use. 
In a sense, it was the foundation phase concerned with 
influencing the shipyard's 'work ethic' and tackling the 
problems of managerial discipline and control over working 
hours. This involved introducing a range of actions to 
ensure that productive work and earnings payments were 
linked, for example, to ensure that the shipyard workers 
received payment only when they 'clocked in' at their work 
areas ready to start work.
This range of actions, the contents of which are illustrated 
in figure 13.1, were aimed at assisting in the process of 
transforming the uncompetitive shipyard into a viable 
shipbuilding operation for the first time in over two 
decades.
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ACTION AREAS
ACTION PROGRAMME 
PHASE ONE
ACTIONS
1. CONCESSIONS
Starting and  S topping 
Times.
- Reduce m anhours conceded 
to activities for other 
than  productive use.
Shop S tew ards Reduce control of shop 
stew ards and Introduce 
accountability.
Additional Days Off - Remove concession  days.
2. PERFORMANCE
Health & Safety - Improve perform ance 
through com m unications 
and increased  com m itm ent
Quality Improve perform ance through 
training and  Increase 
individual accountability 
and commitment.
Flexibility * Remove fac to rs Inhibiting 
application of A greem ents.
3. MANPOWER
A bsen teeism - R educe ab sen tee ism  levels.
S ickness * R e-appraise sick pay sy s tem s and 
the  role of the O ccupational Health 
D epartm ent
SOURCE: Bisset (1991)
Figure 13.1
Within the setting of the new Kvaerner industrial relations 
framework the agreements and the range of actions were 
communicated to the shipyard workers by management and the 
shop stewards, prior to implementation, thus ensuring that 
the workforce were aware of, and fully understood, their 
implications.
The initial phase of the 'action programme' appeared to 
work. The 1990 industrial relations agreement was the 
foundation on which the shipyard's increased productivity 
was built.'
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"In terms of the company's long term future the 
most important achievement, however, has been the 
upturn in productivity. The foundation for the 
increase was laid with the signing of the 1990 
wage agreement which saw the introduction of bell 
to bell working and tackled absenteeism and other 
forms of ineffective time. Perhaps, for the first 
time in many years, the company received the full 
benefit of the agreement." (Draegebo 1991).
Unlike previous agreements, the words of the 1990 agreement 
were translated into deeds and increased productivity. Much 
of the credit for this, according to the Managing Director, 
must go to the workforce who responded immediately to the 
'actions' and, as a result, productive hours available to 
the processes associated with building ships increased.
The statement that 'full benefit was received' was 
significant. The agreement was concluded as a result of
extensive negotiations between management and the shop
stewards. The negotiations had 'give and take' with 
management giving a 9.2% wage increase and a reduction of 2 
hours on the normal 39 hours working week in return for 
effective working arrangements represented by what is termed 
as 'bell to bell working', removal of concessions and 
demarcation, control of shop stewards and the acceptance of 
a rule book.
The initial phase of the 'action programme' tackled 
absenteeism and other forms of ineffective time and produced 
productivity increases under the following headings:
(a) Concessions - a reduction in the manhours 
lost at stopping and starting time, due to 
the introduction of 'bell to bell' working. 
Further manhour reductions occurred due to 
the introduction of control over the shop
stewards and the elimination of the
concession day arrangements.
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(b) Performance - a reduction in manhour losses 
associated with accidents, arising from a 
re-appraised approach to health and safety. 
Further manhour reductions were associated 
with quality improvements in welding and the 
elimination of factors inhibiting the full 
application of flexibility agreements.
(c) Manpower - an increase in the number of 
workers available for production arising from 
reduced absenteeism levels.
The issues tackled under each of these headings are spelled 
out in the following sections.
2. CONCESSIONS
The initial phase of the action programme made a significant 
impact on the manhour losses related to what was loosely 
termed as 'concessions' which arose in three areas of 
business, namely starting and stopping times, concession 
days and shop steward arrangements.
The principal aim of the 'action programme', was to recover 
these conceded manhours and, by so doing, increase the 
manhours available for productive use. However, the 'action 
programme' had further, not quite so evident but equally 
important aims, these being to bring about a change in the 
shipyards workers 'work ethic' and the introduction of a 
greater degree of managerial discipline and control over 
working hours.
The cornerstone of the programme was the introduction of a 
concept known as 'bell to bell working'. Quite simply this 
meant that the shipyard workers started work at the offical 
starting time and ended when the whistle blew.
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More time was devoted to productive work and significantly 
less time to tea breaks and walking to and from clocking in 
stations. This new working arrangement increased the time 
available for building ships by 20%. I.D.S. Report No. 606 
December 1991, indicated:-
"The company that Kvaerner bought from British 
Shipbuilders was paying its employees for a 39 
hours working week, but so many inefficiencies had 
been allowed to creep into the system that it was 
only getting the benefits of around 29."
Ironically, most of these inefficiencies were created as a 
result of bargaining concessions, the nature of which has 
been discussed previously in Chapter 11.
'Bell to bell working' was, therefore, the mechanism adopted 
by Kvaerner to provide the managerial control over the times 
at which shipyard workers started and ended work and thereby 
eliminate the conceded manhours and inefficiencies. In 
addition time clocks were moved from the main gates to the 
work areas where they were manned, at the beginning and the 
end of the shifts, by supervisors. They ensured that the 
shipyard workers were equipped for work before clocking on, 
and that the workers clocked only their own cards at the end 
of the shift. Supervisors were able to 'eyeball' their own 
workers at the start and end of the shifts and could also 
exercise a greater degree of managerial control and 
discipline over their workers activities.
These were clear signals to the shipyard workers that things 
had changed. They acknowledged that payments would only 
occur from the time they actually clocked-on in the 
workplace. As such, they initially had to travel from the 
main gate to the amenity areas, put on their safety 
equipment and make their way to the work areas in their own 
time. The process was reversed at the end of the shift.
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The bell to bell agreement also tackled the problems
associated with the 15 minute tea break which, in some
instances, extended to 45 minutes. Cydesider (Issue No. 17 
May 1990) explains:-
"During the morning shift employees can have a cup
of tea at their place of work. However, the
present practice of leaving the place of work and 
going to canteens or amenity areas will be 
discontinued as it trebles the amount of time 
taken for the tea break."
To support this part of the agreement a sufficient number of 
hot water urns were located in each of the work areas. The 
canteen areas were opened before working hours to enable the 
workers to purchase filled rolls but were then closed during 
working hours. The overall effect of the agreement was that 
the number of manhours lost due to the inefficiencies 
associated with stopping and starting times and tea breaks 
was reduced significantly.
According to the initial analysis of manpower utilisation 
the manhours available for productive work ranged between 28 
to 31 hours per week. Consequently, the starting point for 
measuring improvements, derived from the 1990 agreement, 
varied between the best estimate of 31 manhours out of the 
normal 39 per week, and the worst situation of 28 out of 3 9 
hours per week.
The 1990 agreement did, in fact, reduce the normal working 
week by 2 hours from 39 to 37 but, significantly, it 
increased the number of productive hours to 35 hours 2 0 
minutes. Only 1 hour 40 minutes were devoted to what could 
be loosely termed as 'concessions or lost manhours' and this 
comprised a 15 minute tea-break and 5 minute wash-up daily. 
The improved situation is illustrated in Figure 13.2.
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Figure 13.2
Based on the 'best estimate' scenario, there, was an 
increase of 14% in the number of productive hours and, in 
the worst case, the improvement was 26%. An improvement in 
'best estimate' terms was equivalent to 133,000 manhours 
and, in terms of the worst scenario, the improvement was in 
the region of 247,000 manhours - a significant improvement 
indeed.
Moreover, a further 40,000 manhours were made available when 
the three day concession system was withdrawn. The 
withdrawal recognised that reasonable arrangements for 
holidays, bereavement, jury service etc., existed outwith 
the concession day system.
The 1990 agreement also tackled the somewhat thorny and 
difficult problems related to the 70 shop stewards and the
50,000 manhours they devoted to trade union activities.
289.
Under the terms of the 1990 agreement, the manhours devoted 
to trade union duties were reduced from 50,000 to just over
10,000 per year. The weekly number of allowable manhours 
was established at 227 per week and, as illustrated in 
figure 13.3, the budget for 1991 was maintained.
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Figure 13.3
The 'actions' taken to address the manhour losses due to 
concessions were, therefore, successful and as the Managing 
Director earlier indicated, for the first time in many 
years, the company received full benefits from the 
agreement.
In addition to the considerable manhours savings, the 1990 
industrial relations agreement also brought about positive 
changes in the attitudes of the shipyard workers and the 
industrial relations climate generally in the shipyard.
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3. PERFORMANCE
Manpower actions, aimed at improving productivity were also 
evident in other areas of the business, in particular, 
health and safety, quality and flexibility agreements.
Health & Safety
Health and safety had long been a major cause for concern in 
the Govan shipyard. Indeed, workers had been accustomed to 
working in workplaces cluttered with cables and hoses. It 
had become commonplace for workers to leave debris behind on 
staging planks and it was the exception, rather than the 
rule, for a worker to wear protective safety equipment. The 
result was that accidents occurred on a regular basis.
At the very heart of this unacceptable situation were the 
attitudes of the shipyard workers, their supervisors and 
managers: negative attitudes which had their roots in the
age old problems of 'who does what'. Only this time the 
argument was not so much about 'whose job it was to clear 
the debris and move the cables', but more a statement that 
'it was not my job to do such menial tasks.'
The issue became so contentious that it became a major 
industrial relations issue and formed part of the 1989 I.R. 
Agreement. Clydesider Issue No.13, August 1989 stated
"All tradesmen will remove their own handable 
scrap or debris to assist with the cleaning of 
work areas. Platers/Shipwrights will now draw 
flex-welding equipment from the satellite stores, 
connect up at their work stations and return to 
store at the end of the job or shift."
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That this type of activity had to be underpinned by an 
agreement suggested that the injury or maiming of shipyard 
workers was, apparently, of lesser importance than the 
preservation of age old attitudes whereby tradesmen would 
not carry out tasks of an unskilled nature. A tradesman 
would rather take the risks associated with working in an 
untidy workplace and wait on a labourer to tidy up for him 
rather than clear or tidy up at the end of the shift or when 
their job was complete. The agreement did, at least, 
provide the initial mechanism to address the issue, but 
Kvaerner acknowledged that it would take much more than an 
industrial relations agreement to bring about an acceptable 
improvement.
Several key 'actions' were, therefore, activated to improve 
the situation. These 'actions' included - workshop clean 
ups, supervisory training, other forms of training for 
operators and craftsmen and the introduction of safety 
action teams. The role of the safety action teams was a 
particularly important aspect of the drive to change the 
negative attitudes and improve health and safety 
performance through direct involvement of the workforce. A 
statement from the Personnel and Employee Relations Director 
underlines this.
"The aim was to involve our shop floor employees, 
their foremen and managers and the safety
department in a more participative and active role 
in the health and safety arrangements for their 
work areas." (Gordon 1991).
Health and safety was an important part of the business 
and everyone had a role to play. That required action on 
the part of the employees in the work areas where the
problems existed. This was precisely what the action teams 
were aimed at. Talk had to be replaced by action - if the
work areas is untidy clear it up - if the job is unsafe make
it safe.
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The initiatives appeared to pay off and the health and 
safety performance, as measured firstly, by the number of 
first aid incidents and secondly, by the number of days lost 
as a result of accidents, improved dramatically. During 
1989, there was an average of one minor incident per 
employee, per month, requiring first aid treatment.
During 1990 and 1991 the situation improved considerably and 
by 1991, on average, an employee had 2.8 first aid incidents 
annually. This is illustrated in figure 13.4. According to 
the Personnel and Employee Relations Director.
"In 1991 our improvement is such that we have one 
fifth of the first aid accidents we used to have. 
During the same period the more serious accidents, 
as measured by the number of Mandays lost, has 
been cut by two thirds." (Gordon 1991).
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Figure 13.4
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Annual manhour losses reduced from 69,000 pre 1989 to 21,400 
(2,200 due to first aid incidents and 19,200 due to the more 
serious accidents).
Quality
There were, of course, other reasons put forward in Chapter 
12 for lost manhours, due to poor performance and the most 
obvious of these was the major quality problems associated 
with sub-standard welding workmanship. The welds had 
avoidable faults - slag inclusions, spatter, undercut and 
porosity.
The solution to this massive problem, which was responsible 
for an almost 300,000 manhour loss on ship 301 was, 
therefore, firstly to increase the competence of the welders 
and secondly, gain their commitment.
To increase the competence of the welders Kvaerner invested 
heavily in a major welder training initiative to ensure that 
the welders could carry out the tasks expected of them with 
confidence. The training programmes were a mixture of 
theory and practical training and one participant was quoted 
as having said:-
"This is the best training I have been through at 
the company. It is much more comprehensive and it 
definitely helps to know the reasons behind the 
course - to give a broader picture of the job 
required. So far it has solved a lot of problems 
for me - its like learning to swim yourself then 
someone else comes along and teaches you 
properly." (Sorbie 1990).
At the end of the training programme all participants had to 
pass two test plates which were inspected by the external 
inspection authorities. Successful participants were 
thereafter classified as 'A' class welders.
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Kvaerner believed that at least 70% of the welders should be 
'A' class and it would be these welders who would be 
allocated work on the highly critical areas of the ship, 
the low temperature steelwork and the critical X-ray work. 
These were the areas of the ship where the welding quality 
problems were most acute and where the vast majority of the
300,000 manhours were lost in ship 301.
The target figure for class 'A' welders was achieved and is 
illustrated in figure 13.5.
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Figure 13.5
In addition to increasing the competence of the in-company 
welder resources a secondary problem existed. To meet 
production demands the company had to numerically increase 
the number of welders employed, this to ensure that firstly, 
production programmes were maintained while welders were 
being released from production to take part in training and 
secondly to meet the increased welding demand due to the 
high level of rework.
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The short term solution was to employ 'agency welders', 
craftsmen who were reputed to be 'top of the range' welders 
with experience of sophisticated constructions and whose 
costs to the company were 3 to 4 times greater than simply 
employing welders directly. At its peak some 100 agency 
welders were engaged by Kvaerner at an additional cost of 
over £1 million.
This move to engage 'agency welders' was, of course, 
'unpopular' and created industrial relations unrest. It is, 
however, a credit to the new industrial relation framework 
that economic reality prevailed. After detailed discussions 
with the welders' shop stewards, the management of Kvaerner 
committed themselves to recruiting local unemployed welders 
who had to successfully participate on a pre-employment 
training and testing programme supported under the 
Government's scheme for the unemployed.
Given that it was important not to 'import' further welder 
quality problems, the pre-employment training and testing 
programme ensured that the welders, many of whom had not 
worked for several months or years and were not capable of 
working to the quality demands of the sophisticated 
construction standards of the L.P.Gs, were brought up to 
that standard before recruitment. The Senior Welding 
Instructor explained:-
"The idea is to get welders who have been working 
as temps or who have been away from their trade 
back to work. We will take them on first as Grade 
'B' welders before bringing them up to Grade 'A' 
standard. (Fraser 1990).
The timescale for replacing the 'agency welders' was set at 
6 months and the initiative, as illustrated in figure 13.6, 
was a major success in that all agency welders were replaced 
within a 4 month time frame.
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Figure 13.6
These training initiatives ensured that the Kvaerner 
internal welder resources and those recruited externally,had 
the competence to carry out their tasks with confidence, but 
while it did solve the problem of competence it did not 
entirely solve the problem of commitment.
This was tackled under another initiative which involved the 
introduction of a quality related performance bonus. To 
gain this bonus, which represented an additional payment of 
5% of earnings, the welder had to be classified as 'A' 
class, be working on critical work, be monitored on an 
individual basis and had to achieve at least a 92% quality 
performance.
This was a break from the traditions of the past two or more 
decades. Since the days of the 'Fairfield Experiment' 
collectivism had replaced individualism. Individual 
incentive and payments had been replaced by a notion that 
'we are all Jock Tamson's bairns' and, as such, should all 
be treated and paid the same. Individual monitoring had 
been frowned on.
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Kvaerner's initiative set these traditions to the side and 
was driven by two main factors. Firstly, the pride of the 
welder who valued the recognition that his 'A' class 
classification afforded him and the knowledge that a quality 
performance of less than 92% would alter this 
classification. Secondly, the incentive to increase 
earnings by 5%.
The initiative aimed at improving the quality performance 
appeared to work. According to the Quality Manager,
"There has been a 58% improvement in welding 
quality from ship 301 to 302. Furthermore, at the 
current stage of 3 03 there has been a further 51% 
improvement from ship 302." (McPherson 1991).
Almost 3 00,000 manhours were lost on ship 3 01 due to poor 
quality performance, the improvement on 3 02 reduced the 
manhour losses to 126,000 and still further to 61,740 on 
ship 303.
Flexibility "
The manhour losses associated with what was termed as the 
'poor performance' evident in the application of flexibility 
agreements virtually disappeared. This was principally due 
to the new, more disciplined and controlled approach to 
industrial reations adopted by Kvaerner. In particular the 
communication systems introduced to take the mystique out of 
the industrial relations process ensured that everyone in 
the shipyard fully understood the I.R. Agreements, their 
aims, the reasons for the change and their role in the 
change process. Furthermore, the redefinition of the shop 
stewards' role ensured that the shipyard workers, their 
supervisors and managers applied agreements uninhibited.
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Platers and shipwrights connected up their own burning and 
welding equipment rather than wait on the services of 
others. Caulkers changed their own grinding discs instead 
of queuing at stores for hours to have their discs changed 
by others, welders moved their own exhaust and ventilation 
trunks and all shipyard workers, when required to do so, 
operated the hydraulic lifts without the assistance of a 
stager.
4. ABSENTEEISM
Absenteeism at the Govan shipyard reached an all time low of 
6% in the second half of 1991. This contrasts starkly with 
1989 when absenteeism was rife running at an alarming 22%. 
which created havoc with production schedules and added 
significantly to costs.
The absenteeism levels for the period 1989 to 1991 are 
illustrated in figure 13.7.
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Figure 13.7
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According to the Personnel Director,
"If the company was to survive in the world market 
place we had to have people here to build ships to 
cost and on time. It was obvious that absenteeism 
had to be tackled head on if we were to succeed." 
(Gordon 1991) .
Some of the 'actions' taken by Kvaerner to tackle the 
problems were - the tightening up of the sick pay procedures 
more stringent controls through the disciplinary
procedures - the expansion of the occupational health 
programme to assist employees to return to work - a major 
health and safety drive to prevent lost time through
accidents and a qualification that overtime premium payments 
would only be paid for hours worked beyond 37 in any week.
Kvaerner took the view that absence would only be tolerable 
within the rules of the sickness and disciplinary
procedures. Employees were supported for a maximum of 4 
sickness absences per year and any further absences regarded 
as absenteeism. In some instances sickness absence* was 
measured in days, while in others it stretched to months. 
The total period of support was, however, related to the 
employees length of service.
Company sickness payments were withdrawn from temporary 
employees and restricted to permanent workers with six 
months service or more. Unauthorised absences of more than 
one and a half days per month was regarded as a disciplinary 
offence, as was 5 latenesses - while employees who were 
absent from work for one week, without notification, were 
dismissed.
The occupational health initiative, on the other hand, was 
aimed at assisting employee's to return to work. They took 
the form of visits to the employee's home and weekly 
surgeries in company for employees with a period of absence 
greater than one working week.
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Company sickness support was made or withdrawn on the basis 
of medical assessments and employees who refused to attend 
surgeries had their sickness support withdrawn.
Furthermore, in order to overcome the problems of what was 
loosely termed as the 'Monday Club'- the employees who 
worked a Sunday and were paid premium rate, then took the 
Monday off - a provision was introduced into the overtime 
payment arrangements, that the first 37 hours worked in any 
week was paid at the normal hourly rate and only hours 
worked beyond 3 7 attracted premium payments. This meant 
that the 'Monday Club' employees were paid for their Sunday 
work at their normal rate and not at an overtime premium 
rate.
These measures, together with the great improvements in the 
yard's long term prospects, brought about by the four ship 
order and the prospects of job security, greatly improved 
the absenteeism performance over a sustained period. By the 
latter part of 1991, the absenteeism levels had reached an 
all time low of 6%. (120 employees were off work daily
compared with 44 0 when the level of absenteeism was running 
at 22%).
Production schedules were easier to maintain, recruitment of 
labour to progress work in the absence of the missing 440 
employees was significantly reduced, and the associated 
costs lessened considerably. The sickness costs of 
supporting absent employees, estimated in chapter 12 as 
£0.75 million annually, was also reduced - as illustrated in 
figure 13.8.
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Figure 13.8
The reduction in costs associated with sickness support 
payments was significant from an average of 1.26 hours pay 
per employee in January 1989 to an average of 0.5 in 
December 1991. Based on a labour force of 2,000 employees 
and an hourly rate of £5.81, this means that the weekly 
costs of supporting sick pay was reduced from £14,643.24 to 
£5.810.
The overall effect of the 'actions' were that the shipyard 
workers at Govan were more committed to turning up to build 
ships on a regular basis. Their attitude to the discipline 
of work, on a regular committed basis, changed and this had 
a consequential effect on the shipyard's competitive 
situation by reducing the costs of building ships.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that phase one of 
the 'action programme' provided a solid and disciplined 
foundation on which the Govan shipyard could build a 
competitive future. Solid in the sense that the 'actions' 
removed decades of decay and inefficiencies in terms of 
manpower policies and working practices. Disciplined from 
the point of view that the 'action programme' was part of a 
well thought out three stage manpower strategy aimed at 
transforming the hitherto uncompetitive shipyard into a 
viable shipbuilding operation.
The proposition that 'actions' could remove inefficiencies 
in manpower policies and working practices was not unique to 
Kvaerner - far from it. However, what was distinctive about 
the Kvaerner approach was that the 'action programme' was 
aggressively implemented by local management determined to 
succeed. The 'actions' did substantially impact on the 
shipyard's productivity and, as indicated in figure 13.9,
increased considerably the manhours available for building
ships. ■4:
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Figure 13. 9
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But there was much more to it than this. In quantitative 
terms management were now more in command and accepted to be 
so by the workforce. There was a greater discipline in the 
operation. Important agreements were being put into effect 
without inhibitions and the work ethic was showing signs of 
change.
What was happening in analytical terms was that:
i) the management's confidence increased. This 
based on the fact that the analysis had given 
them understanding and quantification of 
problems.
ii) the new management were finding its feet, 
pointing in new directions and recognising 
the scope for profitability.
iii) the workforce were beginning to recognise 
this managerial confidence and competence. 
Attitudes were changing and a basis for trust 
was being established.
iv) quality workmanship was being restored and 
greater task flexibility.
v) an acceptance of boundaries for collective 
bargaining and the redefinition of 
management's right (and responsibility) to 
manage.
In terms of the conceptual model, some element of the 
flexible firm's were evident but, perhaps, this was not the 
key characteristic.
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CHAPTER 14: KVAERNER GOVAN'S ACTION PROGRAMME
PHASE TWO
1. THE ACTIONS
The second phase of the 'action programme' addressed the 
problems of how best to use or organise the shipyard's
manhours and manpower. The actions are summarised in Figure
14.1.
A C TIO N  PR O G R A M M E
P H A S E  TW O
A C TIO N  A R E A S A C T IO N S
1. O R G A N ISA T IO N  O F  H O U R S •
W o rk in g  S h if ts In t ro d u c e  m a n a g e m e n t  c o n tro l le d  
s h i f t  w o rk in g  a r r a n g e m e n t  s u i te d  
to  p ro d u c tio n  a n d  c o n t r a c tu a l  
d e m a n d s .
O v e r t im e  W o rk in g - M o v e  c o n tro l  o f  o v e r tim e  w o rk in g  
fro m  s h o p  s t e w a r d s  to  m a n a g e m e h t .
2 . M A N P O W E R  O R G A N ISA TIO N
B u r e a u c r a t ic  S t r u c tu r e F la t te n  o r g a n is a t io n  s t r u c tu r e  a n d  
re -a lig n  s u p p o r t  d e p a r tm e n t s  w ith  
p ro d u c tio n  d e p a r tm e n t s .
S u p e r v is o r y /M a n a g e m e n t R e -d e f in e  In d iv id u a l r o le s  w ith in  
f la t te r  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  s u p p o r t  
in d iv id u a ls  w ith  tra in in g .
SOURCE: Gordon (1992)
Figure 14.1
Addressing these problems was the major feature of the 1991 
Industrial Relations Agreement, the principal aim of which 
was to reorganise the resources of the shipyard to suit the 
customers product and workload.
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"1990 therefore has been a year when we have 
started to eliminate inefficiencies and laid 
a solid more disciplined foundation for the 
future. We plan in 1991, to build on this 
foundation and create a competitive 
shipyard." (Draegebo 1990).
The 'range of actions', particularly those associated with 
working hours were regarded as contentious and struck at the 
very heart of what remained of the shipyard's traditional 
and shop steward controlled working practices. The action 
programme involved:-
(a) Creating a three shift working arrangement 
more suited to product demands and a 
competitive shipyard environment.
These arrangements would provide a suitable 
time frame for weld X-Ray and plant 
maintenance, this without inhibiting 
production programmes and thereby enable 
management to productively resource plant, 
equipment and machinery on shifts more suited 
to contractual demands. Control of overtime 
working and the selection of employees to 
work overtime would be transferred from shop 
stewards to management.
(b) Creating a flatter more decentralised 
organisation structure by eliminating several 
layers of management and re-aligning support 
departments such as planning and loft with 
the production function. The roles of 
supervisors and managers within the new 
structure would be redefined and supported 
with training aimed at improving their 
individual and collective performance.
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These actions were aimed at removing the 
bureaucracy associated with the organisation 
structure and, thereby, improving supervisory 
management accountability for manpower and 
manpower utilisation.
The magnitude of the increased shipyard efficiency directly 
related to the actions incorporated in phase two of the 
Kvaerner Govan action programme will be the subject of the 
following sections of this chapter.
2. THE ORGANISATION DISPUTE
Two aspects of organisation namely, shift working patterns 
and overtime working arrangements, both the subject of shop 
steward control, had been identified by the shipyard 
managers and supervisors as being problematic and 
contentious. The shop stewards, not management, controlled 
shift and overtime working times and the rota system that 
determined the shipyard workers who could and those who 
could not work. *
This unsatisfactory situation was summarised by the 
Personnel Director when he stated:-
"Anyone who has been working in the yard over the 
last 12 months realises that our present 
arrangements are unsatisfactory. We have had 
dayshift working, nightshift working, double 
dayshift working, three shift working and even a 
special backshift, all of which resulted in chaos 
and confusion." (Gordon 1991).
Replacing these chaotic shift working patterns with a more 
disciplined and regular working arrangement designed to meet 
the special needs of the sophisticated ships being built in 
the shipyard and to improve communications between the 
shifts was one of the far reaching actions incorporated in 
phase two of the programme.
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Such a shift working arrangement, as embodied in the 1991 
Industrial Relations Agreement, struck at the very heart of 
one of the shipyards remaining traditional working practices 
and resulted in the shipyard workforce taking strike action.
It had long been a tradition in the shipyard for the vast 
majority of the workforce to operate on a dayshift basis. 
They augmented their earnings by working two nights late and 
a Sunday morning. A minority, about 20%, worked nightshift 
and their working week was restricted to four nights. They 
also augmented their earnings by working two nights late and 
a Sunday afternoon. Indeed, the four hour period between 
the end of dayshift and the start of nightshift was nicely 
divided up, the first two hours being dayshift overtime 
hours and the second two hours being the nightshift overtime 
hours. This was part of the traditional culture whereby 
shipbuilding was regarded as an industry where 2 nights late 
and a Sunday were part of the regular working week and 
available at will to the shipyard workers.
The other shift patterns in the shipyard were manned on a 
voluntary basis and still came under the control of the 'shop 
steward movement. The shop stewards dictated the shift 
times and it was they who supplied management with the lists 
of suitable volunteers. Additional payments were made to 
encourage the voluntary process but, inevitably, it was 
difficult to attract suitable volunteers. As a result many 
of the shifts were unbalanced and ineffective. Steel units 
could not be erected on board the ship due to a lack of 
crane drivers, units were not welded due to an imbalance of 
welders. Shifts overlapped and there was a shortage of 
equipment. In other words the situation was chaotic and 
confused.
The move to change the shift pattern was perceived to be 
a further challenge to the traditional values of the 
shipyard.
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The proposed new shift patterns, in their opinion, would 
disturb the status quo and midweek overtime earnings could 
be affected. The shop stewards would no longer control the 
shift times or volunteer lists. Employees would be expected 
to work unsociable backshifts.
It was against this background that the new shift patterns 
were initially rejected and the workforce chose instead to 
strike. Thus, according to a statement from the Personnel 
Director, the future of the company was placed in jeopardy:-
"After all the hard work and changes that have 
taken place over the last year, we now stand on 
the threshold of transforming what was an 
uncompetitive shipyard into one which can compete 
successfully in the shipbuilding market place. It 
seems, therefore, illogical that we are prepared 
to throw all this away and threaten the company's 
future viability by taking strike action over 
issues which, on the surface, appear to be 
reasonable proposals." (Gordon 1991).
*
The 'actions' to be incorporated in the 1991 Agreement, 
including the shift working patterns, were regarded by the 
Personnel and Employee Relations Director as being vital to 
the future viability of the shipyard. The yard was at the 
high end of the technology market. Its products were 
sophisticated and to construct such vessels satisfactorily, 
within budget and within the time constraints, necessitated 
changes to the traditional practices and, in particular, 
changes to the shop steward controlled voluntary shift 
systems and overtime working arrangements.
By virtue of the far reaching actions associated with Phase 
One of the action programme, the viability of the shipyard 
was within touching distance, but it could not be achieved 
under the status quo.
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Delivery times would become unreliable and economic targets 
would not be achieved. As such, in the opinion of the 
Personnel Director, the 1991 Agreement was crunch time for 
the Govan shipyard. All the work of the past year would be 
for nothing if the Agreement could not be concluded. A 
strike would be unhelpful.
Unhelpful or not, the strike did take place, ironically, 
against the recommendations of the shop stewards and the 
full time trade union officials who were realistic enough to 
recognise the problems. Indeed, the shop stewards and 
management had, during negotiations, agreed that there were 
profound problems with the prevailing shift and overtime 
arrangements and accepted that the arrangements had to 
change.
A range of options were discussed on a give and take basis 
with management moving away from their preferred shift 
option of two production shifts between the hours of 7.3 0 
a.m. to 11.15 p.m. followed by a third shift between the
hours of 11.15 p.m. to 7.3 0 a.m. devoted to weld X-Ray and
plant maintenance. Management believed that this ^hift 
arrangement would improve communications and continuity 
between production shifts and, by so doing, increase
shipyard efficiency. It also had the logic of X-Raying 
welding after a full day's production work.
They accepted instead the shop stewards' proposed compromise 
of a production shift starting at 7.30 a.m. followed by a 
support X-Ray type backshift and a second production shift 
starting at 11.3 0 p.m. and operating over 5 nights. The 
shop stewards, in promoting the compromise, believed that 
the backshift would be socially unpopular and, therefore, 
difficult to resource. Logically this shift should be used 
for X-Ray and maintenance, where the number of employees
required to work was small.
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The workforce rejected the shop stewards proposals and opted 
instead to take industrial strike action, an option promoted 
by what could be loosely termed as the unofficial voices. 
These were the voices of employees, many of whom were former 
shop stewards, who had lost their official positions when 
the shop stewards numbers were reduced form 70 to 20. They 
held the view that 'things had gone too far' and the belief 
that 'the clock should be turned back'.
In a sense, this rejection and the option to take strike 
action was, perhaps, the most critical stage of the Kvaerner 
Govan manpower strategy. It challenged the economic 
reality, accountability and credibility of the industrial 
relations framework and the authority of the management and 
the shop stewards. As such it was a challenge that had to 
be taken up if the strategy was to achieve its aim of 
transforming the uncompetitive shipyard into a viable 
shipbuilding operation, based on workable industrial 
relationships.
The strike did take place on Friday 17th May 1991 and lasted 
two weeks. At the end of the first week management issued 
dismissal notices to all striking employees for breach of 
contract. This action brought matters to a head. The 
agenda changed and moved away from discussions on shift
patterns and concentrated instead on conditions associated 
with job reinstatement.
For many the strike was a watershed in that the workforce, 
as represented by the unofficial voices, finally recognised 
that the management of the shipyard were determined and
would not be distracted by strike threats from taking
contentious actions, particularly actions that they believed 
would increase shipyard efficiency. It was a watershed,
also from the point of view that the shop stewards 
credibility and authority was enhanced, at the expense of 
the discredited, unofficial voices who had created the 
dispute which cost the workforce two weeks wages.
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In fact only weeks after the dispute the twenty shop 
stewards, who participated with management in the
negotiations, were re-elected by their departments to 
continue to represent their views.
3. ORGANISATIONAL ACTIONS
The resolution of the organisational dispute saw the
adoption of the 1991 Industrial Relations Agreement which 
had a twenty one month duration and was associated with 
actions aimed at increasing the efficient use of working 
hours. These were embodied in an Agreement which increased 
the pay of the workforce by 6.2% in year one and a further 
4.4% in year two. The principal action was associated with 
shift working arrangements which, following further
discussions with the shop stewards, was based on the 
original management option and had an element of compulsion. 
This was a clear signal to the workforce that the shop 
stewards compromise had been rejected, and once rejected, no 
longer part of the bargaining process. Management's initial 
proposals now prevailed.
The new arrangement made a significant impact on shipyard 
efficiency. The Managing Director subsequently summarises 
this as follows:-
"A major benefit of the shift pattern embodied in 
the 1991 Agreement is that communications between 
the dayshift and the backshift is vastly improved. 
Previously, most time was lost due to a lack of 
contact between dayshift and nightshift and with 
the new agreement the X-Ray programme is now on 
target - thanks to the introduction of a third 
shift and this also allows for much quicker 
feedback on any quality problems coming through so 
that these can be dealt with straight away." 
(Draegebo 1991).
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The shift working arrangement introduced as part of the 
Phase Two action programme is illustrated in Figure 14.2.
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SOURCE: Bisset (IS 91)
Figure 14.2
Quite simply, a majority of the workforce continued to 
operate on that dayshift and a substantial minority, 
approximately 40% operated on backshift. The Agreement 
removed the shop stewards control over shift working times 
and also removed their role in producing lists of 
volunteers. Resourcing shifts became a management 
responsibility and while the preferred option was to 
resource shifts with volunteers management could, if the 
voluntary option failed, use a compulsion as a solution. 
Of the 650 employees required to resource the backshift, all 
but 35 were volunteers. The 3 5 non-volunteers operated on a 
four week on - four week off basis.
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The introduction of the new shift working arrangement 
increased the continuous productive working day from 7.3 0 
a.m. to 11.15 p.m. The shifts were structured back to back 
to ensure contact between shift workers and to allow 
supervisors and managers to discuss the on-going workload. 
Many manhours hitherto lost between the end of dayshift and 
the start up of nightshift, as cited earlier by the Managing 
Director, were recovered and the continuing dialogue between 
the supervisory/management staff ensured that the production 
unit was working to one common objective.
The third shift, the nightshift, was utilised to support the 
X-Ray programme and ensured that this vital work could be 
carried out uninhibited. This was particularly important 
from a safety point of view and allowed X-Rays to be carried 
out at times when the workforce were away from the shipyard. 
The X-Ray results, under the new arrangement, were fed back 
to production management at the start of the morning 
production shift. This ensured that quality problems were 
addressed before staging and equipment was moved and, in the 
case of operator error, before the operator created further 
quality problems. The third shift was also utilised* for 
maintenance purposes and was available to tackle production 
overloads providing, of course, that the X-Ray programme in 
that area would be uninhibited.
The 1991 Agreement also tackled the problems associated with 
overtime working arrangements, an activity which, as 
indicated previously, was organised by the shop stewards. 
It was they who decided the shipyard workers who would work 
overtime. The result of this arrangement was that 
attendance, during overtime working, at 48% of management 
expectation was poor. The prevailing arrangement also meant 
that many manhours were lost as workers moved from one part 
of the yard to work their overtime in another part of the 
shipyard where the work was unfamiliar to them.
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The 1991 Agreement removed this arrangement and placed 
responsibility for overtime working and the selection of 
those required to work firmly under the control of the 
supervisors and managers. It was they who decided, on the 
basis of skill, performance, attendance and work 
requirements, the shipyard workers who would work overtime. 
Since the inception of the agreement, overtime working 
attendance at 95%, has been good. Those working overtime 
have been the same workers who were working on the jobs 
during the normal week. This was a move away from a 
situation where overtime was shared on a common basis to one 
where overtime was done by those whose job really required 
it. It also meant that the skills and knowledge required 
for the job were on tap for management and eliminated the 
need to import manpower from one area of the shipyard to 
another.
Summing up, it was evident that significant changes were 
taking place in the shipyard as a result of the actions 
emanating from this stage of the programme. These included:
(i) important additional contributions to * 
effective use of manpower.
(ii) management willingness to confront resistance 
to change to the extent that they faced up to 
the consequences of strike action.
(iii)shop steward's authority was under challenge 
from a section of the shop floor workforce 
but emerged reinforced after the strike.
(iv) management regaining control over workers 
overtime allocation.
(v) management succeeded in adopting a shift 
working patterns to modern requirements.
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4. BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE
The organisational problems of the shipyard included those 
associated with the costly bureaucratic organisational 
structure, where four tiers of managers operated between the 
Production Director and the supervisor. This structure 
inhibited effective communication and performance was 
restricted by confused job roles. It was a structure, 
particularly during nationalisation, often by-passed by the 
powerful shop stewards movement and where management 
decisions were constantly challenged and overturned, a 
structure that lacked authority and accountability and, as 
such, was regarded as ineffective.
Kvaerner's organisational 'actions', incorporated in phase 
two of the action programme, initially introduced a range of 
measures, including flattening the structure,
decentralisation, role definition and supervisory/management 
training, as a means of addressing these problems. The 
flatter structure was achieved in the production function, 
for example by eliminating three layers of managers, leaving 
only one level of production management between * the 
Production Director and supervisors, as indicated in figure 
14.3.
KVAERNER ORGANISATION STRUCTURE
DIRECTOR
MANAGERS
SUPERVISORS
SOURCE: Bisset (1992)
Figure 14.3
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At the remaining managerial level (the middle tiers), 
functions were allocated, according to pre-determined work 
areas. The steelwork function, for example, was sub-divided 
into four work areas with one production manager responsible 
for each area, the Preparation and Sub Assembly, the 
Fabrication Shop, the Tank Assembly area and the Berth. 
This structure illustrated in Figure 14.4.
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SOURCE: Bisset (1992)
Figure 14.4
In addition to steelwork, production managers were appointed 
for each of the pre-determined work areas associated with 
pipe/mechanical, electrical, joinery and service function. 
The production managers were supported by supervisors or 
foremen, as they were titled in the shipyard, whose role was 
changed to reflect that of a first line manager. As such, 
they were the controllers of manpower, minutes, methods, 
materials and machines.
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To support the new leaner organisation structure, several 
hitherto centralised functions were decentralised. The 
planning, loft and maintenance functions the tools of 
production, were placed under the direct control of the 
Production Director. Repetition and duplication of effort 
within these functions was eliminated.
The organisation was production cost centre driven and based 
on the theory that the customer pays only for the end 
product and all other functions were merely tools to be 
called off when required by the producer of the product. 
These organisation measures reduced the number of staff 
employees employed in support and managerial functions from 
588 to 330 and, as such, had a positive influence on 
overhead costs. However, the sting in the tail was that 
production, as controllers of the other functions, could no 
longer apportion blame to the centralised support functions 
for production delays. Accountability lay squarely with the 
production function, its managers and its supervisors.
Moreover, given that the production managers and foremen had 
participated in the process of developing and implemerfting 
the manpower measures, which were incorporated in the action 
programmes, they had been provided with most of the tools 
essential for success. The constraints to effective 
manpower utilisation had been removed. The problems of the 
hitherto powerful shop stewards movement were resolved. The 
industrial relations environment was conducive to change, 
their job roles had been defined and responsibility and 
authority delegated to the lowest level of the structure.
Significantly, however, Kvaerner acknowledged that 
notwithstanding these changes, the managers and foremen who 
accepted the positions of authority in the structure were, 
basically, the same employees who had managed the shipyard 
prior to 1988.
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They tended to be employees who were products of what could 
loosely be termed as an 'incestuous system' whereby external 
recruitment was discouraged and, therefore, the positions of 
supervisors and managers filled by internal means. The 
result of this was that Govan managers and foremen had not 
been exposed to the harsh realities of the commercial world 
and few had any effective supervisory/management training or 
qualifications.
Moreover, the role of the foremen and managers had changed 
considerably in two or more decades of shipbuilding and, in 
particular during nationalisation. This was due to the 
centralised and bureaucratic organisational structures. 
They were no longer regarded as the 'king pins' of the 
industry, the people who could influence earning and 
employment prospects. The supervisory role had, in most 
instances, changed to that of a progress chaser. It lacked 
status, authority and credibility and those recruited to the 
positions were reflective of the nationalised industry's low 
expectations and perceptions of the role.
This was not to say that talent did not exist within* the 
supervisory management ranks. Of course it did, and the 
excellent quality ships produced, at Govan, served as a 
testament to that talent. The point was that these 
supervisors and managers, notwithstanding their technical 
competence, much of which they brought to the job, could not 
produce their quality ships to budget. They lacked 
competence in various aspects of the supervisory/management 
activities, which they did not perceive as being part of 
their job and for which they were neither trained or 
qualified.
Indeed, as has been discussed earlier, the shipbuilding 
industry's approach to supervisory/management training was 
poor. They thought little about investing vast sums of 
money on the training of apprentices yet did little about 
training supervisors and managers.
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Supervisors, even in 1988, continued to be a product of the 
"weekend miracles". They were part of the craft and trade 
structure on the Friday and a vital member of management on 
the Monday. Kvaerner changed this. They believed that 
effective supervisory/management performance was of 
paramount importance in terms of shipyard viability. A 
vital ingredient of this was competent, well trained 
supervisory/ management staff. Accordingly, a
supervisory/management training initiative was established. 
I.D.S. (report 606 1991) stated:-
"The company has introduced the National 
Examination Board for Supervisory Management
(N.E.B.S.M.) qualifications into supervisory 
training. All supervisors are currently trained 
on-site in an open learning basis as are a number 
of people who aspire to become supervisors of the 
future."
The training introduced by Kvaerner was work related and 
included units of training associated with budgetary 
control, communications, leadership and health and safety
amongst others. These were all areas of the business where 
supervisory skills and knowledge was limited and where 
company performance was regarded as poor.
The principal aim was to improve supervisory performance by 
ensuring that the supervisors were trained on all aspects of 
their job. This was defined to include the areas where they 
had no previous experience and for which they were now 
accountable. The company was underlining its concern to 
deploy well trained and qualified supervisors as a vital 
ingredient of organisational efficiency.
Initially, the training was directed at the existing 
production supervisors. The 104 incumbents had received
little by way of effective supervisory training and had 
little by way of professional supervisory management 
qualifications.
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The training initiative, thereafter, was extended to include 
the supervisors and managers in the commercial and technical 
areas of the company. In total, therefore, 154
supervisory/management staff were committed to an 
introductory training programme consisting of the 5 training 
units, discussed earlier, leadership, supervisory authority, 
communication, budgetary control and Health & Safety.
This part of the training programme was compulsory. 
However, given that the vast majority of the participants 
were taking part in this type of supervisory management 
training and education for the first time, the company did 
not expect all participants to complete the introduction 
stage successfully. They took the view that, in educational 
terms, success would be achieved if 80% of the participants 
gained the introductory award and, as illustrated in 14.5, 
this target was achieved.
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Figure 14.5
321.
The successful candidates were awarded the introductory 
certificate in Supervisory Management by the National 
Examination Board. The majority continued on a two year 
programme aimed at gaining full certification. Those who 
were unsuccessful or who did not continue in the programme 
did so in the knowledge that further promotion was no longer 
available to them.
Significantly, most of the training was done at home with 
only a 2 hour tutorial session once every three weeks, 
carried out on site at Kvaerner. The tutorials were 
arranged to suit the working shifts operating in the yard. 
Dayshift supervisors attending dayshift tutorials and 
nightshift attending tutorials arranged during their shift. 
In addition, a further supervisory/management training 
initiative was aimed at potential supervisors, the employees 
who were being groomed for future supervisory positions.
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This was to ensure that, prior to promotion to a supervisory 
post, the employee had received appropriate training and, in 
this way, the weekend miracle was avoided. In total, some 
60 employees operating in the production, commercial and 
technical departments of the company, participated in this 
programme and, as indicated in figure 14.6, their
performance toward achievement of the introductory 
certificate was good.
Notwithstanding the merits of the educational qualification 
associated with the training, the principal aim of this 
initiative was, of course, to raise the performance level of 
supervisors and management. The recently appointed 
Procurement Director stated
"We believe that this qualification will greatly 
assist managers and foremen in the company to 
carry out their supervisory duties in the
workplace with added confidence and commitment." 
(Bateman 1991).
5. CONCLUSIONS
The second phase of the Kvaerner Govan 'action programme'had 
two. key characteristics. First, the programme aimed at 
increasing the efficiency of shift and overtime working
hours and struck at the very heart of what remained of the 
shipyard's traditional practices and values. Second, it 
focussed on structures, in seeking to eliminate the costly 
and inefficient bureaucratic supervisory management 
structure whose principal function was to organise the
shipyard's manpower.
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At one level of analysis, this phase of the 'action 
programme' was all about 'fine tuning'. The actions 
associated with the programme's initial phase had recovered 
the manhours management and hitherto conceded to 
non-productive activities and removed manpower inhibitions. 
This had effectively increased the manhour and manpower 
resources available for productive work, influenced the 
shipyard's work ethics and tackled the problems of 
managerial discipline and control over manpower resources. 
Phase Two was concerned with how best to organise the 
shipyard's new increased manhours and manpower to best suit 
the products being built and the construction programme, 
taking account of the plant, equipment and facilities 
available in the shipyard.
The perception that Phase Two was 'fine tuning' does not 
detract from its importance. There would, in fact, be 
little point in increasing manhours and manpower 
availability if the problems of how best to use it remained. 
To that extent Phase Two was critical and, in a sense, was 
rather akin to the 'fine tuning' of a high power racing car. 
The car owner invests heavily in powerful resources to 
compete with the world's best but unless these resources are 
'fine tuned' they will be sluggish and will not produce 
maximum efficiency. Kvaerner were, therefore, aiming to 
fine tune their powerful resources to compete efficiently 
with the world's best in the international market place, by 
ensuring that the shipyard's most powerful resource, that of 
manpower, was being used most effectively.
The Phase Two actions included:-
(a) Control of shift and overtime working hours
and the selection of the shipyard workers to 
work moving from the shop stewards - moving 
from the shop stewards to management. 
Responsibility and control was placed in the 
hands of the people best suited to getting 
maximum performance.
324.
(b) The introduction of a disciplined three shift 
working arrangement ensured that the custom 
and practice of working hours was replaced by 
an organisation that was product or customer 
based. Thus it was more capable of meeting 
the demands of an efficient and competitive 
shipyard environment.
The actions were contentious and evoked a reaction from the 
workforce and ultimately led to a two week strike.
Arguably, however, the strike was not really about shift and 
overtime working arrangements there was another hidden 
agenda. This interpretation is supported by the ease by 
which the shift and overtime working arrangements were 
introduced and the fact that the backshift was resourced, in 
the main, by volunteers. The fact was that the strike was 
the platform to enable the unofficial voices to vent their 
disapproval of what was going on in the shipyard. It was a 
last gasp effort on their part to turn the clock back to the 
'good old days' with all of the inefficiencies that entailed
and a bid to regain the powerful base they previously
occupied. The folly of this 'yellow brick road' scenario
was, however, cruelly exposed during the strike and economic 
reality prevailed.
The evidence also suggests that the reorganisation of the 
costly and inefficient bureaucratic supervisory management 
structure increased shipyard efficiency in terms of manpower 
organisation in that:-
(a) If viewed simply from a cost basis the 
elimination of three layers of management 
reduced staffing levels and, as such, staff 
overhead costs. In fact, the reduction in 
overheads was significant given that support 
staff was reduced from 588 to 380.
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These reductions were, however, only half the 
story: the reduced overheads now supported
2.5 million manhours, which now build two as 
distinct from one ship per year.
(b) It improved communications, effectiveness and 
performance of supervisory management staff 
by redefining the job roles in the new 
flatter organisational structure. In effect 
the supervisors and managers were told what 
was expected of them, their key outputs and 
the support they would have from the company. 
Included in the support was a structured 
training programme aimed at equipping them 
with the type of supervisory management 
skills their redefined jobs required.
It would be reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the 
phase two action programme increased organisational 
efficiency in terms of working hour and manpower 
organisation and it was a vital link of the manpower 
strategy aimed at transferring the hitherto uncompetitive 
Govan Shipyard into a viable Kvaerner Govan Shipyard.
6. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE STRATEGY
The overall aim of the Kvaerner strategy was, of course, to 
transform the uncompetitive Govan shipyard into a 
competitive, viable, shipbuilding operation. This to be 
achieved principally by reducing, by approximately 50%, the 
manhour content of building ships at Govan. Kvaerner, 
however, recognised that a reduction of this magnitude would 
not be achieved overnight. Equipment, plant, machinery and 
facilities had to be installed. A range of far reaching 
manpower actions had to be developed and implemented. The 
negative counter-productive attitudes of the shipyard 
workers, their supervisors and managers had to be overcome 
and economic realities had to prevail. The culture of the 
workplace had to change.
326.
Kvaerner believed that a two year time frame was appropriate 
to set in place the individual components of the strategy 
and, thereafter, predicted that the shipyard would cease to 
be a loss maker one year later. To achieve these targets 
the Govan Shipyard had to build their ships at what could be 
termed as competitive levels. In market terms, competitive 
shipyards constructed L.P.G. vessels of the type and size 
built at Govan using 1 million manhours. This, in simple 
terms, meant that to transform the uncompetitive Govan 
shipyard into a competitive shipbuilding operation, Kvaerner 
had to build their L.P.G. ships at Govan for a similar or 
lesser number of manhours. The target for competitiveness 
for L.P.G.'s was, therefore, established at 1 million 
manhours. At the commencement of the two year time frame, 
beginning with the signing of the 1990 Industrial Relations 
Agreement, there was an indication of the normal Govan 
shipyard performance in L.P.G. vessels.
The bulk of the first of the four L.P.G.'s on the order book 
and a large proportion of the second had been completed. 
The first of the vessels was identified in the shipyard as 
hull number 301 and, on delivery, the manhours taken to 
build the ship were estimated at 2.3 million. This was more 
than twice that taken by the competition and still 1.3 
million manhours in excess of the market place demands.
The challenge of the Kvaerner strategy and, in particular, 
the manpower policies and initiative, was to eliminate these 
excessive manhours over the period of construction allocated 
to the three remaining L.P.G. vessels. The strategy's 
effectiveness, as measured by the reducing manhour content 
of the Govan built L.P.G., is illustrated in figure 14.7.
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From the 'normal shipyard performance' of 2.3 million 
manhours in 3 01, the manhours taken to build 3 02 was reduced 
to 1.75 million and a further reduction to 1.45 million 
manhours for 3 03. The forcast was that the manhour content 
of 304, due for delivery in March 1993, would show a further 
reduction and would be in the region of 1 million manhours. 
Consequently, in terms of competitiveness, the Govan 
shipyard is on target to build their quality ships at market 
levels.
This is supported by the fact that they succeeded in 
securing the biggest shipping order placed in the UK and 
valued at £380 million for 5 chemical carrying vessels, the 
last 4 of which were confirmed on 19th December 1991.
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"The biggest merchant shipping order placed in the 
UK for several years has secured the jobs of 2,000 
workers at the Govan yard, on the Clyde, for the 
next three years." (Evans 1991).
The order was won in the tough international market place 
and the Govan shipyard fought off competition from 70 other 
shipyards throughout the international shipbuilding 
community. Kvaerner Govan succeeded in gaining the 
contracts and, in so doing, securing the future of the Upper 
Clyde's last remaining merchant shipyard.
CHAPTER 15 CONCLUSIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
This thesis has attempted to provide an account of the 
approaches to manpower utilisation adopted and practiced at 
the Govan shipyard as it progressed through different 
economic, managerial and organisational phases. This 
detailed account was framed in terms of four different 
'models' of manpower utilisation identified as:-
1. The Classical Approach.
2. The Scientific Management Approach.
3. The Flexible Working Approach.
4. The New Realism Approach.
These four successive models reflect different phases in the 
development of the shipyard, each in their own way 
responding to different technologies, different economic and 
market circumstances and different organisational forms. 
The models were, of course, not discrete, but the 
progression from one to the next, though continuous in time, 
represented a move to a new paradigm.
Part of the purpose of the thesis has been to develop 
conceptual models which can be used analytically to 
understand the processes of change and the significance of 
the successive moves from one approach to manpower 
utilisation to another. A framework borrowed from Douma and 
Schreuder (1992), who draw on the work of others, notably 
Coase. (1937) and Mintzberg (1989), was used to establish a 
conceptual model for this purpose.
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In concluding this thesis, we wish to underline the 
significant differences among the four models of manpower 
utilisation identified in the foregoing chapters. We would 
argue that they do, indeed, represent distinctive models 
with key differences in their approach. These have been 
discussed in detail in earlier chapters but here it is 
worthwhile spelling out, a little more clearly, in what 
respects they differ and this is the first main purpose of 
this chapter.
Secondly, we have developed and used a conceptual framework 
to help us understand the changes between models. In 
retrospect we need to ask whether this framework has served 
its purpose adequately. To address these questions the 
conclusions will be set within the context of some 
literature relating to organisational effectiveness and 
human resource management and the 'conceptual framework' 
will be used to draw conclusions on and to explain, on a 
model by model basis, the developments associated with the 
individual approaches.
2. THE CLASSICAL APPROACH
During the nineteenth and into the twentieth century, the 
Govan shipyard adopted and developed this approach in 
response to changing technological and economic 
circumstances. Technology had enabled ships to be built 
from iron and steel instead of wood. Steam power had 
replaced sail as the principal means of ship propulsion and 
shipbuilding tasks and functions were carried out more 
productively by power generated machines rather than by the 
muscular physical efforts of the shipyard workers.
From the economic point of view, the competitive demands of 
the iron and steel shipbuilding market place, as distinct 
from those of the old wood using industry, meant that the 
shipyard could only achieve profitability if it took account 
of technological advances.
These advances led to major changes being made to the way 
the shipyard workers were utilised and organised. The 
multi-skilled craftsman give way to trade specialists. New 
machine related skills had to be learned for preparation, 
shaping, cutting and fabricating of metal.
What emerged was the approach to manpower utilisation based 
on specialisation we have defined above, as 'The Classical 
Approach', discussed as 'model one' in Chapters 4 and 5. 
The degree of specialism was limited, however:
"While increasing specialisation of the workforce 
in the British shipbuilding industry from the mid 
19th century onwards acted to narrow the range of 
tasks an individual worker was called upon to 
perform and so decrease skill requirements, it is 
important not to confuse this specialism with the 
more extreme forms of the division of labour 
associated with e.g. Adam Smith's example of the 
pin manufacturing." (Lorenz 1991 Page Ref.54).
Lorenz's point is well taken. The iron and steel 
shipbuilding industry was more complex than that of pin 
manufacturing and this meant that it was not possible to 
specialise shipyard manpower to the extent that a worker 
repeatedly performed one simple task at one location in the 
production process. The division of labour in shipbuilding 
therefore had a much broader occupational or craft base and 
to this extent the emphasis was on work group rather than 
individual specialisation.
Using the framework borrowed from Douma and Schreuder 
(1992), illustrated in figure 15.1, it is possible to 
present some conclusions and explain what the management at 
Govan were trying to do by moving to work group 
specialisation and adopting the classical approach to 
manpower utilisation.
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THE FRAMEWORK 
(MODEL ONE)
Division of Labour 
(Dividing the Skills of the Multi-Skilled Crafts)
Specialisation 
(The Creation of Specialist Trade Structures)
Co-ordination 
(Direct Supervision)
Market Organisation
(Hire and Fire) (Piece Work Systems)
SOURCE: Based on Douma & Schreuder (1992)
Figure 15.1
In shipbuilding, division of labour occurred when the skills 
of the multi-skilled shipwrights, who built the old wooden 
ships and those of the boilermakers who constructed the 
steam generated boilers that provided the energy for ship 
propulsion, were divided into a number of specialist trades. 
This narrowed the job content and made the job easier to 
learn.
"By defining jobs narrowly and making each job 
easy to learn many firms obtain increased 
productivity through specialisation and through 
the interchangeability of workers with limited 
skills and experience rather than training workers 
to become multi-skilled." (Lynch 1991 Page 
Ref.9).
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This degree of specialisation brought about the shipbuilding 
craft and trade structure and from the multi-skilled craft 
of boilermaking alone emerged the individual trades of 
Platers, Riveters, Drillers, Caulkers, Template Makers, 
Markers Off and Welders. Each trade was allocated a range 
of tasks and trade boundaries were established for the 
individual trades. Thus multi-skilling gave way to trade 
specialisation which allowed for efficiency and productivity 
gains. However, with this increased specialisation our 
conceptual framework suggests there is a need for 
co-ordination to arrange a network of exchange between the 
specialists.
Mintzberg (1989) provides a technology of organisation which 
enables us to distinguish the form of co-ordination 
associated with our trade specialisation as being that of 
'direct supervision'. The foreman provided this and knew 
exactly what authority and responsibility he had in this 
role. He co-ordinated the work of the specialist workers by 
issuing orders and instructions and his authority stemmed 
from the fact that he could influence the workers employment 
prospects and earning levels.
In terms of influencing employment prospects the foreman had 
authority to regulate the numerical strength of the 
workforce and 'hire and fire' manpower in line with the 
demands of the shipbuilding market place. The foreman 
decided if workers were suitable for employment or if they 
were to be fired. This 'hire and fire' policy was important 
and enabled the shipyard to utilise its manpower 
effectively. This policy was made possible by the fact that 
the Govan shipyard was located in a district where 
shipbuilding was the principal industrial sector in the 
economy. (And, indeed, this concentrated market for 
shipbuilding labour, with its specialist trades, was common 
in all the main shipbuilding areas of Britain down to the 
1960s and 1970s).
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"An individual employer could use a 'hire and 
fire' policy without risking permanent loss of 
skilled labour for the district, as it was 
generally possible for a worker to find comparable 
employment with another firm." (Lorenz 1991 Page 
Ref.62) .
Thus workers 'fired' from Govan could find work in another 
nearby shipyard and did not have to leave the district or 
search for work outwith their trade. In this way there was 
a well developed external labour market for shipbuilding 
workers, providing a mobile supply of manpower that simply 
moved from yard to yard as the need arose. The 
organisational forms associated with direct supervision 
were, in this case, closely limited and complementary to, 
the external labour market.
Another option available to the foreman, in his 
co-ordination role, was his ability to influence his workers 
earnings level through his control of the incentive payment 
systems such as 'piece work'. This control also enabled him 
to influence the workers individual performance. Through 
the piece work system he allocated work on the basis of 
skill and determined the rates of pay, controlled quality 
and workmanship and ensured that the job progressed to plan.
In terms of our conceptual framework, therefore, the 
classical approach, depicted as model one, took as its start 
point the broader based skills of the shipwrights and the 
boilermakers. It divided these skills into a number of 
specialist trades and created a shipbuilding craft and trade 
structure with boundaries that defined 'who does what'. 
Co-ordination was provided by powerful foremen who utilised 
the external labour market through their 'hire and fire' 
policy to regulate their manpower requirements and utilised 
incentive payment systems to organise work. The classical 
approach thus combined both internal oganisational controls 
with free use of a well-developed specialist labour market.
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3. THE SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT APPROACH
This approach was a modified form of scientific management, 
reliant on industrial engineering techniques, allied to a 
participative approach to industrial relations. The 
Shipyard's adoption of the approach was directly related to 
economic circumstances, technology and product market 
conditions and management desire. The problems of manpower 
utilisation and industrial relations had inhibited economic 
growth. Govan had become an unprofitable and uncompetitive 
shipyard. Uncompetitive shipyards elsewhere were closing. 
By 1965 eight of the Upper Clyde's 13 yards had already 
closed and the Govan Shipyard itself was on the brink of 
closure. Significant changes in technology and product 
market conditions took place after World War II in world 
shipbuilding.
"Ships became larger and more standardised. The 
rapid increase in world demand for ships in 
combination with new, more capital-intensive 
technology based on welding and prefabrication 
encouraged often dramatic increase in the scale of 
production with significant variations between 
stages of ship construction, the result was 
increasing routinization of work and its 
simplification through mechanisation." (Lorenz 
1991 Page Ref.96).
The new management of the Shipyard wanted to conduct an 
'industrial experiment' at Govan. This 'experiment' 
involved new management techniques; new communications 
systems and industrial relationships were established, 
requiring age old traditions and customs to be set aside. 
Counter productive attitudes were challenged and 
productivity agreements concluded locally. Management, in a 
sense, sought to re-establish competitiveness and raise 
efficiency by sharing control: shop stewards were given a
role in management processes. As a result the direct 
supervisory control of the foreman was broken down and 
displaced.
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Using our 'Conceptual Framework' it is possible to draw a 
number of conclusions on what the new management were trying 
to do. In our terms they were adopting a scientific 
management approach not, perhaps, of the Taylorist variety 
common in the early twentieth century, but one modified by 
an 'enlightened' industrial relations approach which aimed 
to increase workforce and union participation in the 
production and managerial processes. This framework, 
illustrated in figure 15.2, is used to present conclusions 
on the manpower utilisation and industrial relations 
problems they faced.
THE FRAMEWORK 
(MODEL ONE - PROBLEMS)
Division of Labour
Specialisation 
(Demarcation entrenched and 
supported by trade unions)
Co-ordination 
(Manpower Inhibitions: Foreman 
power reduced by union strength)
I I .Market Organisation
(Redundancies (Piece work system
and reduced breaking down as a
alternative result of friction
employment) at bargaining among
demarcated groups)
SOURCE: This and the following 'Framework' charts are variants of the 
basic scheme provided by Douma & Schreuder (1992)
Figure 15.2
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The historical division of labour had created trade 
specialisation which gave way to trade demarcation and
restrictive working practices, bound in by custom and,
latterly, by the protection afforded to them by trade unions 
support. With changes in design and materials, on a 
continuing basis, conflict and dispute arose between the
various trades over 'who does what' as one trade group
repelled an encroachment of another over their demarcated 
boundaries. Industrial relationships between the individual 
trade groups (even within a single union) and between the 
workers and management was poor and lacked trust and 
co-operation.
"The effect of such disputes was to generate a 
high degree of distrust over any proposed change 
in institutional arrangements that threatened to 
alter the established division of labour between 
the groups of skilled workers." (Lorenz 1991 Page 
Ref. No.71).
Co-ordination of manpower, essential to any efficient 
manpower system, was inhibited by this demarcation and the 
distrust and lack of co-operation associated with it. The 
specialist tradesman was unable to progress work without the 
services of workers from a different trade. A plater 
fairing a butt, for example, in addition to a helper 
required the services of a welder to tack and a burner to 
remove obstructions. Four workers to do a job that the 
plater, but for demarcation, was able to carry out by 
himself. Co-ordination was also inhibited by the fact that 
each of the tradesmen had a different specialist foreman. 
The result of these restrictions was that productivity was 
low, inefficiency was rife, overmanning widespread and the 
shipyard increasingly uncompetitive and unprofitable, in an 
era when overseas competition was rapidly growing.
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Market forces also contributed to the co-ordination 
inhibitions. The closure of eight of the Upper Clyde 
shipyards damaged the 'hire and fire' option. Shipyard 
workers 'fired' from Govan no longer readily picked up 
a job at the nearby shipyard. Instead they faced the 
prospect of unemployment or seeking alternative 
employment outwith the district or industry.
During the 1960's the casual nature of employment 
(hire and fire) became a focal point of discontent 
amongst workers. As the 1960's progressed this 
increasingly resulted in the loss of skilled 
labour to other industrial sectors offering a 
greater degree of employment security." (Lorenz 
1991 Page Ref. 119).
Thus redundancy and lack of job security were industrial 
relations issues which inhibited co-ordination. The decline 
of the Upper Clyde industry was a contributory factor in 
this.
In the mid - 1960's the new management response to those
associated manpower utilisation and industrial relations 
problems was the adoption of an approach defined here as 
Scientific Management which sought to ally a disciplined 
management approach to work control with a participative 
approach to industrial relations. This approach was 
discussed as model two, in chapters 6 and 7.
Our 'Conceptual Framework', illustrated in 15.3 enables us 
to draw conclusions on what the management were attempting 
to do.
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THE FRAMEWORK 
(MODEL TWO)
Division of Labour
Specialisation 
(Trade Specialists Limited Flexibility)
Co-ordination 
(Standardisation of Work Process)
Market 
(Reduced Importance: 
Greater reliance on 
Employment Security, 
Lower Manhours)
Organisation 
(Industrial Engineering 
Allied to Participative 
Industrial Relations)
Figure 15.3
The scientific management approach took as its start point 
the division of labour and the presence of the specialist 
craft and trade structure now backed up by trade union 
power. It departed from the classical approach:
i) By extending the skills of the specialist to 
include those required for a limited form of 
flexible working.
ii) By replacing the direct supervision approach 
by a work standardisation system developed by 
the industrial engineers.
iii) By seeking to replace the unstable payment 
system by a form of measured daywork.
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iv) Seeking to regain management control by 
sharing power in the workplace with workers 
and their union representatives.
i) Skill Flexibility:
A plater, for example, through training extended his skills 
to enable limited tack welding and burning to be performed.
"This creates a new type of flexibility in the 
workplace which is more comparable with rapid
technology and new production techniques-----
Broader skills training for all workers reduces 
the need for supervision and allows the day to day 
management of the firm to be performed." (Lorenz 
1991 Page Ref. 140).
Limited trade flexibility aimed to ease the manpower 
utilisation problems caused by trade demarcation: area
supervision was adopted to ease the manpower inhibitions 
caused by specialist trade foremen and the associated 
difficulties of co-ordination.
ii) Standardisation of Work Process:
The most noticeable change, however, in terms of our 
conceptual framework was in the method of co-ordination. 
Direct supervision was replaced by a form of co-ordination 
distinguished by Mintzberg (1989) as 'standardisation of 
work process' which sought to achieve co-ordination by 
specifying the work process of the shipyard workers carrying 
out inter-relating tasks. The standards and instructions 
were developed by industrial engineers and based on time and 
motion studies. This process of work standardisation and 
instruction was one of the cornerstones of the scientific 
management approach given that the aim was to introduce new 
management techniques, communication systems and industrial 
relationships which sought to ally a management approach to 
work control with a participative approach to industrial 
relations.
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iii) Participative Industrial Relations:
Standardisation of work process was seen, therefore, as a 
means of achieving the standards of work and output which 
the market demanded. This could not, however, be achieved 
in a purely technical way because management faced a long 
established workforce culture based on the crafts on which 
the industry was built, and entrenched by the activities of 
the shop stewards in policing their work areas. Hence the 
need for participative industrial relations and a role for 
the shop stewards in management processes.
This and the replacement of direct supervision as the means 
of co-ordination had major implications for the role of the 
foreman. His ability to influence employment, earnings and 
performance diminished. The hire and fire policy; control 
of planning, manpower resourcing, quality, performance and 
discipline were allocated to service departments. Formal 
authority associated with the job diminished and management 
and shop floor influence eroded with the onset of the shop 
stewards participation in management processes.
iv) Withdrawal of Incentive Payment Systems:
Incentive payment systems had been part of the control 
mechanisms traditionally used to secure desired output 
levels. Fractional bargaining in the yard at work group 
level, undertaken by the shop stewards, had bypassed the 
foremen and helped to create wage escalation and chaotic 
wage structures such as the Donovan Commission complained of 
in 1968. This was to be replaced by a measured day work 
system which sought to control the chaos.
A significant 'sea-change' took place within the shipyard as 
a result of the 'experiment' and the adoption of updated 
scientific management approaches.
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The most significant, in terms of manpower utilisation, was 
the popularisation of productivity agreements and the 
emergence of a shop steward movement which converted an 
acquired power base into a platform of authority that 
enabled them to influence the shipyard management's decision 
making process and to influence the attitudes of the 
shipyards workforce.
"However sceptically the Fairfield (Govan) 
experiment was viewed at the time by the majority 
of employers, and however ambiguous the results, 
it was significant in popularising the concept of 
productivity bargaining in shipbuilding." (Lorenz 
1991 Page Ref. 120).
But, we would argue, it also contained the seeds of future 
problems which could only be eradicated by management 
winning back the right to manage. That would require not 
only a credible plan for effective manpower utilisation but 
also a redrawing of the lines of industrial relationships 
between management and unions.
4. THE FLEXIBLE WORKING APPROACH
Whatever the outcome of the Fairfield experiment might have 
been, we shall never know for it was overtaken by events, 
specifically the Government's initiatives which led, firstly 
to the inclusion of the Govan Shipyard in the ill-fated 
Upper Clyde Shipbuilding and, secondly to the 
Nationalisation of British Shipbuilding and the inclusion of 
the Govan Yard in a new nationalised corporation in 1977. 
The latter initiative produced a new approach governed by 
the centralised nature of the new nationalised organisation 
seeking to face up to the problems of a national industry 
undergoing continuing decline.
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Shipyards throughout the United Kingdom were closing. What 
remained of the industry was on the verge of extinction. 
The surviving shipyards, including Govan, were unprofitable. 
The U.K.'s share of the international market had crumbled. 
Competition was cut-throat. Productivity levels of U.K. 
shipyards were uncompetitive. In technological terms, 
plant, equipment and facilities were inferior to that of the 
foreign competition. Little or no investment had been made 
in new technology. What little modern technology had been 
introduced was rejected by shipyard workers anxious about 
their jobs, or used inefficiently because of excessive 
manning.
Direct shipbuilding jobs in the U.K. were reduced to 87,000 
from 290,000 between the period 1948 to 1978. Unemployment 
in shipbuilding communities were above the national average 
and rising. Shipbuilding capacity, although dramatically 
reduced, exceeded demand and further job losses and shipyard 
closures were imminent. Suspicion and fear was rife. Trust 
and confidence between workers and management had all but 
disappeared.
Our 'Conceptual Framework', illustrated in figure 15.4, 
enables us to present, in a Govan context, a number of 
conclusions on the status of Model Two, at the time of 
nationalisation.
THE FRAMEWORK 
(MODEL TWO - THE PROBLEMS)
Division of Labour
Specialisation
(Demarcation)
Co-ordination 
(Manpower Constraints)
Market 
(Reduced role)
Organisation 
(Shop Stewards Control)
figure 15.4
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The limited flexibility associated with the specialist trade 
structure, a major feature of the scientific management
approach had ended by the time that the shipyard was
nationalised.
Manpower co-ordination was inhibited by the return of trade 
demarcation, overmanning, restrictive working practices and 
by a powerful shop steward movement whose support for these 
inhibitions was based on the logic that it saved jobs.
•'From the perspective of the shop floor and the 
individual craftsman, the logic of job control as 
a strategy to protect future job opportunities
remained intact." (Lorenz 1991 Page Ref. 119).
Rather than save jobs these inhibitions were responsible for 
job losses and shipyard closures given that they were a 
principal factor of uncompetitiveness.
"Foremost was the severity of the crisis, as 
increasingly effective foreign competition forced 
the number of major producers to close. The
employers identified restrictive union practices 
as a principal cause of the significant 
productivity differences between British and 
continental producers." (Lorenz 1991 Page Ref.
118) .
Thus the issue of co-ordination inhibitions was critical. 
From a market perspective lack of competitiveness meant 
insufficient orders. Shipyards without orders closed and 
those remaining reduced manpower. Massive job losses and 
redundancies were common place and this created insecurity 
for those remaining in work and a further weakening of the 
role of the external market for shipbuilding labour as 
redundant workers sought jobs elsewhere in the economy. 
This thinking was short term: current job protection was all 
that seemed to matter. Future job security, through 
increased competitiveness, was not an evident priority.
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Co-ordination was also inhibited by confusion. This was due 
to the demise of the strategy whereby co-ordination was 
achieved by standardisation of work process. 'Direct 
Supervision' was not an alternative due to the erosion of 
supervisory and management authority. The vacuum which 
existed was loosely filled by the shop stewards who carried 
out management tasks and whose participation in the 
management decision making process enabled them to regulate 
manpower utilisation policy and practice.
Nationalisation changed this. A centralised approach to 
organisation allied to a flexible working approach to 
manpower utilisation was established. Our 'conceptual 
framework' illustrated in 15.5, enables us to draw a number 
of conclusions on what the management of the nationalised 
industry were trying to do by adopting this approach.
THE FRAMEWORK 
(MODEL THREE)
Division of Labour
Specialisation 
(Trade Specialisation and Limited Flexibility)
Co-ordination 
(Standardisation of Skills and 
Attempted Standardisation of Norms)
Market 
(Restricted use of 
temporary workers 
& subcontractors as 
aid to flexibility)
Organisation 
(Centralised Control 
Standardisation of Policy 
Implemented by means of 
Nationalised I.R. Process)
Figure 15.5
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The co-ordination, control and direction of all shipyards 
throughout the U.K. was centralised and placed under the 
management of headquarter staff. As such, the shipyards 
lost their right of self determination. The centralised 
staff decided marketing, investment, financial management 
and personnel policies. They decided which of the shipyards 
traded and which closed, who reduced manpower and by how 
many. They held, in their hands, the fate of the shipyards 
and controlled the mechanisms to make or break them. The 
coordination activity was effectively removed to a higher 
organisational plane, the question being whether the 
mechanism of control could fill the void left at individual 
shipyard level.
Manpower utilisation policies were developed at the centre 
and incorporated into national industrial relations 
agreements concluded by headquarter staff and the 
nationalised trade union officials. This bypassed the 
powerful shop stewards and overcame resistance from local 
management. The new manpower policies challenged the 
traditional working practices and were based on a flexible 
working approach to manpower utilisation.
The specialist trade structures remained at the heart of the 
flexible working approach but to enable a greater degree of 
manpower mobility and to ease co-ordinational inhibitions 
forms of functional and numerical flexibility were added. 
The concept was good but support agreements for these were 
cumbersome and bureaucratic, a charter for continued 
dialogue between local managers and shop stewards neither of 
whom were the owners of the agreements.
The co-ordination of manpower was based on the policies 
emanating from these centralised agreements. This conforms 
to Mintzberg's (1989), standardisation of skills allied to 
standardisation of norms.
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The policies took account of the uncompetitive nature of the 
U.K. shipyards and their declining share of the 
international market. Thus the annual round of industrial 
relations and pay bargaining became closely linked with 
changes to working practices and restructuring proposals. 
National agreements were associated with the organisation of 
manpower and shipyard closures and job losses were 
associated with pay increases.
The approach to manpower utilisation was confused. On the 
one hand policies were introduced to improve shipyard 
competitiveness and on the other restructuring proposals to 
close shipyards and create job losses. Workers annually 
were asked to radically alter their 'job saving' working 
practices to improve competitiveness, yet they had no reason 
to believe that their job or the shipyard was secure for the 
duration of the agreements - improve the shipyard's 
competitiveness one day and close it the next was the 
perceived theme. This confusion gave rise to distrust 
between the local shipyard management and the centralised 
staff and between management and the workforce. Motivation, 
initiative and morale in the shipyard was low and the 
attitudes of those who worked at Govan reflected this.
Arguably, the nationalised approach was fundamentally 
flawed, managing such a massive operation from the centre 
proved not to be viable. Standardisation and uniformity of 
policy implementation, in a complex industry with diverse 
problems and management styles, was never a suitable option. 
A shipyard, such as Govan, had unique problems and required 
a management who understood the uniqueness of these and 
could resolve them. The scientific management approach 
adopted at the yard in the 1960's proved that a localised 
initiative could secure progress. Changes, many similar to 
those of the flexible working were made and productivity and 
competitive levels improved.
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There is nothing to suggest that industrial relations 
agreements and the flexible working approach, based as it 
was on a concept akin to that of Atkinson's 'Flexible Firm', 
were unsound. In fact the reverse is true and conceptually 
the approach to flexible working is credible. 
Unfortunately, the effectiveness was inhibited by the 
remoteness of the centralised approach and the resistance 
and distrust created by this and the undoubted fact that 
U.K. shipbuilding capacity exceeded demand.
5. THE NEW REALISM APPROACH
Kvaerner's acquisition of the Govan shipyard and the 
adoption of the new realism approach to manpower utilisation 
was based on economic and market considerations. 
Economically, the yard was a loss accumulating business 
disaster. Annual losses were in excess of £40 million. The 
yard was available for privatisation at a modest price. 
Financial arrangements were available to the new owner for 
restructuring, redundancy and retraining costs. A cost-plus 
workload provided a protected lead-in period, E.C. subsidy 
and attractive shipbuilding mortgage facilities were
available to attract potential customers. Market research 
indicated an upturn in the shipbuilding market by Mid 
1990's. The shipping market was changing with more
sophisticated cargos transported by sea. Owners were
planning to replace their aging fleets with more technology 
based and safety conscious vessels. A shortage of
shipbuilding capacity world wide and a perceived demand for 
new builds presented profitable market opportunities.
Kvaerner had a long and profitable association with
shipbuilding in Norway for over a century and a belief that,
with appropriate investment and changes to manpower
policies, ships would be built profitably at Govan. Much 
had to be done to enable this uncompetitive shipyard to take 
advantage of these profitable market opportunities.
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A decade of nationalisation had left the yard riddled with 
inefficiency, complacency and ineffectiveness. Manpower 
utilisation was constrained by restrictive working 
practices, demarcation and overmanning. Managers and the 
workforce were inhibited by their traditional values. 
National agreements had not led to improvements in manpower 
utilisation and industrial relations agreements were not 
implemented for a sustained period.
The result of this was that ineffectiveness accounted for 
50% of productive time and absenteeism levels were in excess 
of 22%. Morale, commitment and motivation were at an all 
time low. These were symptoms of a demoralised workforce 
who had lost faith in their ability to build ships 
competitively in a profitable environment and instead looked 
upon Govan as a government 'loss maker' providing a socially 
responsible function.
Our 'conceptual framework', illustrated in figure 15.6, 
enables us to present conclusions on the status of the 
nationalised industry's flexible working approach to 
manpower utilisation at the time of the acquisition.
THE FRAMEWORK 
(MODEL THREE - THE PROBLEMS)
Division of Labour
Specialisation 
(Flexible Working but Inhibited by Shop Stewards)
Co-ordination 
(Centralised, Remote, Manpower Inhibitions)
i--------------— --------------1
Market Organisation
(Lack of local management control, 
shop steward power and involvement 
in labour management, absenteeism 
reflecting indiscipline and low 
morale).
Figure 15.6
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Attempts by management to implement flexible working were 
challenged by shop stewards intent on protecting 'their 
department members' by preserving the specialist trade 
structures. Shipyard workers were instructed by stewards, 
at departmental meetings and in the workplace, on what they 
could and could not do. Management were helpless, in such 
circumstances, and this gave rise to a reluctance, on the 
part of management, to implement the principal elements of 
the flexible working approach. This restricted manpower 
co-ordination but it was not the only inhibition. The
standardisation and uniformity of policy implementation, the 
cornerstone of the centralised approach proved problematic. 
Local management and shop stewards had difficulties with
ownership of national agreements and policies. Management 
were never quite sure of interpretation and application and 
shop steward created 'department rules' to nullify the 
effectiveness.
Co-ordination was also curtailed by the workforces' poor 
attitude and commitment to work. The symptoms of this were 
evident in the exceptionally high levels of absenteeism and 
poor health and safety and quality performances. One in 
four of the workforce were not at their work every day and
the effectiveness of those who were, was constrained by the
high number of accidents and quality failures. Work 
programmes had to be re-arranged because of this and the 
organisation of the shipyard's manpower was seriously 
affected.
The shop stewards involvement in the organisation of shift 
working and in the management of overtime working 
arrangements, a relic of the scientific management approach, 
inhibited co-ordination. Shifts were voluntary and organised 
to suit the social and leisure needs of the shipyard workers 
rather than contractual and market circumstances. 
Management of overtime working arrangements by the shop 
stewards gave rise to inefficiency, confusion and 
confrontation. Thus management's inability to organise the 
hours of work to suit the production programme seriously 
handicapped manpower co-ordination.
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Kvaerner's response to these and other problems of manpower 
utilisation and industrial relations was the adoption of the 
new 'realism approach', discussed in chapters 10 to 14. 
What emerged was an 'industrial revolution' whereby an 
uncompetitive loss making shipyard, with a demoralised 
workforce and management, was transformed into one of 
Scotland's most successful companies with an export order 
book valued at £380 million and a 2.5 year workload. The 
strategy responsible for this transformation, developed and 
implemented in 3 years, changed the work ethic, shipyard 
culture, workforce attitudes and industrial relationships. 
It increased the competence and effectiveness of the 
workforce and management and provided the base on which 
competitiveness was improved.
Our 'conceptual framework', illustrated in figure 15.7, 
enables us to draw a number of conclusions on what the 
management were doing by adopting the new realism approach.
Division of Labour 
(Reduced, reflecting reduced extent of Product Market)
Specialisation 
(Modified, using fully flexible trade specialists, 
following up-grading of skills and training)
THE FRAMEWORK
(MODEL FOUR)
Co-ordination 
Direct Supervision (restored)
Market Organisation
i
(Free access to labour 
market subcontracting 
work new training 
programmes for 
entrants.)
(Resumption of management's 
right to manage: Redress
of power in I.R: Management
regulated deployment of 
working hours and manpower.)
Figure 15. 7
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The approach took, as its start point, the restoration of 
supervisory/management authority and the erosion of the shop 
stewards control over the workforce. The guiding 
proposition was that management and not the shop stewards 
were responsible for the pace of change taking place in the 
shipyard. As such, they should not be inhibited by the 
stewards from making decisions or taking actions that would 
increase shipyard competitiveness.
This approach contrasted starkly with that pursued 
previously in the shipyard. The shop stewards had extended 
joint regulation, to include involvement in a range of 
management processes, without any implied accountability. 
They had the power and authority to flout agreements in the 
interest of job demarcation and overmanning, thus inhibiting 
manpower co-ordination, productivity and shipyard 
competitiveness.
Changing the prevailing industrial relations system and the 
attitudes and values within it was, therefore, the key to 
unlocking the door to co-ordinational inhibitions and lost 
productivity, the principal factors of the shipyard's 
uncompetitiveness. The system had been unable to cope with 
contentious changes to working practices. It ignored 
economic reality, it lacked accountability and credibility. 
Overcoming this required a shift in the balance of power. 
Management required to regain control against the prevailing 
culture but much depended on management's ability to replace 
the prevailing shop steward controlled communications system 
with one that enabled them to deal directly with employees 
and, thereby, influence the attitudes of the workforce.
Thus management confronted the contentious issues inhibiting 
co-ordination and, when necessary, took on the shop 
stewards. New methods of communication were established and 
the role of the shop stewards in co-ordinating manpower 
utilisation and change was reduced. Management by 
concession was no longer a tolerable option.
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Kvaerner were committed to working with the recognised trade 
unions in a responsible way and within an industrial 
relations framework, provided accountability of the union 
and their respresentatives was properly defined by procedure 
acceptable to management. The aim was to establish a 
culture of union recognition with accountability, ensuring 
that agreements would be honoured on both sides. Collective 
bargaining, therefore, was still the recognised process by 
which rules associated with manpower utilisation and 
practices were made and unions and workers rights regulated 
by management. But the scope of union control was reduced 
and management's right to manage important areas affecting 
manpower co-ordination restored. In a sense the key to 
co-ordination and to implementing the manpower utilisation 
changes, lay as much in the collective bargaining process as 
in the direct solutions themselves.
In terms of our 'conceptual framework' the type of 
co-ordination mechanism adopted would be distinguished by 
Mintzberg (1989) as being 'Direct Supervision', whereby the 
supervisor issued orders and instruction to a group of 
shipyard workers whose tasks inter-related. Thus for the 
first time in (at least) a decade, supervisors and managers
had restored to them a positive and active role in the
co-ordination of manpower and management of the shipyard
change processes. This involved identifying and quantifying 
the factors inhibiting manpower co-ordination and proposing 
'actions' that would remove these inhibitions and, thereby , 
improve productivity and shipyard competitiveness.
The 'actions' were incorporated into industrial relations 
agreements negotiated between management and shop stewards 
and accepted by the workforce. Action programmes were
established, progress monitored and results fed back to 
management, unions and workers. Thus ownership of the 
change process and agreements and the accountability for 
actions was established within the parties to industrial 
relations at yard level.
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The 'action programmes' incorporated into the 1990 and 1991 
industrial relations agreements, initially maximised the 
manhours available for productive use and influenced the 
shipyard's 'work ethic', by tackling the problems of 
managerial discipline and control of working hours. 
Thereafter, the problems of how best to use or organise the 
shipyard's manhours and manpower were addressed. The 
actions are illustrated in figure 15.8.
IMPROVING 
MANPOWER EFFECTIVENESS
INVESTMENT RECOVER LOST
—
MANHOURS
Plant Manpower Policies
Equipment Working Practices
Facilities Absenteeism
PERFORMANCE — --to* ORGANISATION
Trained Workforce Shifts
Supervisors Overtime
Discipline Structure
Communications
Initiative
1[
INCENTIVE
Motivation Commitment
Job Security Morale
Trust Confidence
SOURCE: Gordon (1992)
Figure 15.8
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The new realism approach has proved successful to date. It 
enabled restraints on co-ordination to be removed and 
manpower effectiveness to be improved. Govan is now on the 
brink of profitability and its competitiveness was 
sufficient to secure contracts valued at £380 million in the 
international shipbuilding market place. These new 
contracts afford the workforce a degree of job security and 
an opportunity to continue the process of transforming the 
shipyard. The basis of this was put in place with the 
signing of the 1993 industrial relations agreement which 
integrates the needs and values of the employees with that 
of the company's goals - illustrated in figure 15.9.
OBJECTIVES 
"Integrate the needs and values of the 
employees with company goals."
Needs and Values 
Employees
Job Security 
(now and future)
Remuneration 
(wages, pensions, 
sick pay)
Personal Fulfilment 
(opportunity for 
advancement, 
incentive)
Training
(skills & knowledge)
Working Conditions 
(health, safety & 
environment)
Company Goals
Produce quality 
product, at a 
competitive price, 
within the time 
frame set by 
customer - 
profitably
SOURCE: Gordon (1992) Figure 15.9
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This has been addressed within an 'initiative framework'
whereby the emphasis is on improving commitment, motivation,
trust and confidence of the workforce and related to the 
timely delivery of quality ships to the customers 
satisfaction.
In conclusion a summary of the four models of manpower
utilisation is illustrated in figure 15.10.
THE FOUR MODELS
MODEL
The Classical Approach
(a) Ingredients
Increased division of 
labour.
Limited multi-skilled 
groups.
(b) Outcome
Specialisation 
Craft structure 
Demarcation
ORGANISATION
(a) Co-ordination
Direct Supervision 
through Foreman.
(b) Organisation
Deployment to skills 
Piece work system
(c)(c) Organisation
Entrepreneurial 
The Scientific Management Approach
Market
Hire and Fire
(a) Ingredients
Industrial engineering 
techniques allied to 
a participative 
industrial relations 
approach
(b) Outcome
Standardisation of 
work
Shop stewards involvement 
in management processes
(a) Co-ordination
Direct supervision 
supplanted 
standardisation of 
work processes
(c) Organisation 
Machine
(b) Organisation
withdrawal of 
piece work systems
introduction to 
industrial 
engineering 
techniques
shop stewards
authority
increased
(c) Market
Restriction on 
hire and fire
BREAKDOWN FACTORS
Contracting markets for 
products (ships) - 
reducing profitability.
Shop stewards control of 
management processes 
co-ordination function 
lost to management.
Fairfield experiment ended 
abruptly - political change 
brought reorganisation 
in the face of declining 
market.
The 'experiment' did not 
fail nor was success proven.
SOURCE: Gordon (1993)
Figure 15.10
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THE FOUR MODELS (CONT'D.)
MODEL ORGANISATION BREAKDOWN FACTORS
3. The Flexible Working Approach
(a) Ingredients
Increased flexible 
working.
Centralised control
(b) Outcomes
Search for control. 
Lack of ownership.
(a) Co-ordination 
Standardisation of 
skill.
Attempted
standardisation of 
norms but from a 
central corporate 
H.Q., without means 
of implementing.
(b) Organisation
Centralised control 
by means of national 
industrial relations 
process.
Stronger trade union 
control.
Decline in U.K. 
share of market.
Level of competitiveness.
Bureaucracy/
over centralisation.
Uncompetitive Govan 
Yard sold off.
(c) Organisation (c) Market
Machine Limited numerical
flexibility.
4. The New Realism Approach
(a) Ingredients
A strategy which 
recognised manpower 
utilisation as a 
principal factor of 
shipbuilding 
competitiveness and 
a belief that ships 
could be built 
prof itably.
(b) Outcome
Restoration of 
managerial authority 
and a redefined role 
for the shop 
stewards.
Common values and 
belief.
Various forms of 
standarisat.’.on.
(c) Organisation 
Entrepreneurial
(a) Co-Ordination
Direct supervision 
restored. 
Decentralised 
control
re-established.
(b) Organisation
Standardisation of 
norms.
Skills upgrading. 
Investment in 
technology.
Return to 
incentives.
(c) Market
Hire and fire 
restored but against 
background of greater 
employment security.
SOURCE: Gordon (1993)
Figure 15.10 (Cont'd.)
The new realism approach has improved manpower utilisation 
in the shipyard and is an important ingredient of Govan's 
competitiveness.There is little doubt that this is not the 
end of the story. Both product and labour markets, as well 
as technology, will continue to change and, as this happens, 
new responses will be needed in corporate strategy, yard 
objectives and in the practice of managing the labour 
process.
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Arguably, the present model has potential for such 
flexibility and, if one were to hazard a guess about the 
direction of change in organisational terms, it would be 
that greater emphasis will be placed on standardisation of 
norms built on trust and mutual adjustment - which may be 
regarded as a relatively high aspiration and, perhaps, 
difficult to achieve.
In reviewing the material in this chapter, we believe that 
it has been demonstrated:-
a) that the models discussed and analysed
earlier are distinctive and that key
characteristics within them can be identified
b) that the conceptual framework has generally
been able to cast light on the nature of the
shifts between models as economic and
technological environments have changed. Of 
particular interest here has been the
changing character of the division of labour 
and specialisation, expanding and then
shrinking as the extent of the market has 
increased and declined. It is also important 
to note that the two alternative forms of 
co-ordination, through the market and through 
internal organisation, have continued to play 
complementary roles as the evolution of the 
models has unrolled, though undoubtedly the 
most interesting areas of change have been in 
the area of internal co-ordination, with an 
eventual return, in Model Four, to the direct 
supervision arrangement characteristic of 
Model One. But other features of the 
organisation and the utilisation of market 
processes have changed in the meantime. 
Hopefully, we can attribute some of our 
understanding of what happened during the 
evolutionary process to the insights provided 
by the conceptual framework.
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